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For the past few years, both academic and trade publications have repeatedly 
found that “social media crises” were at the core of organization fears. This dissertation 
argues that one of most important reasons for such fear is the prevalent use of the term 
“social media crisis” to refer to both crises and risks emerging from social media, which 
obscures the differences between risks and crises and among various types of risks that 
might require different organizational responses. To address this problem, Coombs and 
Holladay proposed the term “paracrisis” to describe more accurately crisis risks as 
socially constructed in social media. They also developed conceptual work on 
classifying paracrisis clusters and response strategies. However, extant crisis 
communication research and practice has largely failed to incorporate this concept.  
The first focus of this dissertation is thus to build on their work to refine and 
expand the framework of paracrisis clusters and response strategies with empirical data 
by collecting and 143 paracrisis cases occurring during January 2014 to December 2017 
(Study 1). The other focus is to examine how might a paracrisis evolve on and off social 
media to gain more sophisticated understanding on how the publics communicatively 
construct a paracrisis and how a paracrisis differs from a full-blown crisis. To serve this 
focus, a big data case study using mainly computational methods has being conducted to 
analyze 210, 892 tweets, along with offline news coverage (Study 2). As such, this 
dissertation contributes to the severely understudied paracrisis communication research 





understanding to paracrisis communication processes as socially constructed on and off 
social media. The research findings also offer practical suggestions for social media 
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The burgeoning growth of social media has presented opportunities to 
organizations as they seek to capitalize on social media’s strengths in low costs, wide 
reach, and immense engagement potential. However, social media, along with the ethos 
guiding communication within social media contexts, may present a double-edged sword 
when the use of social media is seen as conflicting with or impeding those organizational 
objectives. In the participatory environments created through social media, organizations 
are often confronted with crisis risks as any discontented stakeholders can go to social 
media to expose and broadcast what they perceive as a negative organizational behavior.   
Rather than lamenting their loss of control in social media contexts, organizations can 
capitalize on the technological affordances of social media and use them to their 
advantage. However, surveys over the past few years (e.g., ERM Initiative & Protivit, 
2019; Weber Shandwick & KRC Research, 2015) all suggest that many organizations are 
not well prepared for managing risks in and through social media.  
The fundamental reason that managing risks has been challenging for years is that 
many practitioners and scholars do not have clear, precise understandings of the 
uniqueness of crisis risks in social media. Before the prevalence of social media, a crisis 
risk was generally unknown to the publics and could thus be managed largely through an 
internal process. However, a crisis risk in social media is visible to potentially all publics 




Therefore, some form of public responses would be necessary to mitigate a crisis risk 
before it escalates into a crisis. Nevertheless, a crisis risk is not a crisis, and using crisis 
response strategies to manage a crisis risk might not be appropriate.    
Still, for almost a decade, scholars and practitioners alike have used the term 
“social media crisis” to refer to both crisis risks and full-fledged crises that spread on 
social media platforms (e.g., "Speed and scope play key roles in social media crises," 
2009; Aula, 2010; Jahng & Hong, 2017; Oelschig, 2018). The negligence to differentiate 
between crisis risks and actual crises prompted Coombs and Holladay (2012) to address 
this pressing concern. They proposed the term “paracrisis” to refer to “a publicly visible 
crisis threat that charges an organization with irresponsible or unethical behavior” (2012, 
p. 409) and identified possible response strategies to manage a particular type of 
paracrisis, the challenge paracrisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2015b).  Coombs later went on 
to describe additional forms of paracrises that organizations might face, including 
customer service, misuse of social media, and venting (2015a). In a more recent work, 
Coombs (2019) revised the paracrisis typology to include four clusters: (1) faux pas, (2) 
rumor(s), (3) challenge(s), and (4) collateral damage. 
Despite Coombs and Holladay’s important conceptual contribution, the field of 
risk and crisis communication has largely overlooked the concept of paracrisis. Against 
such background, this dissertation seeks to further clarify the distinctions between 
paracrises and crises, among different forms of paracrises, describe paracrisis response 




different from crisis communication during the post-crisis stage. Two separate yet 
interrelated studies were conducted to meet this research goal.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contains five chapters focusing on the concept of paracrisis. The 
present chapter provides a brief introduction, rationale, and overview of the dissertation 
to contextualize and to demonstrate the value of this work. The second chapter reviews 
foundational literature in crisis communication, risk management, social media, and 
paracrisis to demonstrate how the concept of paracrisis adds value to existing crisis 
communication theories.   
Chapter 3 describes Study 1. Building on nascent research on paracrisis, Study 1 
adopts content analysis to build a framework of organizational paracrisis communication. 
Following a systematic identification of a corpus of “social media crises,” a case series 
study is used to refine and elaborate existing typologies of paracrisis clusters and 
paracrisis response strategies, and to connect typologies with response strategies.  
The fourth chapter describes Study 2, an investigation into the evolution of a 
specific paracrisis on social media. Time series analysis and social network analysis are 
used to describe paracrisis development and social media influencers. Finally, the fifth 
chapter presents overall conclusions and implications derived from the two studies of 
paracrisis, discusses limitations as well as future research directions, and presents 






Focus and Rationale for Study 1 
 Research on organizational crisis communication has generated considerable 
interest among scholars as well as practitioners due to the potential negative effects of 
crises. Crises not only violate important stakeholder expectations but may, in some 
situations, endanger the physical and psychological well-being of stakeholders as well as 
the health of the organization in crisis. Though the magnitude of the crisis may influence 
the severity of negative outcomes, researchers note possible negative effects of crisis 
including operational damage, reputational damage, reduced purchase intention, and 
negative word-of-mouth (Coombs, 2019). Origins of crises vary as does perceived 
responsibilities for crises. Though some crises may develop through no fault of the 
organization (e.g., natural disasters, terrorist attacks), other crises vary in the extent to 
which they are attributed to an organization’s actions or inactions (e.g., chemical 
explosions, operational disruptions, safety violations resulting in casualties, management 
misconduct). Thus, the level of the organization’s perceived responsibility for a crisis has 
been used to identify different types of crises (Coombs, 2019). 
Following a crisis, an organization is expected to communicate with stakeholders 
to ensure their safety and to provide an account for the crisis. The type of crisis as well as 
the content of the organization’s communication - its response strategies - are assumed to 
influence stakeholder perceptions and willingness to support the organization as it 
recovers from the crisis. Because response strategies presumably influence the 
organization’s ability to protect important intangible and tangible assets, communication 




The exploding growth of social media has affected all aspects of communication 
with stakeholders, ranging from opportunities for two-way interaction with stakeholders 
and among stakeholders (e.g., active engagement processes and community-building) to 
reliance on more traditional, unidirectional communication such as marketing messages. 
Social media environments also have been examined as potential facilitators of crisis 
risks and crises as well as conduits for crisis response strategies.  
Relevant to this study are the visible, online challenges to organizations that may 
arise due to stakeholder concerns regarding business practices. For instance, stakeholders 
may claim an organization’s supply chain permits exploitation of children or a CEO’s 
behavior constitutes sexism. Because these challenges differ from actual crises, the term 
“paracrisis” has been proposed to describe the crisis risks posed through these online 
challenges. A paracrisis is distinct from a crisis because it signals a possible risk; but it 
does not necessarily portend a crisis. Moreover, some researchers argue the concept of 
paracrisis may offer a panacea to overuse of the term “social media crisis” to describe 
nearly any negative comments or parodies posted by stakeholders in response to an 
organization’s online or offline actions (Coombs 2017).   
As is the case with crisis clusters, several paracrisis clusters have been proposed 
based on the nature of the online challenge (Coombs, 2017; 2018). However, researchers 
who have begun to incorporate the paracrisis concept often do not distinguish between 
paracrisis clusters (e.g., Kim, Zhang, & Zhang, 2016; Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017) and may be 
prone to label any online, negative feedback as a paracrisis or perceive a crisis as a 




should be managed analogously to a crisis, as some researchers tend to test the 
effectiveness of crisis response strategies for paracrisis cases (e.g., Roh, 2017), which 
might actually increase the publics' perceived level of crisis responsibility (Kim et al., 
2016).  
The dearth of research on paracrises and responses to paracrises provides the 
backdrop for Study 1. The aims of this study are two-fold. First, Study 1 seeks to 
describe and categorize paracrisis clusters through the systematic examination of online 
incidents labeled “social media crisis” as well as other negative events that might pose 
crisis risks requiring public responses from organizations. This effort is designed to test 
the external validity of existing paracrisis typologies. Second, to address questions 
concerning the appropriateness of applying crisis response strategies to paracrises 
management, examples of actual organizational responses to the various paracrisis 
clusters previously identified through Study 1 will be examined. Testing and refining 
current typologies for both paracrisis clusters and response strategies supports the utility 
of the distinction between crises and paracrises and clarifies how crisis response 
strategies can be applied and/or adapted to different paracrisis types. 
Three research questions guide Study 1: 
RQ 1: To what extent does the current paracrisis typology describe paracrises 
occurring from January 2014 to December 2017?  
RQ 2: What response strategies did organizations use to address the paracrises 




RQ 3: What single and combined response strategies were used to address 
different paracrisis clusters occurring from 2014 to 2017?  
Focus and Rationale for Study Two  
Study 2 extends the examination of paracrisis by shifting focus to the online 
development of a paracrisis. This study complements current literature by documenting 
the evolution of a specific paracrisis, #DeleteUber. Additionally, it demonstrates the 
viability and usefulness of big data methods in unpacking paracrisis development and 
offers a unique methodological contribution.  
The purpose of Study 1 was to revise the typologies of paracrisis clusters and 
response strategies. The data set for the investigation was created by identifying 
mentions of “social media crises” and protests against organizations that posed online 
risks, and culling the cases. In Study 1, the case series was composed of incidents that 
corresponded with the definition of paracrisis. Thus, these cases were selected because 
they had reached the status of paracrisis and could provide insights for the typology 
modifications. However, neither the data set nor current research can explain exactly how 
online comments escalate into paracrises that can be viewed by other social media users. 
Instead of treating incidents as fait accomplis, Study 2 problematizes the ontology of a 
specific paracrisis and unpacks factors contributing to its evolution.  
 Though researchers claim a paracrisis may unfold on social media in highly 
uncertain and complicated ways, the transformation of an online comment into a 
paracrisis is not well understood. Some researchers suggest online challenges will 




novelty, conflict) and garner traditional media coverage and credibility (Pang, Hassan, & 
Chong, 2014). However, for the purposes of this dissertation, there also is a need to 
understand how online comments can evolve into a paracrisis. This knowledge would 
benefit practitioners who need to monitor and decide if and when to respond to a 
developing paracrisis as well as researchers who seek to identify factors contributing to 
paracrisis evolution. The research questions guiding Study 2 are situated within the 
context of Twitter and address the variables of time, characteristics of social media 
influencers and their networks, and traditional media coverage to better understand if and 
how these factors may influence how a specific paracrisis evolves over time. 
Six research questions guide Study 2: 
RQ 1: How did the #DeleteUber paracrisis evolve over time online on Twitter? 
RQ 2:  Did news coverage from traditional media escalate the evolution of the 
#DeleteUber paracrisis to a crisis status?  
RQ 3: Who are the social media influencers (SMIs) during #DeleteUber on 
Twitter? 
RQ 4: How might their accounts be characterized?  
RQ 5: How might social media influencers (SMIs) change over time during 
#DeleteUber on Twitter?  
RQ 6:  What are representative SMIs’ volumes and extends in spreading their 







Overall, this dissertation examines (1) organizations’ paracrisis communication 
practices by analyzing a large sample of paracrisis cases (Study 1) and (2) the evolution 
of one paracrisis on social media where various SMIs played critical roles in spreading 
their content as related with the paracrisis (Study 2). While Study 1 generates 
comprehensive understandings on paracrisis communication practices by identifying 
typologies on paracrisis clusters and response strategies, and connecting clusters with 
response strategies through examining a corpus of actual paracrisis cases, Study 2 relies 
on a single case study to unveil features of a paracrisis evolution and factors that 
contribute to the process. As such, Study 1 and Study 2 complement each other to further 
understanding on paracrisis communication as an understudied area. Taken together, this 
dissertation offers both theoretical and practical suggestions to paracrisis communication, 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the emerging area of paracrisis 
communication as situated in the larger field of risk and crisis communication. To set the 
overall theoretical ground for this dissertation, the first section of this literature review 
defines terms key to this dissertation, including organizational crisis, crisis management, 
crisis communication, crisis risk, risk management, and risk communication. The 
distinctions between a crisis and crisis risk and between crisis communication and risk 
communication are also discussed in this section. The second section presents an 
overview on important crisis communication theories, including corporate apologia, 
Image Restoration/Repair Theory (IRT), Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT), stealing thunder, Discourse of Renewal Theory (DRT), and Rhetorical Arena 
Theory (RAT). The section also reviews briefly the synergistic and antagonistic effects 
of using combined crisis response strategies together to address a single crisis.  
The third section provides a more detailed discussion on how social media 
complicate risk and crisis communication, traces scholarly as well as trade publication 
articles on practitioners’ struggles to manage risks and crises on social media, and 
explains why the term “social media crisis” might exaggerate crisis risks posed via social 





The fourth section then focuses on the concept of paracrisis and reviews evolving 
definitions of paracrisis, typologies for paracrisis clusters, and response strategies used 
by organizations to address paracrises. Recent empirical studies relevant to paracrisis 
communication are then reviewed. This section also discusses connections between 
paracrisis typologies and major crisis communication theories, arguing for the need to 
develop distinct typologies for paracrisis clusters and response strategies. Additionally, 
the review suggests that Rhetorical Arena Theory (RAT), with its multivocal approach, 
could offer new insights into how paracrisis are socially constructed by various voices in 
the arena. Research questions for Study 1 (Chapter III) are derived from the literature 
review and posed at the end of this section. Finally, the fifth section explores the 
uncertain, complicated processes of paracrisis evolution and raises the research questions 
to be addressed in Study 2 (Chapter IV).  
Defining Key Terms in Risk and Crisis Communication 
This section defines key terms relevant to this dissertation. These concepts are 
crisis, crisis management, crisis communication, crisis risk, and risk communication.  
Defining Organizational Crisis 
Crisis is a polysemantic notion that has been used to refer to various situations 
ranging from national economic recessions to natural disasters to personal quandaries. 
This dissertation focuses on organizational crisis experienced by corporations, non-
profits, and government agencies. Therefore, crises in the context of disaster and 




In the dynamic field of organizational crisis research, there is no consensus on the 
definition of organizational crisis (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Pearson & Clair, 1998; 
Winter & Steger, 1998). Yet despite the various definitions, there are common important 
elements, such as significant threats, suddenness, and urgency (Kaman, 2005). Capturing 
and synergizing these elements, Coombs (2018, p. 3) defines crisis as “the perceived 
violation of salient stakeholder expectations that can create negative outcomes for 
stakeholders and/or the organization” (p. 3).  
As indicated in Coombs’ (2018) definition, a crisis is a threatening event or 
situation that has four features. Firstly, a crisis is perceptual. Though the existence of 
some crises may be indisputable, as in cases of product harm or visible management 
misconduct, the status of other incidents may be more difficult to discern. Nevertheless, a 
crisis exists when important stakeholders perceive expectation violations on safety, 
environment, health, and/or economic issues. As such, a crisis might come into being 
when an organization is not aware of it or when an organization denies its existence in 
order to persuade stakeholders there is no crisis. There are also cases when an 
organization perceives a developing crisis before its important stakeholders do and 
manages it proactively via stealing thunder. 
Secondly, a crisis may generate serious negative outcomes for stakeholders 
and/or the organization. On one hand, when stakeholders experience expectation 
violations in the above-mentioned aspects, they might be physically and/or 
psychologically threatened or harmed to various extents. On the other, a crisis may have 




reputational and/or operational survival, which are key to the organization’s financial 
bottom line (Coombs, 2002).  
While many situations and events can pose threats to an organization, not all of 
them are crises. Coombs (2002) proposed a Threat Grid to assess the threat (risk) 




Figure 1 Threat Grid 
*Reprinted from Public Relations Review, 28(4), W. Timothy Coombs, Deep and 
surface threats: conceptual and practical implications for “crisis” vs. “problem”, 339-345, 
Copyright (2002), with permission from Elsevier.  
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Fig. 1. Threat Grid.
was found to have sold cars that had their odometers disconnected during test drives. The event
was aminor spot onChrysler’s reputation. Similarly, the application of image restoration theory
to Hugh Grant’s solicitation of a prostitute and Queen Elizabeth’s reaction to Diana’s death are
examples of thrive reputational events.7 Hugh Grant’s solicitation might have cost him a few
choicemovie parts butwould no end his career. SimilarlyQueenElizabethmight loss a fewpop-
ularity points for seeming to be cold but it would not end the monarchy in the United Kingdom.
The survive reputational threats strike at the heart of a reputation and shatter it. The event
is seen as extremely offensive and/or the event contradicts a key factor the organization has
used to build its reputation. For instance, say an organization has built its reputation around a
concern for the environment. A revelation of illegal dumping of toxic chemicals would shatter
that reputation because the stakeholders will see the organization as hypocritical. Texaco’s
racism event was at the survival level because of the seriousness attributed to racism problems
in corporate America. The effect of a reputational threat can be delayed because it takes time
to feel the financial impact of a destroyed reputation. However, if the reputation is not restored,
the organization is unlikely to thrive and potentially could fold in a worst case scenario.
The thrive operational threat is a tolerable loss of revenue; the loss will reduce profits or
cause minor losses but will not be detrimental. When Burger King recalled the “dangerous”
Pokeballs, the action was costly but nothing that threatened Burger King’s financial solvency.




As shown in Figure 1, this matrix is used to evaluate a negative event through 
two intersecting dimensions: operational (y axis) and reputational threats (x axis). 
Numbers on the axes represent increasing threat levels.  According to Coombs (2002), 
for an event to be labeled as a crisis, it would need to pose either a survival reputational 
threat that “strikes at the heart of a reputation and shatters it” (p. 341) (Quadrant 3 in 
Figure 1) or a survival operational threat where financial loss is intolerable and might 
result in organizational extinction (Quadrant 2), or both (Quadrant 4). In other words, 
events posing only thrive operational and reputational threats are not considered crises 
(Quadrant 1).  
In addition, it is noteworthy that these threats are not limited to corporations. 
Nonprofits in crisis are threatened operationally and financially as well because they 
might lose donations and clienteles; government agencies might not experience 
immediate financial threats, but operational and reputation threats are key to their 
existence as well. Actually, an organization in crisis might not experience all three types 
of survival threat. For example, companies experiencing a supply chain disruption due to 
a natural disaster crisis can face severe operational threats but their reputations are likely 
to be intact (Coombs, 2019).  
Lastly, a crisis is innate with equivocality. As an unpredictable event or situation, 
a crisis brings uncertainty to an organization and stakeholders (Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Sellnow, 2007). Nevertheless, in many cases, a crisis is “unpredictable but not 
unexpected” (Coombs, 2019). It is a more of a matter of when a crisis would happen 




crisis management assessment and communication generally are prepared for such crises. 
For example, because food companies are aware they are at risk from food contamination 
concerns, they can develop patterned responses before a food recall crisis affects the 
organizations.  
Defining Crisis Management 
Crisis management is the combination of four interrelated factors, namely (1) 
prevention, (2) preparation, (3) response, and (4) revision to reduce actual crisis damage 
(Coombs, 2019). According to Coombs’ (2017; 2019) regenerative crisis model, there 
are two stages of crisis: pre-crisis and post-crisis. These two stages are separated by 
either an objective crisis event such as chemical explosion or the management’s 
subjective realization that the organization violates stakeholders’ key expectations. 
Although this model has only two stages, it is a dynamic model because it demonstrates 
how a crisis might be reframed and redefined when a turning point occurs. In such 
scenario, the post-crisis stage becomes part of the pre-crisis stage and a new post-crisis 
phase begins (Coombs, 2017; 2018). Nonetheless, not all crises have a turning point, but 
a crisis manager should be aware that a crisis might be reframed into a new crisis type 
(Coombs, 2019). 
Regarding the four factors that compose crisis management, prevention occurs 
during a pre-crisis stage, when a crisis manager seeks to avoid a crisis by detecting crisis 
threats and taking action to prevent a crisis from manifesting. Preparation refers to more 
systematic efforts to prepare the organization for possible crises because a crisis is not 




assessing the organization’s crisis vulnerabilities, creating a crisis management plan, and 
developing a crisis management team. Preparation also necessitates consideration of 
stakeholders that could be affected by a crisis.  Response, or the public communication 
with the stakeholders, directly serves the goals of reducing negative crisis outcomes for 
both stakeholders and the organization. Effective responses sometimes can lead to 
organizational learning and improvement. Finally, revision refers to the “evaluation of 
the organization’s response in simulated and real crises” to determine whether the 
organizational response is effective and if modifications are needed (Coombs, 2019).  
There are alternative definitions for crisis management and models for crisis 
stages in the crisis management literature. For example, based on their review of 
management literature, Pearson and Clair (1998) defined crisis management as covering 
management actions before and after a triggering event. Before a triggering event, crisis 
management focuses on minimizing potential risk prior to a triggering event, whereas 
after a triggering event, an organization improvises and interacts with key stakeholders to 
reconstruct individual and collective sense making, shared meaning and roles, addressing 
individual and organizational readjustment of basic assumptions, and creating behavioral 
and emotional responses aimed at recovery and readjustment. 
Regarding crisis stages identified in crisis management literature, Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1992) proposed five stages: (1) signal detection, (2) preparation/prevention, (3) 
containment, (3) recovery, and (5) learning stages. The signal detection stage recognizes 
potential crises. The preparation/prevention stage occurs when organizations manage 




damage. The recovery stage occurs when organizations try to restore the situation to 
normal. Finally, the learning stage is a phase when an organization evaluates its crisis 
management efforts and makes possible improvements in crisis responses for future 
crises.  
Another frequently-cited model is Fink’s (1986) four-stage model, which 
encompasses the (1) prodromal, (2) acute, (3) chronic, and (4) crisis resolution stages. 
Despite the different definitions and stages used to characterize crises and crisis 
management, it is clear that crisis management begins before a crisis hits an organization 
and that crisis communication is one of the most important components of crisis 
management (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). The following subsection will define crisis 
communication as grounded in Coombs’ regenerative crisis model, because compared to 
other crisis stage models, this model places a stronger emphasis on communication.  
Defining Crisis Communication 
As with the term crisis, crisis communication has been defined in various ways. 
According to Coombs (2010a), crisis communication is “the collection, processing, and 
dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation” (p. 25). As an applied 
field, crisis communication seeks to understand and guide the processes of both 
managing information to share facts and managing meaning to shape the publics’ 
perceptions of a crisis (Coombs, 2010b). Crisis communication is crucial for crisis 






Crisis Communication during Post-crisis Stage 
When the organization enters the post-crisis stage, a crisis manager should first 
manage information to protect the publics physically and psychologically (Coombs, 
2019). Only after an organization meets the overriding goals of protecting the publics’ 
safety and wellbeing (i.e., provides an ethical base response) can it start to manage 
meanings to reduce its own reputational and financial damages. Traditionally, crisis 
communication has focused on organizations’ responses during a post-crisis stage, 
exploring what an organization could say or do repair the organizational reputation that is 
threatened by a crisis. Though research may seem to reflect an “organization-as-sender,” 
orientation, models often incorporate a simultaneous receiver orientation by examining 
how publics influence and react to organizational crisis responses (Coombs & Holladay, 
2014). The second section of this literature review will present a more detailed review on 
major crisis communication theories centering on the post-crisis stage, including 
corporate apologia, IRT, SCCT, and DRT.  
Crisis Communication during Pre-crisis Stage 
Traditionally during a pre-crisis stage, communication efforts concentrate on 
identifying and mitigating crisis risk. To identify risk, a crisis manager engages in 
information management through environmental scanning (Lauzen, 1995) and risk 
assessment. To mitigate crisis risk, a crisis manager focuses on both information and 
meaning management by training the organization to respond to hypothetical crises and 
to manage risks proactively before they become crises (Coombs, 2010b). The following 




Defining Crisis Risk 
The concept of crisis risk carries different definitions and implications in 
different fields. For example, for financial management scholars, risk is closely related 
with future losses and risk management focuses on the estimation of such losses to 
eliminate risk and reduce “the expected costs of financial trouble” (Stulz, 1996, p. 8).  
For the purpose of this dissertation, risk or a crisis risk is defined as an event or situation 
that has the potential to escalate into an organizational crisis (Coombs, 2019). 
Traditionally, an organizational crisis risk arises from products, customer services, 
personnel, competition, regulations, or procedures (Barton, 2001; Seeger, Sellnow, & 
Ulmer, 2003).  
Just as not all crisis risks evolve into crises, not all threatening events or 
accusations pose crisis risks. If an event or accusation only threatens an organization’s 
ability to thrive rather than to survive (Coombs, 2002), it is more like  a problem than a 
crisis, because it lacks the potential to become a crisis. Nevertheless, problems can be 
dynamic. If a problem keeps compounding, it might develop into a crisis risk or even a 
crisis.  
Defining Risk Management 
Risk management seeks to reduce an organization’s vulnerabilities (Smallwood, 
1995). It starts with risk assessment to identify risks and evaluate their likelihoods of 
becoming a crisis (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). After identifying a risk, an organization 
considers the crisis-prevention potential to make the decision to engage in risk aversion, 




when the cost of a risk (e.g., property damage) is lower than the cost of risk reduction 
(e.g., resources needed to fix the property damage and possible negative outcomes 
brought by the damage). Once the strategy of risk aversion is chosen, the organization 
manages the risk by eliminating the risk or reducing it as reasonably as possible 
(Coombs, 2019).  
When a risk threatens stakeholders’ safety and wellbeing, risk communication 
between an organization and its stakeholders becomes necessary. Other than that, risk 
management traditionally is more of an internal process that scans internal weaknesses 
and takes management actions without public awareness.  
Defining Risk Communication  
Historically, risk communication and crisis communication are grounded in 
different academic traditions. Risk communication is rooted in the emergency 
management tradition and is aligned more closely with health, safety, and environmental 
communication. Its objectives include warning the publics about certain risks, helping 
the publics to manage risks via care communication, fostering public consensus to 
manage risks, and preparing the publics for sudden, extreme dangers (Lundgren & 
McMakin, 2018).  In contrast, crisis communication is more closely associated with 
public relations and organizational communication to protect stakeholders and repair 
corporate images (e.g., Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 2019) .  
In this dissertation, risk communication is viewed as a subset of crisis 
communication that occurs during the pre-crisis stage. According to Palenchar (2005), 




process among individuals and organizations regarding the character, cause, degree, 
significance, uncertainty, control, and overall perception of risk” (p. 752). As a dialogue 
between an organization with a crisis risk and the stakeholders who might be affected by 
the risk (Coombs, 2019), risk communication involves both information management to 
warn stakeholders and provide protection information and meaning management to 
persuade stakeholders to take actions and reduce the organization’s perceived 
responsibility.  
The above subsections defining risk, risk management, and risk communication 
are based on research that examines more traditional types of risks related with products, 
personnel, and procedure. Organizations nowadays face more and different types of risks 
that arise from the ubiquity of social media and society’s increasing yet often different 
and sometimes contradictory expectations for corporate social responsibility (Castelló, 
Morsing, & Schultz, 2013). The third section of this chapter will present a more detailed 
discussion on these new types of risks that require public responses from an organization. 
But before elaborating on crisis risks in the social media context, the following section 
reviews major crisis communication theories that have informed work on paracrisis, a 
relatively new concept that attempts to incorporate risks that manifest through social 
media.  
Crisis Communication Theories 
This section reviews major crisis communication theories. These theories are 
corporate apologia, Image Restoration/Repair Theory, Situational Crisis Communication 




Arena Theory (RAT). The first four theories focus on post-crisis communication, with 
the first three theories sharing similarities in recommending crisis response strategies to 
repair organizational reputation.  The DRT approach shifts communication goals to 
organizational change and growth after a crisis. The fourth theory, stealing thunder, is 
more of a crisis response strategy than a theory of crisis communication, as stealing 
thunder is an alternative communication strategy used during a pre-crisis stage. Finally, 
RAT is a more macro theory offering an alternative perspective to understanding crisis 
communication as constructed by a multitude of voices. 
Corporate Apologia  
Apologia is a genre that refers to self-defense (Hearit, 2006). Grounded in the 
rhetorical tradition, apologia research was first developed for individual uses. Ware and 
Linkugel (1973) found that when being accused of misbehavior, an individual can 
choose from four rhetorical strategies to defend oneself. These four strategies are (1) 
denial (denying responsibility for an offense), (2) bolstering (making oneself look better 
by stating good qualities or values), (3) differentiation (making a distinction between the 
accusation and what actually happened), and (4) transcendence (placing the accusation 
within a bigger, more favorable picture). As the first scholars to apply apology in a 
corporate setting, Dionisopolous and Vibbert (1988) proposed the term “corporate 
apologia” and argued the four strategies could be used as the first identified set of crisis 
response strategies. Hearit (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997) then actively applied apologia to 
corporate communication, expanding Ware and Linkugel’s (1997) typology to help an 




Image Restoration/Repair Theory 
Drawing upon corporate apologia, Kenneth Burke’s work on guilt and 
redemption (1969, 1970), and Scott and Lyman’s (1968) account research, William 
Benoit (1997) proposed Image Restoration/Repair Theory (IRT) to explain how 
individuals could respond when their images were attacked. IRT is based on the 
assumptions that maintaining a favorable image is the primary goal for individuals, and 
that when the image is attacked and threatened, an individual can resort to 
communication to restore the image. At the outset, Benoit named this theory “Image 
Restoration Theory” and applied the theory to describe how prominent individuals and 
celebrities responded to image threats, including reputational threats to disgraced 
politicians, actors/actresses, and athletes. Only later was Benoit’s work adapted to 
corporate settings by drawing upon the reasoning first outlined by Dionisopolous and 
Vibbert (1988). Benoit later revised the title to “Image Repair Theory” because he 
reasoned that after a personal or corporate crisis happens, a completely restored image is 
not always possible. Though originally not developed for application in crisis 
communication research, IRT’s concern with image protection attracted attention from 
crisis communication scholars. Thus, the communication strategies proposed in IRT soon 
were applied to organizational images. 
According to Benoit (1997), for an attack to pose an image threat, two conditions 
must be met: (1) an individual or organization is held responsible for an act and (2) the 
act is considered offensive by stakeholders or audiences. Building on these assumptions, 




of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. These five 
categories were further divided into 14 sub-strategies and used to examine responses 
(See Benoit, 1997, p. 179). 
To address the first dimension of responsibility for an act, a crisis manager can 
choose from two categories: denial and evasion of responsibility. The denial strategy can 
be either simple denial or shifting the blame to assert someone else is responsible for an 
offensive act. Evasion of responsibility is used when an individual or organization cannot 
deny an offensive act but may try to evade the responsibility for committing the act. This 
strategy can be used in the forms of provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good 
intention. 
To address the second dimension of causing offensiveness, Benoit suggested 
using reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. Six ways might be 
considered to reduce offensiveness: bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence as 
identified by Ware and Linkugel (1973) as well as minimization, attacking the accuser, 
and compensation. Corrective action is more costly than other strategies as it involves 
taking action to restore situations to pre-crisis levels that predate the offensive act or 
enacting measures to prevent the act from happening again. Finally, mortification, a term 
drawn from Burke (1969), refers to the effort to admit guilt, apologize for an offensive 
act, and seek forgiveness.  
Limitations of Corporate Apologia and IRT 
Corporate apologia and IRT contribute significantly to the field of crisis 




rhetorical approach, corporate apologia and IRT rely heavily on case studies to illustrate 
theories. Take IRT for example. Although Benoit stressed the importance of 
understanding stakeholders’ perceptions of an act’s offensiveness and an 
individual/organization’s culpability for the act, he did not establish a connection 
between crisis situations and response strategies. Crisis communication studies using 
IRT or corporate apologia often describe an organization’s words and actions during a 
crisis and then sort them into the crisis response typologies. When it comes to evaluating 
communication effectiveness, researchers typically make subjective or speculative claims 
without rigorous empirical tests (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). Secondly, sporadic studies 
that empirically tested IRT’s claims yield contradictory results (e.g., Coombs & Schmidt, 
2000). Thus, despite corporate apologia and IRT’s contribution in generating rich 
descriptive findings, more evidence-based studies are necessary to test theories 
developed from rhetorical approaches (Coombs, 2010b).  This line of research is almost 
exclusively sender-oriented, as it focuses on organizations’ words and actions (Coombs, 
2010b). More receiver-oriented studies are necessary to understand how crises affect 
stakeholders, how stakeholders perceive crises, and how organizational crises responses 
can be adapted based on stakeholder perceptions.  
Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
As an evidence-based theory, SCCT originally was developed to understand how 
stakeholders’ crisis responsibility attributions affect their perceptions of an 
organization’s reputation after a crisis and how to use communicate strategies to protect 




inferences or perceptions of causes (Weiner, 1985) as well as IRT’s response strategies, 
SCCT is built on the connection between a crisis situation and crisis response strategies 
(Coombs, 2007). According to Coombs (2007), the crisis situation should provide the 
foundation for an organization’s response.  An organization must first communicate the 
“ethical base response” by providing instructing and adjusting information designed to 
protect the physical and psychological well-being of stakeholders. Only then should 
organizations seek to protect organizational reputation. A crisis manager should evaluate 
the crisis situation by considering three factors: initial crisis responsibility, crisis history, 
and prior relational organizational reputation.  
Initial crisis responsibility refers to the extent to which stakeholders believe an 
organization holds control over a crisis event. Empirical studies confirm that the greater 
crisis responsibility attributed to an organization, the more likely the organization would 
suffer from reputational loss (Coombs, 2004). Using cluster analysis, Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) categorized 13 prevalent types of crises into three clusters: victim crises, 
accidental crises, and preventable crises, ranging from lowest attributed crisis 
responsibility to the highest. For victim crises where organizations are victims of events 
such as natural disasters and product tampering, organizations are considered to have a 
minimal amount of crisis responsibility as they as well as stakeholders are victims of the 
crises. For accidental crises such as technical-error accidents such as machinery failures 
and software glitches, the organization is perceived as unintentionally causing harms and 
thus attributed with a low crisis responsibility level. For preventable crises, such as 




purposefully causing the crises and thus are attributed with the highest level of crisis 
responsibility.  
In addition to assessing initial crisis responsibility, a crisis manager also needs to 
consider two mitigating factors: crisis history and prior relational reputation. Crisis 
history reflects whether the organization has experienced similar crises before; and prior 
relational or relationship reputation addresses how well or poorly the organization is 
evaluated by its stakeholders before a crisis. These two factors have direct effects on 
reputation outcome and indirect effects on responsibility attribution. If an organization 
has a crisis history and/or poor prior relational reputation, its crisis situation will be 
intensified as evidenced by studies on the Velcro effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). On 
the other hand, if an organization has no crisis history and a positive prior relational 
reputation, it might benefit from the halo effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2006). In other 
words, its reputation during the post-crisis stage might be protected to a certain extent. In 
addition to examining reputation damage as a crisis outcome, SCCT also has investigated 
other crisis consequences, such as emotions, purchase intention, and negative word of 
mouth (Coombs, 2019).   
Crisis Responses 
After evaluating the crisis situation, a crisis manager can select communication 
responses accordingly. First and foremost, organizations must provide instructing and 
adjusting information (Sturges, 1994) to protect stakeholders. Instructing information 
informs stakeholders on how to physically protect themselves from a crisis, and adjusting 




communicating what Coombs’ terms the “ethical base response,” i.e. the combination of 
instructing and adjusting information, should a crisis manager develop responses that aim 
to reduce negative crisis outcomes threatening the organization (Coombs, 2019). 
SCCT strongly recommends a crisis manager to choose reputation repair crisis 
response strategies based on the level of attributed crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2019). 
According to SCCT (Coombs, 2019), there are four postures, or categories of strategies: 
denial, diminishment, rebuilding, and bolstering, the latter of which is a secondary 
posture that can be used to supplement the other three but is unlikely to be effective if 
used on its own (See Coombs, 2019, p. 151).  
For some victim crises such as natural disasters, providing instructing and 
adjusting information will be sufficient. Yet, for crises where organizations are perceived 
as responsible, the denial, diminishing or rebuilding postures would be desirable to repair 
reputation damage (Coombs, 2019). Out of the four postures, the denial posture is the 
most defensive as it seeks to negate the connection between a crisis and the organization 
by using strategies such as attack the accuser (i.e.,  to confront the person or group who 
claim a crisis exists), denial (i.e., to state that no crisis exists), and scapegoating (i.e., to 
blame other person or group outside the organization for the crisis). The diminishment 
posture, which includes the strategies of excuse (i.e., to minimize the organization's crisis 
responsibility)  and justification (i.e., to minimize the perceived damage associated with 
the crisis), intends to reduce the attributed crisis responsibility. This is a moderately 
accommodative posture because it acknowledges some responsibility while trying to 




rebuild posture. By using the strategies of compensation (i.e., to provide money or other 
gifts to the victims) and apology (i.e., to publicly state that the organization takes full 
responsibility for the crisis and ask for forgiveness), an organization aims to mitigate the 
crisis’s negative outcomes and improve its sullied reputation. Finally, the bolstering 
posture is a supplementary strategy that can be used with any of the other three postures 
to foster a positive connection with stakeholders. This posture includes two strategies, 
ingratiation (i.e., to raise stakeholders)  and victimage (i.e., to explain how the 
organization is also a victim of the crisis). It is noteworthy that when used by itself, this 
posture is not effective in managing reputation (Coombs, 2019). In addition, the 
diminishment and rebuild posture might be used together as they both accept crisis 
responsibility (Coombs. 2018).  
Limitations  
Although SCCT’s propositions and crisis response recommendations have been 
empirically supported, it still has limitations as do any other social scientific theories. A 
meta-analysis on 24 SCCT studies published between 1990 and 2015 (Ma & Zhan, 2016) 
suggested that while an organizational reputation and the attributed crisis responsibility 
are strongly correlated, the connection between organizational reputation and reputation 
repair strategies recommended by SCCT is relatively weak. This is partly because 
compared to the basic psychological process of attributing crisis responsibility, how 
crisis response strategies affect cognitions and affect is a more complex process 
(Coombs, 2016). Crisis responses have a limited effect on repairing reputation, especially 




It is unreasonable to expect SCCT to provide answers for all crisis 
communication problems. The theory was developed to guide organizations to choose 
crisis responses based on stakeholders’ attributed crisis responsibility. It assumes 
organizations will be the primary communicators, and the message strategy will be 
guided by the level of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization. SCCT also 
incorporates the intensifying factors of crisis history and prior reputation to further guide 
response selection. SCCT does not seek to address the forms and channels of crisis 
responses, nor does it explicitly articulate how the multiple voices arising during a crisis 
communication process would affect the choice of crisis responses. The two theories that 
are reviewed in the following section, stealing thunder and the rhetorical arena theory, 
complement SCCT by respectively addressing the timing of responses and the multiple 
voices aspects of crisis communication.  
Synergistic/antagonistic Effects of Crisis Response Strategy Used in Combination 
In actual crises, crisis response strategies are often used in various combinations. 
A quantitative content analysis on 18 years of published crisis communication research 
using IRT and/or SCCT (Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009) found that apart from using 
bolstering as a secondary response strategy as recommended by SCCT, denial was also 
used frequently with attack-the-accuser, corrective action, mortification, and 
defeasibility.  
The combination of crisis response strategies can lead to both synergistic and 
antagonistic effects. For example, using bolstering with other crisis response strategies 




apology  not recommended, because using a defensive strategy and an accommodative 
strategy together leads to contradicting and inconsistent impression (Coombs, 2007). 
Thus, Coombs (2008) recommends that an organization should maintain consistency or 
coherence in their crisis responses. 
Drawing from Fisher's (1989) narrative theory on storytelling, Ihlen (2002) 
further distinguished three aspects of coherence (i.e., response consistency) during crisis 
communication: argumentative/structural coherence, material coherence, and 
characterological coherence. Arugmentative coherence can be assessed by featuring a 
consistent internal logic and characters acting from good reasons. In a crisis scenario, it 
can be enhanced by avoiding response strategies (postures) prescribed for different 
clusters identified in SCCT (Coombs, 2019). Material coherence, or external coherence, 
requires the presentation of  thorough facts, arguments, and counterarguments. Finally, 
characterological coherence, or the credibility of an organization, may be attained by 
adhering to initial characterizations of a situation or a problem. By increasing coherence 
in these three ways, an organization may be able to deliver a consistent  message that 
capitalizes on the synergistic effect of using combined strategies.  
Discourse of Renewal 
Discourse of renewal theory (DRT) was proposed by Ulmer and Sellnow (2002) 
to shift attention from image restoration to organizational renewal and growth during a 
post-crisis stage. Through an examination of the 911 terrorist attacks, the authors 
discussed three categories of renewal based on (1) stakeholder commitment, (2) 




extended DRT as an alternative to crisis communication theories that seeks to understand 
“what will happen and how the organization will move forward” (Ulmer et al., 2007).  
In their 2007 article, Ulmer et al. listed four characteristics of renewal 
communication: (1) DRT is provisional rather than strategic, (2) DRT is prospective 
rather than retrospective, (3) DRT is leader-based communication, and (4) DRT focuses 
on the ability to reconstitute an organization by identifying opportunities within a crisis. 
Firstly, renewal is described as an ongoing process that requires an organization to be 
provisional in creating immediate, natural communication responses. Secondly, since 
DRT’s focus is not reputation management but rather positive organizational 
reconstruction, communication efforts should be prospective to address upcoming 
changes. Thirdly, effective DRT should be led by organization leaders and derived from 
their values and virtues. Lastly, DRT emphasizes optimism as it identifies opportunities 
from a crisis and seeks to inspire stakeholders. Later, Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2009) 
revised DRT as covering central objectives for renewal: organizational learning, ethical 
communication, a prospective vision for the organization, and effective rhetoric. 
Regarding conditions under which DRT can be applied, Ulmer et al. (2007) 
argued that DRT is more effective (1) for disaster crises or crises where massive 
destruction takes place and/or (2) when the organization has positive stakeholder 
relationships prior to a crisis so that stakeholders can help with rebuilding. However, 
DRT might be more effective for privately held corporations than for publicly held 
corporations, partly because private organizations have greater autonomy and are more 




DRT has been used to study cases such as large-scale industrial crises (Seeger & 
Ulmer, 2002), community restoration after a school shooting (Littlefield, Reierson, 
Cowden, Stowman, & Feather, 2009), and three universities respectively going through a 
financial crisis, a student arson case, and a natural disaster (Barone, 2014). These studies 
showed that DRT is constructive under specific conditions and attested to DRT’s 
characteristics and objectives. However, it should be noted that these are subjective case 
studies where the effectiveness of DRT was largely based on researchers’ interpretations. 
To address this deficiency, recent scholarship developed measures to investigate how 
DRT affects publics’ relationship with an organization (Xu, 2018) as well as  
organizational readiness for renewal during a precrisis stage (Fuller, Ulmer, McNatt, & 
Ruiz, 2019). Future research in DRT might be more rigorous in testing assumptions and 
might extend into the pre-crisis stage to explore organizations’ preparedness for renewal 
if a crisis occurs.  
Stealing Thunder as a Pre-crisis Communication Theory 
So far, this section has reviewed crisis communication theories developed 
primarily for the post-crisis stage. Because risk communication used to be a largely 
internal process, theories on organizations’ public communication during a pre-crisis 
stage is relatively underdeveloped. The most important communication theory developed 
for use during a pre-crisis stage is stealing thunder.  
As a proactive crisis communication strategy, stealing thunder is used when an 
organization “breaks the news about its own crisis before the crisis is discovered by the 




to remaining silent until a crisis threat is exposed, self-disclosing a thunder, or an 
upcoming crisis threat, is found to be effective in reducing crisis damages for various 
possible reasons (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). First, frames used by the organization to 
describe the crisis and downplay the crisis severity might be more acceptable to the 
publics. Second, the organization might draw less attention to itself and be perceived as 
more credible than those who respond during a post-crisis stage (Arpan & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 2005). Furthermore, stakeholders might be better prepared to handle physical 
and psychological threats. In this way, the organization is behaving ethically as it takes 
the initiative to break the crisis news to protect its stakeholders (Claeys, 2017). 
Therefore, if possible, practioners should steal thunder rather than using reputation repair 
responses recommended by SCCT during a post-crisis stage (Coombs, 2016).  
Rhetorical Arena Theory with a Multivocal Approach 
Crisis communication theories and strategies reviewed so far assume the 
organization itself will be the primary crisis communicator and examine how 
organizations might communicate effectively in the context of individual and/or 
organizational crises. Yet, it is also important to understand the dynamic, complicated 
interactions among various stakeholders that are involved in the crisis communication 
processes. To address such concern, Frandsen and Johansen (2010, 2016) developed the 
rhetorical arena theory (RAT) that takes a multivocal approach to explain crisis 





RAT is based on two metaphors: arena and voice. The term "arena" was first 
perhaps applied in social sciences by Strauss (1978) to refer to a social world or space 
where members from different backgrounds engage in and negotiate for their issues of 
concern. Frandsen and Johansen (2010, 2016) applied the concept of arena to the field of 
crisis communication to refer to a space that opens up around the discussion of a crisis. 
This metaphor emphasizes “how actors involved in a crisis struggle with each other on 
how to interpret not only the crisis itself but also how to handle it” (Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2018, p. 94). The second metaphor, voice, underlines the multitude of senders 
and receivers in the arena who communicate about, to, with, past, or against each other. 
These senders and receivers include but are not limited to media outlets, activists, 
experts, and other companies (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010)).  
The goal of RAT is to "identify, describe, and explain patterns within the multiple 
communication processes taking place inside the arena” (Frandsen & Johansen, 2016, p. 
142). This theory approaches crisis communication from two integrated perspectives: 
macro and micro perspectives. A macro perspective examines all voices and 
communicative processes within a rhetorical arena to gain overviews of interactions 
among voices whereas a micro perspective addresses individual communicative 
processes in terms of context, media, genre, and text (Frandsen & Johansen, 2016).  
Based on RAT's concept of rhetorical arena, Coombs and Holladay further 
proposed the term "sub-arenas" to address multiple spaces that compose a rhetorical 
arena (2014). Taking a multivocal perspective, communicative interactions on various 




online news story (Coombs & Holladay, 2014), a corporate Facebook page (Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2016), Sina Weibo, a Chinese social media platform (Zhao, 2017), and 
newspapers (Raupp, 2019) from both macro and micro perspectives.   
Social Media and Crisis Communication 
Social media can be defined as “a group of internet-based applications that build 
on the ideological and technical foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and 
exchange of user generated content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 60). Till January 
2019, Facebook had about 2.2 billion active users, YouTube 1.9 billion, WhatsApp 1.5 
billion, WeChat 1 billion, Instagram 1 billion, Sina Weibo 446 million, and Twitter 326 
million (We Are Social, Hootsuite, & DataReportal., n.d.). According to the 2019 
version of the “What Happens in An Internet Minute” report (Lewis, 2019) that has been 
released each year since 2016, within one single minute, 1 million users log in Facebook, 
347,222 users scroll Instagram, 87,500 people tweet, 18.1 million WeChat texts are sent, 
and 4.5 million YouTube videos are viewed.  
The pervasive use of social media by individuals and organizations has 
transformed the landscape of crisis communication. Though the content of organizational 
crisis responses tends to remain the same, the variety of channels has changed. While the 
above-mentioned as well as other social media platforms differ in their user 
demographics and technical features, they share common features such as interactivity, 
connectedness, openness, participation, and communities (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). On the 
one hand, these features promise richer possibilities for organizations to communicate 




media and may complicate the process of risk and crisis communication.. This section 
begins with a discussion of how features of social media have generated, amplified, and 
complicated crisis risks faced by organizations, and reviews practitioners’ challenges in 
managing these risks. The section concludes with a critique on why the term “social 
media crisis” is confusing and inappropriate, and how the prevalent use of this term has 
limited  further theory development that might help organizations to deal with crisis risks 
in the context of social media.  
Social Media Features as Related with Risks and Crises 
Social media features first and foremost offer open access to almost all users. In 
the absence of gatekeepers, any individual or organization can share information on 
social media. As social media have been integrated increasingly into daily life, traditional 
media’s model of one-to-many communication has been greatly challenged (Enli, 2009). 
Traditionally, the publics generally rely on traditional media to obtain information, 
including crisis information. Nowadays, individuals have increasingly turned to social 
media sites to seek and produce information on crisis causes, backgrounds, and inside 
perspectives (Austin, Fisher Liu, & Jin, 2012; Palen & Liu, 2007). However, it I 
important to note that social media sites simply present the potential for stakeholders and 
organizations to use additional and more varied channels of communication; the 
availability of social media does not guarantee it will be used in any particular ways.  
From a multivocal perspective, voices on the sub-arenas (Coombs & Holladay, 2014) of 




social media because stakeholders with diverse stances and intentions can now easily 
communicate with, against, and past each other via social media.   
The nascent research on the diverse voices arising on the sub-arenas of social 
media mainly examine two types of actors: (1) faithholders, or publics with favorably 
predisposed attitudes towards an organization and (2) hateholders, or publics with 
unfavorable predisposed attitudes (Luoma-aho, 2015). Faithholders tend to support an 
organization in trouble by seeking and providing positive information, expressing 
sympathy (Coombs & Holladay, 2012), attacking hateholders (Johansen, Johansen, & 
Weckesser, 2016), and sending tweets using traditional crisis response strategies to help 
the organization manage its reputation (Brown & Billings, 2013). By contrast, 
hateholders were found to use persuasive attacks against an organization and urge other 
stakeholders to protest (Johansen et al., 2016).  
In addition to providing open access to all, social media also allow users to 
connect with each other and form various communities. In uncertain situations such as 
those involving risks and crises, these features leave opportunities for helpful 
information-sharing as well as the potential for inflammatory, malicious voices to 
disseminate information lacking veracity and/or to instigate negative reactions from other 
users. Past crisis research has shown that in times of crisis when complete, accurate crisis 
information is not available, misinformation, ambiguous messages, and rumors tend to 
fill the information void on social media platforms (Austin et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
social media’s networking structures are particularly pliable spreading misinformation 




these networks than on many other network types, including those where any two 
individuals have connection(s) with each other (Doerr, Fouz, & Friedrich, 2012). 
Another type of voice that is prominent within social media is trollers (Craker & 
March, 2016). As ill-intentioned voices, trollers seek to provoke reactions from others 
via deliberate, deceptive, and mischievous communications (Noble, Noble, & Adjei, 
2012). Research on trolling is still at its infancy. However, according to a survey 
conducted by YouGov, an international Internet-based market research and data analytics 
company, over 25% of Americans have engaged in trolling behavior at one time or 
another (Gammon, 2014), which seems to attest to the enormous attraction of engaging 
in this online misconduct.  
What further complicates the presence and impacts of misleading, inflammatory 
voices is the rise of social bots, or automated accounts that algorithmically impersonate 
humans (Lazer et al., 2018). According an estimation made by scholars from the field of 
artificial intelligence (Varol, Ferrara, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2017), about 9% to 
15% of active Twitter users are actually social bots. While social bots have positive 
functions such as volunteer coordination (Savage, Monroy-Hernandez, & Hollerer, 
2016), they are often used to spread misinformation. A recent study (Shao et al., 
2018)that analyzed 14 million tweets spreading 400 thousand articles on Twitter also 
found that social bots played a disproportionate role in spreading articles from low-
credibility sources and tended to target influential users when doing so. Unfortunately, 
human beings were found to be vulnerable to social bots’ manipulation, as they tended to 




trollers and social bots in crisis communication yet, it seems safe to assume that at least 
for online threats involving heated issues, trollers would be present in the arena, and so 
might social bots.  
Another social media feature that also contributes to the spread of misleading, 
inflammatory information is the tendency to value emotionality over rationality. 
Theoretically, social media are capable of facilitating rational deliberation, because it is 
close to the ideal of equal and unrestrained communication (Bohman, 2004). However, 
empirical studies on various social media platforms and across national backgrounds 
seem to suggest otherwise. For example, a content analysis of 250 Facebook political 
group pages from 23 countries showed that the majority of the examined pages were 
created to express political selves and identities rather than to promote rational 
discussions (Marichal, 2013). Similarly, a study that examined public discussion on food 
safety issues on Sina Weibo also found that this social media platform is not an effective 
forum for deliberative discussion (Song, Dai, & Wang, 2016). By using machine learning 
and social network analysis, Song et al. (2016) revealed that emotional interactions 
predominate cognitive ones and that the most contagious emotions are negative ones 
such as anger, fear, and sadness. YouTube users also tend to respond more to emotional 
video content. A study on YouTube users’ responses found that videos with a stronger 
positive or negative valence received more replies and likes, with the exception of 
political videos with positive valence. For these videos, positive emptions had no effect 
on users’ responses (Möller, Kühne, Baumgartner, & Peter, 2018). While current 




scholarly interests on emotions’ effects during online interaction has begun to extend to 
crisis contexts. For example, when examining tweets with #MH370 that were posted 
after Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 went missing from radar, Xu and Zhang (2018) also 
found that tweets with both positive and negative sentiments tended to gain more 
retweets than emotionally neutral content.  
Valuing emotionality over rationality not only impedes the spread of emotionally 
neutral content, but also reinforces user fragmentation on many social media platforms. 
Thanks to social media’s connective feature, users across geographic boundaries can 
discuss issues they are concerned with, including content they may not share offline for 
the fear of social and/or political rejection. As like-mined individuals tend to cluster 
together during their online interactions, they are likely to reinforce each other’s stances 
and thus lead to fragmented communities on social media. 
For a century, objectivity and impartiality have been central pillars for journalism 
(Schudson, 2001). In the past, publics relied on traditional media content to make sense 
of public events and construct daily narratives (Bird, 1998). Now social media have 
transformed norms of news providing and sharing, which further erodes traditional 
media’s norms for objectivity and impartiality. For organizations, such change may 
result in more uncertainty and crisis risks.  
Crisis Risks as Generated, Amplified and Complicated by Social Media 
Crisis Risks Arising from Organizations’ Social Media Use 
Crisis risks seem inevitable as organizations increasingly use social media to 




vulnerable to risks such as hacking. For example, in 2014, many of CNN’s Facebook, 
Twitter and blog accounts were hacked and posted content accusing CCN content as all 
lies (Shoichet, 2014). In 2017, IHOP’s Twitter account was hacked and sent an anti-
Hillary tweet (Dicker, 2017). Also, spoof sites and social media accounts might be 
created to sabotage an organization’s social media presence and confuse current and 
potential social media followers.  
Secondly, attracted by social media’s immense potential to get close to customers 
and facilitate revenue increases, many organizations maintain an active social media 
presence to disseminate information, organize various campaigns, and interact with 
followers. However, sometimes an organization might post social media content with 
good intentions but end up offending some publics. One example is Wendy’s use of a 
questionable meme. In response to a Twitter user’s request: “@Wendy’s Got any 
memes”, Wendy’s tweeted an image of Wendy Thomas, the company’s mascot and 
namesake, morphing into a Pepe the Frog meme. The company was immediately 
denounced online for using an image associated with white-nationalist and the “alt-right” 
Internet culture (Reinstein, 2017). Wendy’s later apologized and said they were unaware 
of the changing connotation of the meme and did not intend to use an “alt-right” Internet 
symbol. As shown in this example, creating social media content and interacting with 







Crisis Risks Arising from Employees’ Use of Social Media  
Employees’ use of social media might generate risk as well. To begin with, there 
are cases in which organizations sent out nonsense or even inappropriate content but later 
it turned out that the content was meant to be sent from their social media professionals’ 
personal accounts. One high-profile example of this type is the “rogue” tweet sent from 
American Red Cross’ Twitter on drinking beers, which should have been send from their 
social media director’s personal account (Wasserman, 2011). As social media 
increasingly blur the work-life boundary for social media professionals, it is highly 
possible that such mishaps might happen again. 
Furthermore, many individual social media users have made their job information 
available online. When such individuals post offensive or controversial content on their 
personal social media accounts, angry publics might take to their employers’ social 
media accounts, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp pages, to air their opinions and 
emotions. The criticism might spread to the organizations they work for, especially when 
the individual is viewed as representing the organization as a member of management.  
Crisis Risks Amplified by Social Media  
The above subsections discuss how the use of social media by organizations and 
their identifiable members might generate risks that were unlikely to occur in the days 
predating social media. Yet, what makes managing risks in social media contexts more 
challenging is social media’s potential to amplify and complicate risks.  
As reviewed earlier, social media allow all users, including hateholders and 




might not catch public attention, unless traditional media decide the event is worthy of 
coverage. However, with social media, any mistakes made by an organization might be 
brought into the limelight. For instance, DC Comics’ 2016 Superman/Wonder Woman 
Annual #2 contained a scene that mistakenly used "Pakistanian" rather than Urdu to refer 
to the language spoken by bystanders from a village in Pakistan. After angry readers 
exposed and spread this mistake on social media, DC Comics was vehemently criticized 
for their ignorance of and disrespect for other cultures (Burlingame, 2016). If a similar 
mistake had been made predating social media, the company would most likely avoid  
this crisis risk because many of the social media users who expressed their anger were 
not DC Comic fans and would not be aware of this scene at all.  
Because social media have given potentially all users a megaphone, even a 
groundless accusation against an organization may go viral and force the organization to 
respond publicly. On 2017, Starbucks launched its red holiday cup  featuring snowflakes, 
wrapped presents, and a pair of hands holding each other, of which the gender(s) cannot 
be identified. Yet after a Buzzfeed article suggested that the pair of hands was “totally 
gay,” social media discussion heated, and traditional media outlets such as Fox News and 
the Blaze, took Buzzfeeds' suggestion and accused Starbucks of pushing a homosexual 
agenda (Stack, 2017). This viral accusation would be quite impossible during pre-social 
media days, when journalism still operated by the norms of objectivity and impartiality.  
Starbucks’ 2017 red holiday cup risk is one of the many cases that demonstrate 
how social media have generated and amplified crisis risks. Now that individuals or 




media, if the accusation gains wide attention from others with similar concerns, interests, 
and/or stances, the organization may be forced to make public responses. What is worse, 
as in the Starbucks’ case, an accusation does not have to be legitimate at all to go viral. If 
an accusation has elements that fit into social media norms for content sharing, it may 
have the potential to attract many retweets, reposts, likes, thumb-ups, and comments, and 
become a crisis risk or even a crisis.  
Crisis Risks Complicated by Social Media  
Social media not only have the potential to amplify crisis risks, but also 
complicate how crisis risks might evolve online. Firstly, it is challenging to predict 
whether a crisis risk would be amplified into a crisis. A challenge or accusation might 
travel quickly n social network sites in the beginning, but soon lose its momentum as 
social media feature fragmented communities and information overload (Gomez-
Carrasco & Michelon, 2017). Secondly, social media have given rise to more plural and 
potentially polarizing expectations on what counts as corporate social responsibility 
(Castelló et al., 2013). As a result, companies these days are often confronted by new 
media activists challenging corporate actions that might otherwise not violate 
mainstream social expectations when traditional media still played a dominant role in 
agenda setting. Since these new media activists might be able to reach millions of social 
media users by protesting against certain corporate behavior or policy, a company would 
need to constantly scan the social media environment for possible risks and make public 




In addition to being pressured to address a wide range of challenges, an 
organization might find itself in quagmire when a challenge involves polarizing stances 
among its key stakeholders. For example, in 2016, Coca-Cola Russia posted on 
Vkontakte, a Russian social media platform, a map of Russia decorated with Christmas 
theme with words: “Ring in the New Year together with Coca-Cola.” This Christmas 
greeting was vehemently criticized on and off the social media platform for not including 
Crimea, the Kuril Islands, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. But after Coca-Cola 
apologized and posted a revised map including all three areas, Ukraine was upset and 
their lawmakers called for a boycott against Coke (Esterl & Sonne, 2016). While 
multinational companies’ stances for geographic and political rows have always been a 
management challenge, social media further complicate these challenges as companies 
are under heightened pressure to react under potentially the full view of stakeholders 
with contradicting stances. No matter which side a company takes, important 
stakeholders from different sides could immediately find out and air their protests.  
As reviewed earlier, a crisis happens when stakeholders’ expectations on health, 
safety, environmental, and economic issues are violated (Coombs, 2019). Traditionally, a 
crisis risk often arises from external legal changes and internal operations that might 
violate stakeholder expectations in the above-mentioned aspects. However, with social 
media’s potential of uniting discontented users, an organization may experience a crisis 
risk when the expectations it violates are not directly related with health, safety, 
environmental, or economic issues. As in the examples of DC Comics, Starbucks’ 




risks arising on social media are often related with people’s feelings, values, and issue 
stances. Given social media’s potential to amplify and complicate crisis risks, 
organizations are prompted to manage these risks to preclude further escalation. 
Unfortunately, both trade and academic publications suggest that many organizations and 
crisis communication professionals are still ill-prepared to address such crisis risks.  
Organizations’ Continuous Struggles in Managing Risks on Social Media  
 Over the past decade, increasing industrial and academic efforts have been made 
to understand organizations’ practices in managing risks in the social media context. For 
example, a 2013 global survey conducted by Deloitte found that new technologies, 
especially social media, were key to organizations’ fears (as cited in Lambret & Barki, 
2018). A 2015 Weber Shandwick survey of Fortune Global 1000 companies’ in-house 
lawyers who were involved with risk management showed that companies require about 
38 hours to respond to a social media threat (Weber Shandwick & KRC Research, 2015). 
Given how fast information can travel on social networking sites, a lapse of 38 hours 
might be too late to mitigate a threat before it evolves into a crisis. A 2018 annual 
research report investigating executives’ perspectives on risks found that social media, 
mobile apps, and other internet-based applications were  the third most threating strategic 
risk issue among all possible organizational risks (ERM Initiative & Protivit, 2019). The 
above-mentioned as well as many other industrial surveys all suggest that despite the 
growing body of practical suggestions made by scholars and practitioners, risks arising 




In addition to large-scale industry surveys and consulting reports, scholars also 
have examined how organizations and crisis communication professionals are under-
prepared for risk and crisis communication in the context of social media. For instance, 
Claeys and Opgenhaffen’s (2016) interviews with Belgian crisis communication 
practitioners suggested that “companies seemed to experience more and more problems 
with regard to rumors and information leaking through social media” (p. 267). Helsloot 
and Groenendaal (2013) studied Twitter use during a fire disaster in Netherlands and 
concluded that crisis communication professionals’ use of this particular social media 
platform was premature. Ott and Theunissen’s (2015) work revealed that organizations 
still applied traditional media-based crisis responses on social media without tapping into 
social media’s dialogic, interactive features to communicate with the publics.  
However, what has been largely overlooked in the industrial research and 
academic literature are small businesses’ plights of managing risks on social media. 
Traditionally, crisis scholars tend to focus on large organizations. This is because 
compared to small businesses, large organizations in crises tend to generate more harm to 
stakeholders, attract more media attention, and have more resources to repair damages. 
Though small businesses also experience crises, they generally attract only local media 
attention, if any. However, the advent of social media has transformed the situation. A 
local business whose action is viewed as inappropriate may experience backlash from 
social media users from far beyond its business area.  
For example, Spicer Greene Jewelers, a family-owned jewelry store in Asheville, 




Asheville that reads “Sometimes, it's ok to throw rocks at girls...” Among many of the 
critical voices is Chelsea Clinton, who might never have heard of the store before 
(Schmidt, 2017). Arguably, when small businesses experience risks arising on social 
media, they might be even more unprepared than large organizations as their resources 
for social media communication and risk management is very limited. Therefore, it is 
important to further develop knowledge of risks on social media, which would not only 
benefit large organizations but also small businesses as well.  
“Social Media Crisis” as a Confusing Term 
In 2008, Alfonso and Suzanne explained how the Internet could both trigger and 
facilitate crises. In the same year, practioners began to use the term “social media crisis” 
when discussing how social media might change crisis communication, such as the 
necessity to develop a “social media crisis plan” (e.g. Marketwired, 2008). During the 
2010s, such discussion has gained popularity and people have continued the use of 
“social media crisis” to refer to a threatening situation that originated in and/or is 
magnified by social media. While the early use of this term has its own merit in 
highlighting social media’s impacts on crisis communication, this section argues that 
with social media’s burgeoning presence in today’s society, the continual use of this term 
could limit scholars and practitioners from making theoretical contributions to risk as 
well as crisis communication in the social media context. The following argues why this 
is the case. 
Managing crisis risks in social media is challenging partly because research tends 




When it comes to the context of social media, many scholars and practitioners have 
confused the differences between a crisis risk and an actual crisis, as evident in the 
prevalent use of the term “social media crisis.” When using “social media crisis” to 
address both risks and crises related with social media, they tend to overlook the 
differences between a crisis risk and a crisis, as well as among various types of crisis 
risks arising on social media, which would limit scholarly efforts from making further 
theoretical development on crisis and risk response strategies. 
Firstly, neglecting the differences between a crisis and crisis threat prevents 
scholars from developing specific response strategies to managing this new type of crisis 
risks. As reviewed earlier, a crisis risk is different from a crisis because it only has the 
potential to affect organizational reputation and operation. Although an organization may 
need to make public responses when a crisis risk is made visible to all publics on social 
media, response strategies for managing a crisis might not be a good fit for crisis risks In 
a case study that examined an organization’s communication effectiveness during an 
online risk event, Kim, Zhang, & Zhang’s (2016) study of TMall, a Chinese e-commerce 
platform, found that the CEO’s self-mockery and mocking the accuser were more 
effective than traditional crisis response strategies in reducing consumer blame, 
increasing their satisfaction, and developing more positive consumer attitudes. Based on 
their research finding, the authors argued that companies should be cautious about using 
traditional crisis response strategies, which may increase rather than reduce the perceived 




associated with severe events or situations that involve substantial harm to important 
stakeholders and threaten organizational survival.  
Secondly, risks that are made publicly visible by social media come in various 
forms that require different response strategies. As Coombs (2017) pointed out, “social 
media crisis” is used too often to describe both risk situations that can be managed easily 
with one single apology and more complicated, uncertain situations that require more 
sophisticated communication.  
One example illustrating this situation would be Nestlé’s reactions towards 
Greenpeace’s challenge of the company’s palm oil purchasing practice in 2009. At that 
time, Nestlé was sourcing palm oil from Sinar Mas, a manufacturer who destroyed 
orangutan habitat to produce palm oil. Greenpeace used social media platforms to release 
and spread a parody commercial of Kit Kat, a Nestlé candy bar product, and to argue that 
Nestlé’s sourcing practice was not sustainable. Nestlé eventually reformed by closing its 
contract with Sinar Mars and partnering with the Forest Trust to develop a sustainable 
palm oil purchasing program (Coombs & Holladay, 2015b). There are trade publications 
that described this high-profile case as a “social media crisis,” including established ones 
such as PR Week (see O'Reilly & Magee, 2010). Nevertheless, a closer look into this case 
would suggest that Greenpeace’s accusation, though triggering intensive attention on and 
offline, did not plunge Nestlé into a full-blown crisis. Since Greenpeace’s challenge only 
posed a crisis risk, not a crisis, existing crisis response strategies cannot fully account for 
Nestlé’s reactions and responses (Coombs & Holladay, 2015a). Therefore, in view of 




the use “social media crisis” but also identify types of crisis risks that may be related 
with different risk response strategies.  
Meanwhile, lack of conceptual clarity on the differences between a crisis risk and 
a crisis might also interfere with research on crisis communication in the social media 
context. If a study claiming to explore crisis communication actually selects a crisis risk 
case as either an experiment scenario or  collects data for content analysis, its research 
findings might be misleading. For instance, a study discussed an online apology and 
tested purchasing/donating behaviors during a crisis by examining Lowe’s case of 
pulling advertisements from a controversial TLC program, All-American Muslim 
(Kinsky, Drumheller, Gerlich, Brock-Baskin, & Sollosy, 2015). The program was 
controversial because some Muslims did not like the program’s portrayal of their faith 
and lifestyle, and some non-Muslims were concerned about the possibility of a hidden 
Islamic agenda that threatened traditional American values. However, what Lowe’s 
managed was a crisis risk, not a crisis. While Lowe’s decision led to online outcry and its 
apology on Facebook promoted more than 28,000 comments, there was no evidence 
suggesting financial loss or operational disruption. When arguing that Lowe’s did not 
truly apologize because it did not show mortification, the authors were operating from 
the assumption that the effective apology for a crisis requires an acceptance of crisis 
responsibility. Yet in Lowes’ case, there was no consensus on what Lowes’ had done 
wrong to put its own survival in question.  Therefore, clear conceptual distinction 
between a crisis risk and a crisis is also necessary for research on crisis communication 




Another reason why the term “social media crisis” should no longer be used is 
because nowadays almost all crises involve the channels of social media, as used by the 
publics, the organization, or both. Additionally, many traditional media rely on their 
social media extensions to disseminate news. Thus, we can say all crises are “social 
media crisis,” which nullifies the initial merit of this term: to emphasize the increasingly 
important roles of social media.  
In fact, evidence indicates some practitioners are wary of the questionable use of 
“social media crisis” to describe both crisis risks and crises. For example, Van den Hurk, 
the principal of a crisis management consulting firm, proposed a typology of crises based 
on their impact levels in her book Social Media Crisis Communications: Preparing for, 
Preventing, and Surviving a Public Relations #Fail (2013). According to this 
experienced practitioner, a Level-1 crisis is short-lived and has minimal impact, such as 
negative customer feedback, negative media stories, and venting from unhappy 
employees. A Level-2 crisis is an ongoing situation with moderate impact such as an 
activist campaign against an organization or an unresolved customer service issue. A 
Level-3 crisis arises from episodes such as employee misconduct and illegal 
organizational behavior . A Level-4 crisis is of catastrophic impact as in the cases of data 
breaching and natural disaster. Regarding the necessity of public response, Van den Hurk 
suggested that a Level-1 crisis might or might not need a communication response and 
Level-2, 3 & 4always need to be addressed.    
It seems like what this crisis consultant actually tried to articulate was the need to 




or level 4 crisis) and to be cautious about addressing the first two types of crises using 
traditional crisis response strategies. Clearly, more scholarly efforts are needed to 
account for practitioner concerns and instincts through clear illustration of the distinction 
and connections between crisis communication and crisis risk communication in the 
social media context.  
Paracrisis: Definition, Typology and Responses 
Definition 
To describe more accurately crisis risks that have been confused “social media 
crises,” Coombs and Holladay (2012) developed the term “paracrisis” to refer to a 
socially constructed crisis challenge or threat that may or may not develop into a crisis. 
In the past, organizations used to manage a crisis risk without full public awareness 
unless or until the risk was exposed by traditional media, as the publics relied heavily on 
traditional media for risk and crisis information. Since traditional media generally would 
not cover a crisis risk that does not pose threats to public safety or the survival of a high-
profile organization, risk management remained e a predominately internally-managed 
process before the prevalence of social media.  
However, the ubiquity of social media use by individuals and organizations 
means discontented stakeholder can go to social media to air their negative experiences 
and/or launch an accusation against an organization. Given the features of social media 
communities, these may or may not generate attention from other stakeholders.  If other 
stakeholders notice and endorse such negative content, an organization may need to offer 




However, the organization may determine the content does not pose a risk and chose not 
to respond. In the case of the former, this new type of crisis risk is similar to a crisis in 
that it requires public response; but it is not a crisis because it does not threaten either the 
reputational or the operational survival of an organization, at least not yet. In the case of 
the latter, the organization does not perceive the negative content as warranting a public 
response. 
Initially, Coombs and Holladay (2012) defined a paracrisis as arising from a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) challenge or “a publicly visible crisis threat that 
charges an organization with irresponsible or unethical behavior” (p. 409). Later, 
Coombs (2017; 2018) expanded the definition of paracrisis to encompass a wider range 
of crisis risks that appear to be crises but are actually crisis risks that are managed in 
potentially full view of all publics.  
Paracrisis Clusters 
Just as crises can be categorized into different types, paracrises also tend to group 
into identifiable types or clusters despite the wide contextual differences among them. To 
further understand crisis risks that require public responses from organizations, Coombs 
(2015) first distinguished four clusters of paracrises: (1) customer service, (2) misuse of 
social media, (3) venting, and (4) challenges.  
 First, Coombs described a customer service paracrisis as a situation where 
multiple customers complain about an organization’s product, service, or inappropriate 
social media use by employees. Second, misuse of social media is a situation when an 




example, GAP tweeted about its online shopping on its website during Super Storm 
Sandy, which was viewed as inappropriate and insensitive for many who lost power 
during and after the disaster (Nudd, 2012). Paracrises of this type might become a crisis 
if the violation is perceived as a significant ethical breach by an organization. Third, a 
venting paracrisis occurs when “stakeholders are simply angry at the organization and 
seek to express that anger” (Coombs, 2017, p. 285). Unlike costumers who launch a 
customer service paracrisis, angry stakeholders do not seek solutions but simply to 
release their anger. Fourth, the challenge paracrisis resembles Coombs and Holladay’s 
original definition of paracrisis. It occurs when stakeholders use social media to claim an 
organization is behaving in an irresponsible or unethical way.  
In a more recent work, Coombs (2019) revised the paracrisis typology to include 
four clusters: (1) faux pas, (2) rumor(s), (3) challenge(s), and (4) collateral damage. This 
new typology is quite different from the earlier one, with the challenge paracrisis as the 
only type included in the revision. According to Coombs (2019), a faux pas paracrisis 
occurs when an organization takes an action it believes is positive or neutral but is 
viewed by stakeholders as negative, racist, and/or insulting. A rumor paracrisis refers to a 
situation when “false or misleading information is purposefully circulated about an 
organization or its products in order to harm the organization” (p. 59). Lastly, a collateral 
damage paracrisis is “a risk of guilt by association” when “some negatively viewed actor 
mentions or is publicly associated with the organization” (p. 59).  
The customer service cluster was dropped from the more recent typology because 




management that can be addressed by following guidelines of customer service. 
Moreover, as customer service increasingly move online, customer complaints are 
normalized within the context of the customer service functions. Customer service fails 
become a crisis only when more unusual customer service concerns arise, such as those 
exposing evidence of product harm or tampering (Coombs, 2017).  
Connecting Crisis Communication Theories to Paracrisis Communication  
As reviewed earlier, paracrises are similar to crises in that they require public 
responses. Yet because paracrises are not crises, we should consider whether crisis 
response strategies can be applied to paracrisis communication. This section discusses 
the connections between paracrisis communication and crisis communication, arguing 
that effective paracrisis communication calls for a distinct set of public response 
strategies.  
To begin with, there are compelling reasons to believe crisis response strategies 
recommended by Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), the primary crisis 
communication theory in the field, cannot be applied directly to paracrises 
communication. Based on the assumption that attributed crisis responsibility affects 
organizational reputation, SCCT recommends matching response strategies with the level 
of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization. Yet, the level of attributed 
responsibility for a crisis is much higher than for a paracrisis, as a paracrisis is simply not 
as severe as a crisis. Furthermore, for a challenge paracrisis involving divisive issues, it 
is debatable whether an organization is responsible at all for doing something wrong or 




end up increasing the publics' perception of  paracrisis severity rather than mitigating the 
risk before it becomes a crisis. In addition, instructing and adjusting information, the 
ethical base response recommended by SCCT, probably is not applicable to paracrises 
because paracrises do not involve public safety issues. For crisis risks that impact public 
safety, stealing thunder should be considered during a pre-crisis stage 
We should be especially cautious about applying crisis response strategies that 
might seem to be applied for paracrisis situations. Take apology for example. According 
to SCCT, apology is a highly accommodative strategy that often comes at heavy costs to 
an organization. If an organization apologizes for a crisis, it means the organization 
accepts the crisis responsibility, including legal responsibility that often requires 
compensation or organizational changes to repair the damage and prevent the crisis from 
happening again. However, for a faux pas paracrisis where an organization inadvertently 
offends a group, making an apology incurs minimal costs, ranging from deleting an 
offensive tweet to canceling a controversial marketing campaign. For a challenge 
paracrisis involving divisive issues, an organization can choose to express regret without 
mortification if they do not want to support the issue stance advocated by the challenger. 
In such cases, we cannot conclude that because an organization does not show 
mortification, its apology is ineffective. Therefore, although paracrisis and crisis 
communication share the goal to protect reputation, a distinct set of paracrisis 
communication strategies may need to be developed to more accurately correspond to the 




For the same reasons, crisis response strategies identified in corporate apologia 
and image repair theory (IRT) cannot be applied directly to paracrisis communication. 
Nevertheless, existing crisis response strategies may provide useful information for 
developing paracrisis response strategies. For example, drawing from Benoit’s (1995) 
integration of apologia and account analysis, Coombs and Holladay (2015b) developed a 
list of responses for challenge paracrises, which will be reviewed in the next subsection. 
Similarly, based on findings from IRT and SCCT, it is reasonable to expect bolstering 
could be used for paracrisis communication, because bolstering is not associated with 
perceived level of crisis responsibility and, as a secondary strategy, can be used for all 
crisis types to reduce offensiveness.  
Recently, scholars have tried to extend DRT (discourse of renewal theory) to 
examine renewal after hoaxes (see Sellnow, Parrish, & Semenas, 2019). While the 
authors examined case studies on full-blown crises such as a campus shooting, their 
argument references hoaxes that were actually paracrises, such as the false claim of 
finding syringes in Pepsi cans. The authors argued the strategy of denial is not sufficient 
to clear the lingering concerns regarding a hoax and conclude the discourse of renewal 
can fill the gap. However, based on previous discussion, this project assumes that that a 
timely refutation against misinformation would be sufficient to manage a paracrisis and 
that applying discourse of renewal might be a waste of organizational resources. 
Nevertheless, more empirical studies are necessary to address this dispute on whether 




Finally, RAT’s (rhetorical arena theory) multivocal perspective seems 
particularly applicable to examining paracrises as socially constructed by both the 
organization facing a paracrisis and the voices in the arena. While this theory does not 
recommend specific communication strategies, it encourages scholars to observe how the 
organization and voices (publics) in the arena use social media to make sense of and 
manage the meanings and implications of paracrises. If we extend RAT to paracrises, it 
can be said that the rhetorical arena opens whenever a crisis threat is raised on social 
media. Additionally, it is highly likely the multiple voices will express many different 
views regarding the nature of a paracrisis. 
Paracrisis Response Strategies 
Because a paracrisis is a risk rather than an actual crisis, paracrisis 
communication requires a reconsideration of crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2017). 
Among all types of paracrisis, challenge paracrises are most complicated in terms of 
response options. When an individual or organization raises a challenge online, a social 
media manager may evaluate the situations and then decide which responses are 
appropriate. Drawing reference from crisis communication (Benoit, 1995) and rhetoric of 
agitation and control (Bowers, Ochs, Jensen, & Schulz, 2009), Coombs and Holladay 
(2015a) developed six response strategies for challenge paracrises: (1) refusal, (2) 
refutation, (3) repression, (4) recognition or reception, (5) reform, and (6) revision.  
As stated in their work (Coombs, 2017; 2018; Coombs & Holladay, 2015a), 
refusal is a form of deliberate silence. Organizations use it when they pretend to ignore 




includes two sub-strategies: denial with evidence and dispute (Coombs & Holladay, 
2015a). Denial with evidence asserts there is no violation of stakeholder expectations as 
supported by evidence, whereas dispute is used to argue that stakeholder expectations are 
invalid or unreasonable. Organizations can use refutation to protect their current practice 
from the challenge raised against it.   
Repression refers to an organization’s efforts to prevent a challenge from 
disseminating, such as deleting negative comments on the organization’s social media 
pages. This strategy is very risky because it seems like the organization tries to use its 
power to silence free speech, a practice inconsistent with the ethos of social media. It can 
only be used cautiously when an organization seeks to stop the circulation of rumors and 
misinformation.  
Recognition/reception is used when the organization acknowledges a problem but 
cannot take action due to various constraints. Revision is used when an organization 
makes a minor modification that is consistent with the challenger’s request, but is not the 
exact change proposed by the challenger. This strategy is used when the change proposed 
by the challenger is not feasible or too costly to make. Finally, reform occurs when an 
organization implements the exact change expected by the challenger.  
Apart from the response strategies to manage challenge paracrisis reviewed 
above, some sporadic efforts also have explored other response strategies used 
specifically for paracrises. For example, Kim et al. (2016) identified the strategies of 
self-mockery from an organizational leader and mocking the accuser in their case study 




was perceived to exaggerate its sales figures.  While their study profiled a fairly unique 
paracrisis and two responses, a more systematic study on how organizations are 
managing different types of paracrises would be necessary to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of paracrisis communication practices.  
Refining Typologies on Paracrisis Clusters and Response Strategies with Large Sample 
of Paracrisis Cases 
Coombs and Holladay’s work has provided a significant conceptual foundation 
for further development of theories on paracrisis communication. This dissertation 
argues the next important step towards theory development is to test and refine their 
typologies on paracrisis clusters and response strategies with a large sample of naturally-
occurring cases.  
Firstly, such examination and refinement will increase the ecological validity of 
the paracrisis typology to better guide paracrisis research and communication practices. 
External validity can be defined as the degree to which a research assumption is 
congruent with real-life circumstances (Schmuckler, 2001).  Strong external validity 
reflects effectively what occurs in actual contexts and increases confidence in the 
generalizability of the typology when categorizing paracrises. Furthermore, given the 
conceptual confusion underlying the wide use of “social media crisis,” an exhaustive 
typology on paracrisis clusters would not only provide criteria for identifying paracrisis 
types, but it would also explain what is not a paracrisis. In other words, an empirically 
tested paracrisis cluster typology will further clarify the confusion between a crisis and a 




thriving but not survival (see Coombs, 2002).Secondly, extant empirical research on 
paracrises also highlights the importance of an empirically-tested typology of paracrisis 
clusters as tied to a typology of response strategies. So far, the author has identified two 
peer-reviewed journal articles and one dissertation (Honisch, 2018) that examined the 
effectiveness of paracrisis response strategies. The study conducted by Kim et al. (2016) 
examined a paracrisis triggered by a Sina Weibo tweet sent by TMall, a Chinese e-
commerce platform. The Weibo tweet claimed that 2 million pairs of underpants were 
sold within an hour during China’s “Cyber Monday” and that if all underpants were laid 
out one after another, the row of underpants would be 3,000 km long. Other Weibo users 
soon pointed out that the Weibo tweet was an exaggeration because for the row of 
underpants to reach 3,000 km, each pair of underpants would be longer than a meter. By 
studying this case, Kim et al. found that traditional crisis responses may not work for 
paracrisis communication and that humorous self-mockery used by a corporate leader is 
an effective paracrisis response strategy. However, this TMall case, though professing to 
examine a paracrisis, seems fairly atypical and does not correspond to paracrisis types 
proposed by Coombs and Holladay. 
Honisch(2018) claimed to conduct an experimental study of paracrisis 
communication and offered response recommendations that differed substantially from 
Kim et al.’s recommendations. Using fictional paracrisis where International IT suppliers 
were accused of creating unethical contracts with producers that exploited Indian 
workers, Honisch examined respondent perceptions of organizational reputation and 




response whereas a humorous strategy is the least effective. However, it is very likely 
that the discrepancy between the results of the two studies results from vastly different 
paracrises they studied. A framework that offers meaningful distinctions between types 
of paracrises and ties response strategies to different types of paracrisis would better 
support and guide future empirical studies of paracrises. 
Another journal article (Roh, 2017) reports an experimental study to compare he 
effects of crisis responses strategies (deny vs. diminish) on public perceptions of a 
fictional paracrisis in which an identifiable individual (CEO vs. real estate agent) posted 
a racist tweet. At least two problems might constraint this study’s contributions to 
organizational paracrisis communication. Firstly, crisis response strategies were used to 
address the paracrises. Although the deny strategy seems to be identical with the denial 
with evidence response for challenges crisis, the former negates crisis responsibility 
whereas the later negates the violation of stakeholder expectations. Testing crisis 
response strategies for paracrisis studies may not help researchers or practitioners to 
distinguish between a paracrisis and a crisis. Secondly, the study’s responses and the 
measures for response effectiveness were more related to individual image repair than to 
organizational paracrisis communication. In the experimental setting, the responses were 
provided by the identifiable individual who posted a racist tweet. Participants’ perceived 
paracrisis responsibility after being exposed to a response was measured with individual-
oriented items such as the racist tweet was the identifiable individual’s mistake. As such, 
the experiment might contribute more to individual risk management than to 




It seems that empirical studies on paracrisis communication are about to take off. 
Given the deficiencies in the research designs and discrepant research findings reviewed 
above, it is all the more necessary to develop a framework connecting paracrisis clusters 
with response strategies to lay the groundwork for future empirical research on the 
effectiveness of organizational paracrisis communication. Therefore, the first study of 
this project seeks to answer the following research questions through case series analyses 
by collecting and analyzing a sufficiently large sample of paracrisis cases: 
RQ 1: To what extent do the current paracrisis typologies categorize paracrisis 
occurring from 2014 to 2017?  
RQ 2: What response strategies did organizations use to address paracrises 
occurring from 2014 to 2017?  
RQ 3: What single and combined response strategies were used to address 
different paracrisis clusters occurring from 2014 to 2017? 
Paracrisis Evolutions as Uncertain, Complicated Process 
Managing a paracrisis is challenging for companies partly because its life span 
can unfold on social media in highly uncertain and complicated ways. On one hand, 
because of social media’s interactive, participatory, and community features (Coombs, 
2015), a crisis threat might quickly become a social media hype (Pang, 2013) and evolve 
into a full-blown crisis. On the other hand, not all paracrises go viral. A crisis threat 
might stall in spreading with minimal or even no action from the threatened organization. 
Though practitioners may not be familiar with the term “paracrisis,” undoubtedly they 




example, a Marketwired article recommended reacting “appropriately” to risk online, 
because both overreacting and underreacting can hurt a brand (Sysomos, 2013). 
However, few studies have contributed to heuristic knowledge on how to monitor and 
diagnose a paracrisis so that managers can respond appropriately.  
One effective way to close this knowledge gap is to identify patterns of paracrisis 
evolution through in-depth case studies of various paracrises. As an initial effort in this 
direction, the second study of this project tracks the #DeleteUber movement, a paracrisis 
that originated in Twitter and led 200,000 Uber users to delete their accounts within three 
days. Inspired by a multivocal approach, Study 2 seeks to contribute to theories on 
paracrisis diagnosis by answering three fundamental questions: (1) how did this 
paracrisis evolve over time?; (2) who are the social media influencers (SMIs) shaping the 
evolution online?; and (3) what are the structural features of SMIs’ content dissemination 
on the social networking site?   
Specifically, Study 2 is guided b six research questions: 
RQ 1: How did the #DeleteUber paracrisis evolve over time online on Twitter? 
RQ 2:  Did news coverage from traditional media escalate the evolution of the 
#DeleteUber paracrisis to a crisis status?  
RQ 3: Who are the social media influencers (SMIs) during #DeleteUber on 
Twitter? 
RQ 4: How might their accounts be characterized?  
RQ 5: How might social media influencers (SMIs) change over time during 




RQ 6:  What are representative SMIs’ volumes and extends in spreading their 
original tweets in the form of retweets? 
To sum up, Chapter II presents a literature review that sets the theoretical 
foundation for this research, including definitions of key concepts, major crisis 
communication theories, a discussion on social media and risk and crisis communication, 
and a review on extant paracrisis communication research. This chapter ends with 
research questions for Study 1 (Chapter III) and Study 2 (Chapter IV).  Next chapter 








Alfonso, G.-H., & Suzanne, S. (2008). Crisis Communications Management on the Web: 
How Internet-Based Technologies are Changing the Way Public Relations 
Professionals Handle Business Crises. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 16(3), 143-153. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2008.00543.x 
Arpan, L. M., & Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R. (2005). Stealing thunder: Analysis of the 
effects of proactive disclosure of crisis information. Public Relations Review, 
31(3), 425-433. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.05.003 
Austin, L., Fisher Liu, B., & Jin, Y. (2012). How audiences seek out crisis information: 
Exploring the social-mediated crisis communication model. Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 40(2), 188-207.  
Barone, K. K. (2014). Analyzing discourse of renewal in post-crisis organizational 
resiliency among nonprofit organizations. (Doctoral), Indiana University of 






arone%202014%20discourse%20renewal%22   





Benoit, W. L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations 
Review, 23(2), 177-186. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(97)90023-0 
Bird, S. E. (1998). News We Can Use: An Audience Perspective on the Tabloidisation of 
News in the United States. Javnost - The Public, 5(3), 33-49. 
doi:10.1080/13183222.1998.11008681 
Bohman, J. (2004). Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects 
for Transnational Democracy. The Sociological Review, 52(1_suppl), 131-155. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.2004.00477.x 
Bowers, J. W., Ochs, D. J., Jensen, R. J., & Schulz, D. P. (2009). The rhetoric of 
agitation and control. Chicago, IL: Waveland Press. 
Brown, N. A., & Billings, A. C. (2013). Sports fans as crisis communicators on social 
media websites. Public Relations Review, 39(1), 74-81. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2012.09.012 
Burke, K. (1969). A rhetoric of motives (Vol. 178). Berkeley, CA: Univ of California 
Press. 
Burke, K. (1970). The rhetoric of religion: Studies in logology (Vol. 188). Berkeley, CA: 
Univ of California Press. 
Burlingame, R. (2016). DC Comics' Superman & Wonder Woman comic draws criticism 






Castelló, I., Morsing, M., & Schultz, F. (2013). Communicative Dynamics and the 
Polyphony of Corporate Social Responsibility in the Network Society. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 118(4), 683-694. doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1954-1 
Claeys, A.-S. (2017). Better safe than sorry: Why organizations in crisis should never 
hesitate to steal thunder. Business Horizons, 60(3), 305-311. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2017.01.003 
Claeys, A.-S., & Cauberghe, V. (2012). Crisis response and crisis timing strategies, two 
sides of the same coin. Public Relations Review, 38(1), 83-88. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.09.001 
Claeys, A.-S., & Opgenhaffen, M. (2016). Why practitioners do (not) apply crisis 
communication theory in practice. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(5-6), 
232-247. doi:10.1080/1062726x.2016.1261703 
Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the Right Words:The Development of Guidelines for 
the Selection of the “Appropriate” Crisis-Response Strategies. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 8(4), 447-476. doi:10.1177/0893318995008004003 
Coombs, W. T. (2002). Deep and surface threats: conceptual and practical implications 
for “crisis” vs. “problem”. Public Relations Review, 28(4), 339-345. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(02)00167-4 
Coombs, W. T. (2007). Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The 
Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory. 




Coombs, W. T. (2010a). Crisis communication and its allied fields. In W. T. Coombs & 
J. H. Sherry (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 54-64). Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Coombs, W. T. (2010b). Parameters for crisis communication. In W. T. Coombs & S. J. 
Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 17-53). Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. 
Coombs, W. T. (2015). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and 
responding: Sage Publications. 
Coombs, W. T. (2016). Reflections on a meta-analysis: Crystallizing thinking about 
SCCT. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(2), 120-122. 
doi:10.1080/1062726X.2016.1167479 
Coombs, W. T. (2017). Digital Naturals and the Rise of Paracrises: The Shape of Modern 
Crisis Communication. In S. C. Duhe (Ed.), New Media and Public Relations 
 (The third edition ed., pp. 281-290). Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang US. 
Coombs, W. T. (2019). Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and 
Responding. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2001). An Extended Examination of the Crisis 
Situations: A Fusion of the Relational Management and Symbolic Approaches. 
Journal of Public Relations Research, 13(4), 321-340. 
doi:10.1207/S1532754XJPRR1304_03 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2014). How publics react to crisis communication 




Communication Management, 18(1), 40-57. doi:doi:10.1108/JCOM-03-2013-
0015 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2015a). CSR as crisis risk: expanding how we 
conceptualize the relationship. Corporate Communications: An International 
Journal, 20(2), 144-162. doi:doi:10.1108/CCIJ-10-2013-0078 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2015b). How Activists Shape CSR: Insights from 
Internet Contagion and Contingency Theories. In A. Adi, G. Grigore, & D. 
Crowther (Eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility in the Digital Age (pp. 85-97). 
Bingley: Emerald Insight. 
Coombs, W. T., & Schmidt, L. (2000). An Empirical Analysis of Image Restoration: 
Texaco's Racism Crisis. Journal of Public Relations Research, 12(2), 163-178. 
doi:10.1207/S1532754XJPRR1202_2 
Craker, N., & March, E. (2016). The dark side of Facebook®: The Dark Tetrad, negative 
social potency, and trolling behaviours. Personality and Individual Differences, 
102, 79-84. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.06.043 
Dicker, R. (2017, Jaunary 17, 2017). IHOP’s Anti-Hillary Clinton Retweet Makes 
Customers Blow Their Stack. Hoffpost. Retrieved from 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ihops-anti-hillary-clinton-retweet-makes-
customers-blow-their-stack_n_587df41ae4b0897228652fc4 
Dionisopoulos, G. N., & Vibbert, S., L. (1988). CBS vs. Mobil Oil: Charges of creative 
bookkeeping in 1979. InH. R. Ryan (Ed.), Oratorical encounters In H. R. Ryan 




Doerr, B., Fouz, M., & Friedrich, T. (2012). Why rumors spread fast in social networks. 
Communications of the ACM, 55(6), 6.  Retrieved from 
https://hpi.de/friedrich/docs/paper/CACM1.pdf 
Dutton, J. E., & Jackson, S. E. (1987). Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to 
Organizational Action. Academy of Management Review, 12(1), 76-90. 
doi:10.5465/amr.1987.4306483 
Enli, G. S. (2009). Mass Communication Tapping into Participatory Culture: Exploring 
Strictly Come Dancing and Britain’s Got Talent. European Journal of 
Communication, 24(4), 481-493. doi:10.1177/0267323109345609 
ERM Initiative, & Protivit. (2019). Executive Perspectives on Top Risks for 2018: Key 
Issues Being Discussed in the Boardroom and C-Suite.  
Esterl, M., & Sonne, P. (2016, January 6, 2016). Coke Holiday Ad Depicting Russia Map 
Stumbles Into Geopolitical Row. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coke-holiday-ad-depicting-russia-map-stumbles-
into-geopolitical-row-1452122024 
Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: Planning for the inevitable: American Management 
Association. 
Fisher, W. R. (1989). Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of 
reason, value, and action. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. 
Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2010). Crisis communication, complexity, and the cartoon 
affair: A case study. In W. T. Coombs & S. J. Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of 




Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2016). Organizational crisis communication: A 
multivocal approach. Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage. 
Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2018). Voices in Conflict? The Crisis Communication of 
Meta-Organizations. Management Communication Quarterly, 32(1), 90-120. 
doi:10.1177/0893318917705734 
Fuller, R. P., Ulmer, R. R., McNatt, A., & Ruiz, J. B. (2019). Extending Discourse of 
Renewal to Preparedness: Construct and Scale Development of Readiness for 
Renewal. Management Communication Quarterly, 33(2), 272-301. 
doi:10.1177/0893318919834333 
Gammon, J. (2014). Over a quarter of Americans have made malicious online comments. 
YouGov.  Retrieved from https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/10/20/over-
quarter-americans-admit-malicious-online-comm/ 
Gilpin, D. R., & Murphy, P. J. (2008). Crisis management in a complex world. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Gomez-Carrasco, P., & Michelon, G. (2017). The Power of Stakeholders' Voice: The 
Effects of Social Media Activism on Stock Markets. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 26(6), 855-872. doi:doi:10.1002/bse.1973 
Hearit, K. M. (1994). Apologies and public relations crises at Chrysler, Toshiba, and 





Hearit, K. M. (1995). “Mistakes were made”: Organizations, apologia, and crises of 
social legitimacy. Communication Studies, 46(1-2), 1-17. 
doi:10.1080/10510979509368435 
Hearit, K. M. (1996). The use of counter-attack in apologetic public relations crises: The 
case of General Motors vs. Dateline NBC. Public Relations Review, 22(3), 233-
248. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(96)90047-8 
Hearit, K. M. (1997). On the use of transcendence as an apologia strategy: The case of 
Johnson controls and its fetal protection policy. Public Relations Review, 23(3), 
217-231. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(97)90033-3 
Hearit, K. M. (2006). Crisis management by apology: Corporate response to allegations 
of wrongdoing. Mahwah, NJ: Routledge. 
Helsloot, I., & Groenendaal, J. (2013). Twitter: An Underutilized Potential during 
Sudden Crises? , 21(3), 178-183. doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12023 
Honisch, S. V. (2018). The effects of paracrisis origin and response strategy on 
audience’s perceived organisational reputation and behavioural intentions. 
(Doctoral Dissertation), Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Retrieved from 
https://repositori2.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/35792/Honisch_2017.pdf?seq
uence=1&isAllowed=y   
Ihlen, Ø. (2002). Defending the Mercedes A-Class: Combining and Changing Crisis-





Johansen, B. F., Johansen, W., & Weckesser, N. M. (2016). Emotional stakeholders as 
“crisis communicators” in social media: The case of the Telenor customer 
complaints crisis. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 21(3), 
289-308. doi:doi:10.1108/CCIJ-05-2015-0026 
Kaman, B. L. (2005). Crisis, culture, community. Annals of the International 
Communication Association, 29(1), 275-310. 
doi:10.1080/23808985.2005.11679050 
Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and 
opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59-68. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2009.09.003 
Kim, S., Avery, E. J., & Lariscy, R. W. (2009). Are crisis communicators practicing 
what we preach?: An evaluation of crisis response strategy analyzed in public 
relations research from 1991 to 2009. Public Relations Review, 35(4), 446-448. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.08.002 
Kim, S., Zhang, X. A., & Zhang, B. W. (2016). Self-mocking crisis strategy on social 
media: Focusing on Alibaba chairman Jack Ma in China. Public Relations 
Review, 42(5), 903-912. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2016.10.004 
Kinsky, E. S., Drumheller, K., Gerlich, R. N., Brock-Baskin, M. E., & Sollosy, M. 
(2015). The Effect of Socially Mediated Public Relations Crises on Planned 
Behavior: How TPB Can Help Both Corporations and Nonprofits. Journal of 




Lambret, C. V., & Barki, E. (2018). Social media crisis management: Aligning corporate 
response strategies with stakeholders’ emotions online. Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management, 0(0). doi:doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12198 
Lauzen, M. M. (1995). Toward a Model of Environmental Scanning. Journal of Public 
Relations Research, 7(3), 187-203. doi:10.1207/s1532754xjprr0703_02 
Lazer, D. M. J., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, 
F., . . . Zittrain, J. L. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380), 1094-
1096. doi:10.1126/science.aao2998 
Lewis, L. (2019). 2019: This Is What Happens In An Internet Minute.    
Littlefield, R. S., Reierson, J., Cowden, K., Stowman, S., & Feather, C. L. (2009). A 
Case Study of the Red Lake, Minnesota, School Shooting: Intercultural Learning 
in the Renewal Process. Communication, Culture and Critique, 2(3), 361-383. 
doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2009.01043.x 
Lundgren, R. E., & McMakin, A. H. (2018). Risk communication: A handbook for 
communicating environmental, safety, and health risks. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Luoma-aho, V. (2015). Understanding stakeholder engagement: Faith-holders, 
hateholders & fakeholders. RJ-IPR: Research Journal of the Institute for Public 
Relations, 2(1).  
Ma, L., & Zhan, M. (2016). Effects of attributed responsibility and response strategies on 




theory research. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(2), 102-119. 
doi:10.1080/1062726X.2016.1166367 
Marichal, J. (2013). Political Facebook groups: Micro-activism and the digital front 
stage. First Monday, 18(12). doi:https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v18i12.4653 
Marketwired. (2008). New eBook, "There Is No Secret Sauce," Teaches Best Practices 
for Social Media Involvement by Companies.  Retrieved from http://sdn.sys-
con.com/node/522994 
Möller, A. M., Kühne, R., Baumgartner, S. E., & Peter, J. (2018). Exploring User 
Responses to Entertainment and Political Videos:An Automated Content 
Analysis of YouTube. Social Science Computer Review, 0(0), 
0894439318779336. doi:10.1177/0894439318779336 
Noble, C. H., Noble, S. M., & Adjei, M. T. (2012). Let them talk! Managing primary and 
extended online brand communities for success. Business Horizons, 55(5), 475-
483. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2012.05.001 
Nudd, T. (2012). American Apparel, Gap blasted for Hurricane Sandy Ad fails: Stormy 
sales pitches get chilly reception.   Retrieved from 
https://www.adweek.com/creativity/american-apparel-gap-blasted-hurricane-
sandy-ad-fails-144905/ 
O'Reilly, G., & Magee, K. (2010). Nestlé faces Facebook crisis over Greenpeace 






Ott, L., & Theunissen, P. (2015). Reputations at risk: Engagement during social media 
crises. Public Relations Review, 41(1), 97-102. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.10.015 
Palen, L., & Liu, S. B. (2007). Citizen communications in crisis: anticipating a future of 
ICT-supported public participation. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, San Jose, 
California, USA.  
Palenchar, M. J. (2005). Risk communication. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
pulci relations (Vol. 2, pp. 752-755). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pang, A. (2013). Social Media Hype in Times of Crises: Nature, Characteristics and 
Impact on Organizations. Asia Pacific Media Educator, 23(2), 309-336. 
doi:10.1177/1326365X13517189 
Pauchant, T. C., & Mitroff, I. I. (1992). Transforming the crisis-prone organization: 
Preventing individual, organizational, and environmental tragedies. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Pearson, C. m., & Clair, J. a. (1998). Reframing Crisis Management. The Academy of 
Management Review, 23(1). doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/259099 
Raupp, J. (2019). Crisis communication in the rhetorical arena. Public Relations Review. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2019.04.002 





Roh, S. (2017). Examining the paracrisis online: The effects of message source, response 
strategies and social vigilantism on public responses. Public Relations Review, 
43(3), 587-596. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2017.03.004 
Savage, S., Monroy-Hernandez, A., & Hollerer, T. (2016). Botivist: Calling Volunteers 
to Action using Online Bots. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 19th ACM 
Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, San 
Francisco, California, USA.  
Schmidt, S. (2017, March 27). ‘Sometimes, it’s ok to throw rocks at girls’: Jewelry store 




Schmuckler, M. A. (2001). What Is Ecological Validity? A Dimensional Analysis. 
Infancy, 2(4), 419-436. doi:10.1207/s15327078in0204_02 
Schudson, M. (2001). The objectivity norm in American journalism*. Journalism, 2(2), 
149-170. doi:10.1177/146488490100200201 
Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33(1), 
46-62. doi:10.2307/2092239 
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (2003). Communication and 
organizational crisis. Westport , CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Sellnow, T. L., Parrish, A., & Semenas, L. (2019). From Hoax as Crisis to Crisis as 




Renewal. Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research, 
2(1), 6.  
Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G. L., Varol, O., Yang, K.-C., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. 
(2018). The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature 
Communications, 9(1), 4787. doi:10.1038/s41467-018-06930-7 
Shoichet, C. E. (2014). Some CNN social media accounts hacked.   Retrieved from 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/tech/cnn-accounts-hacked/index.html 
Smallwood, C. (1995). Risk and organizational behavior: Toward a theoretical 
framework. In L. Barton (Ed.), New Avenues in risk and crisis managment (Vol. 
4, pp. 139-145). Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada, Small Business 
Development Center. 
Song, Y., Dai, X.-Y., & Wang, J. (2016). Not all emotions are created equal: Expressive 
behavior of the networked public on China's social media site. Computers in 
Human Behavior, 60, 525-533. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.02.086 
Stack, L. (2017, Nov. 20, 2017). Starbucks Is Criticized for Its Holiday Cups. Yes, 
Again. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/style/starbucks-gay-agenda.html 
Strauss, A. (1978). A social world perspective. Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 1(1), 9.  
Retrieved from https://www.uzh.ch/cmsssl/suz/dam/jcr:ffffffff-9ac6-46e7-ffff-
fffffdf1b114/04.22_strauss_78.pdf 
Stulz, R. M. (1996). Rethinking Risk Management Journal of Applied Corporate 




Sturges, D. L. (1994). Communicating through Crisis: A Strategy for Organizational 
Survival. Management Communication Quarterly, 7(3). 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318994007003004 
Sysomos. (2013). Social media crisis prevention tips from Sysomos.    
Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Sellnow, T. L. (2007). Post-crisis communication and 
renewal: Expanding the parameters of post-crisis discourse. Public Relations 
Review, 33(2), 130-134. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2006.11.015 
Ulmer, R. R., & Sellnow, T. L. (2002). Crisis management and the discourse of renewal: 
understanding the potential for positive outcomes of crisis. Public Relations 
Review, 28(4), 361-365. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(02)00165-0 
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (Eds.). (2009). Post-crisis communication 
and renewal: Understanding the potential for positive outcomes in crisis 
communication. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Van den Hurk, A. M. (2013). Social Media Crisis Communications: Preparing For, 
Preventing, and Surviving a Public Relations# fail: Pearson Education. 
Varol, O., Ferrara, E., Davis, C. A., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2017). Online human-
bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and characterization. 
Ware, B. L., & Linkugel, W. A. (1973). They spoke in defense of themselves: On the 
generic criticism of apologia. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59(3), 273-283. 
doi:10.1080/00335637309383176 
Wasserman, T. (2011). Red Cross Does PR Disater Recovery on Rogue Tweet.   




We Are Social, Hootsuite, & DataReportal. (n.d.). Most famous social network sites 
worldwide as of January 2019, ranked by number of active users (in millions).   
Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-
networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ 
Weber Shandwick, & KRC Research. (2015). Social media’s role in crisis management: 
A call for greater legal vigilance.  
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. 
Psychological review, 92(4), 548.  
Winter, M., & Steger, U. (1998). Managing outside pressure: Strategies for preventing 
corporate disasters. Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Xu, S. (2018). Discourse of renewal: Developing multiple-item measurement and 
analyzing effects on relationships. Public Relations Review, 44(1), 108-119. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2017.09.005 
Xu, W., & Zhang, C. (2018). Sentiment, richness, authority, and relevance model of 
information sharing during social Crises—the case of #MH370 tweets. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 89, 199-206. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.07.041 
Zhao, H. (2017). The Impacts of Contextual Factors on Social Media Crises: 
Implications for Crisis Communication Strategy Selection. International Journal 





CHAPTER III  
STUDY 1 
 
Chapter III presents Study 1 which focuses on the identification and description of 
paracrisis clusters and organizational response strategies used to address these paracrisis 
clusters. Study 1 elaborates and expands upon previous work to more precisely describe 
characteristics of naturally-occurring paracrisis cases identified through the case series.  
Study 1 also examines how these response strategies were used to address the observed 
paracrises in the case series. The organization of Chapter III is as follows: (1) a brief 
review of relevant literature from Chapter II to establish the rationale and research 
questions for Study 1; (2) methods used to address the research questions; (3) study 
results; and (4) a brief discussion, including limitations and theoretical and practical 
implications of Study 1.  
Overview 
The preceding review of literature demonstrates the field of crisis communication 
arose from the need for organizations to communicate effectively with stakeholders 
affected by a crisis (e.g., at a minimum, provide instructing and adjusting information to 
insure stakeholder well-being) as well as the need for organizations to reduce the 
negative consequences of a crisis. The risk tradition often situates communication about 
risks within the pre-crisis phase to emphasize the importance of information sharing and 
understanding risk-bearers’ perceptions and concerns in order to manage risk. However, 
risk communication also may be required in the post-crisis phase when organizations 




protection and to cope psychologically with a specific crisis. Thus, the need to manage 
risk is a preeminent organizational concern.  
Crisis has been defined as the manifestation of risk. Theories of crisis 
communication vary in their emphases (e.g., image repair, organizational renewal, 
multiple voices) and the explanatory mechanisms used to guide the selection of optimal 
communication strategies (e.g., attributions of responsibility, conditions for positive 
reconstruction). Despite differences, crisis communication theories offer guidance for 
minimizing negative outcomes for stakeholders and the organization, including damage 
to important tangible and intangible resources. The notable exception to univocal 
approaches to crisis communication (i.e., organizations communicating to stakeholders) 
is Rhetorical Arena Theory’s multivocal approach which proposes multiple voices begin 
communicating to, with, against, or past other voices in the arena when a crisis hits 
(Frandsen & Johansen, 2016).  
The multivocal approach does not privilege the voice of the organization or any 
particular media channel in crisis communication. Rather, the organization’s voice co-
exists with many other voices conveyed through myriad media – i.e., carriers of 
messages. Its complexity is both a strength and weakness. The multivocal approach offers 
provocative metaphors for contemplating the contributions of many voices to the arena 
that opens around a crisis. Thus, the approach may best reflect the multitude of voices 
available via social media and traditional media. The concept of paracrisis, including its 
concern with how crisis risks arise and are managed in online environments, seems 
consistent with issues raised through the multivocal approach.  Public challenges (voices) 




well as others (potential voices) in the arena. The consequences of such charges can be 
uncertain. To what extent will additional voices contribute to the challenge? Will other 
voices support the challenge? Will others even notice? How might these challenges affect 
the organizations (i.e., assessing crisis threat through likelihood and impact assessments)? 
Organizations within the arena are tasked with making sense of the charges and 
determining if and how they will respond to the challenges. This context sets the stage for 
Study 1 of this dissertation. 
Study 1 seeks to contribute to the arena that has opened around paracrisis 
research. As a relatively new concept, paracrisis warrants investigation to determine its 
ability to contribute to the arena – the scholarship of risk and crisis communication. 
Three concerns drive the research agenda presented in Study 1: identification and 
description of (1) paracrisis clusters, (2) organizational paracrisis response strategies, and 
(3) uses of response strategies to address different paracrisis clusters. The last synthesizes 
the first and second concerns to move toward a framework for recommending responses 
for managing paracrises in order to mitigate risks and prevent crisis from happening.  
 Study 1 poses three research questions designed to contribute to the body of 
knowledge surrounding paracrises: 
RQ 1: To what extent do the current paracrisis typologies categorize paracrises 
occurring from 2014 to 2017?  
RQ 2: What response strategies did organizations use to address paracrises 
occurring from 2014 to 2017?  
RQ 3: What single and combined response strategies were used to address 





Study 1 uses a case series method to identify, categorize, and describe paracrises 
and responses to paracrises. In the field of crisis communication, the case study method 
has been used widely, in part because crises are complicated, naturally occurring 
situations (Jaques, 2008) that cannot be fully assimilated by experimental designs (Yin, 
2009). Compared with other research methods such as experimental studies, the focused 
case study excels in enabling the researcher to gain in-depth knowledge on a specific 
commonly occurring, but little-understood, real-life phenomena that researchers generally 
have little control over (Merriam, 2009). Case studies often are comprised of a single 
case or a few cases selected because of similarities (e.g., similar types of crises). 
However, despite the case study’s strength in theory testing and refining in new research 
areas (Eisenhardt, 1989), research using this method is prone to deficiencies in validity, 
reliability, and generalizability (Cutler, 2004; Michael, Winfried, & Barbara, 2008).  
Because the case study is better-suited to in-depth analysis of a single crisis (or a limited 
set of similar crises), the traditional case study method was not appropriate for Study 1.  
Therefore, Study 1 adopts a case series, a method used in clinical research, to identify 
and describe paracrises and responses to paracrises to develop the paracrisis and response 
strategy typologies.   
Applying Case Series to the Identification of Paracrisis Clusters and Paracrisis Response 
Strategies 
The case series approach is a descriptive, unobtrusive research method often used 
in clinical research that allows researchers to “follow a group of patients who have a 




time” (Kooistra, Dijkman, Einhorn, & Bhandari, 2009). In clinical settings, in the absence 
of experimental protocol or a comparison group for medical treatment, case series offer 
an observational approach that enables patients and doctors to decide whether treatment 
is given or to obtain reports on novel diagnostic or therapeutic strategies. The primary 
purpose of a case series study is to develop hypotheses that can be tested later in clinical 
analytical studies with stronger methodological rigor. Compared to other clinical research 
methods, the case series excel in external validity because the study results resemble 
those obtained in actual, routine clinical practice. Including a diverse range of patients 
also increases external validity. Stronger external validity is advantageous because it 
suggests the results can be more appropriately generalized to other patient groups. 
Nevertheless, a limitation of this method is the potential for researcher bias in 
case selection and assessment. To address possible limitations in sample selection, 
researchers must articulate and apply clear criteria for case inclusion and exclusion. In 
addition, the approach is purely descriptive, not analytic, so no causal inferences are 
possible. Thus, only descriptive statistics can be used to characterize the sample.  
However, information gleaned from the case series may be used to formulate testable 
hypotheses for future research (Kooistra et al., 2009). 
 Although case series are rarely used outside of clinical research settings, the 
principles of case series offer a good fit with the purposes of Study 1 and can be grafted 
to descriptions of paracrisis clusters and responses to paracrises. Firstly, the term case 
series captures the nature of the sample and sampling purpose: to use predetermined 
criteria to collect a corpus of paracrisis cases to describe and cluster cases according to 




of the collected cases to existing paracrisis typologies proposed by Coombs and Holladay 
(Coombs, 2017, 2018; Coombs & Holladay, 2012, 2015).   
Secondly, Study 1 also seeks to increase the external validity of descriptions of 
paracrisis clusters and response strategies and refine these so they can be applied to 
similar cases outside of this case series sample. Furthermore the goal of a clinical case 
series study is to identify and describe possible medical treatments applied to patients in a 
non-experimental setting, so as to guide future analytical studies. This study also seeks to 
identify paracrisis "treatments," or the uses of response strategies to address different 
paracrisis clusters, as an essential step towards analytical research findings on 
organizational paracrisis communication.  
The following section elaborates how the sampling and data collection methods 
were used to strengthen external validity, avoid selection bias, and increase the accuracy 
of descriptions.  
Data Collection: Selecting the Sample 
The unit of observation for this study is a paracrisis case that occurred during 
January 2014 to December 2017. Miles and Hubermas (1994) suggested that depending 
on the richness and complexity of cases, researchers should decide how many cases are 
sufficient to answer their research questions. Following case series study’s guideline to 
collect a wide, diverse range of cases, this study aimed to cast a wide net to identify 
various clusters of paracrises reported over the time frame of four years. The goal is to 
capture both the overall characteristics as well as the peculiar elements of paracrisis 
which might occur less frequently, but still be worthy attention from crisis 




Since a case series approach is developed for clinical research and thus provides 
few guidelines on collection of text-based data, this study refers to Yin's (2009) data 
collection principles developed for case studies to ensure the rigor of this process. 
Specifically, two linked steps were taken:  (1) use of multiple sources of evidence and (2) 
summary of a case study database. Four separate rounds of literature search were 
conducted to collect cases from various sources. Figure 3 presents the task flow chart for 















As established in Chapter II’s review of paracrisis literature, incidents that could 
be defined more precisely as paracrises often simply are labeled as “social media crises.” 
Round 1. 
Google search for 
key phrases such as 
“social media crisis” 
Round 2. 
Search via Access World 
New with key phrases such 
as “social media crisis” 
Round 3. 
The New York Times 
search for challenge 
crises 
Round 4. 




from data set 




During the first round, key phrases such as “social media crisis”, “social media failure” 
and “social media blunder” coupled with “2017”, “2016”, “2015,” and “2014” were 
entered on Google’s search engine. During the second round, the same sets of key 
phrases were searched on Access World News, a data set that offers more than 5,900 news 
sources and trade publications at local, state, regional, national and international levels.  
Reviewing cases collected during these two rounds of search, the author realized 
most of them fall into or contain elements of the faux pas type of paracrisis and customer 
relations problems. However, the literature indicates challenge paracrises do pose risks 
for organizations; , the challenge paracrisis is the most complicated and intriguing of all 
paracrisis clusters (Coombs, 2017). Because challenge paracrises may be more complex 
and less likely to be labeled as simple social media crises, the search terms used earlier in 
the process may not have captured challenge paracrises. To potentially increase the 
sample of challenge paracrises or paracrises more aligning with the challenges type, the 
author then turned to social movement literature for possible key search phrases.  
From an activism perspective, a challenge paracrisis is also a form of 
communication that may be used by social movements to target companies as existing 
systems of authority. After initiating claims that an organization behaves in an 
irresponsible way, a challenger would need to engage in some form of collective action to 
generate pressure for the organization to respond. Specifically, King and Soule (2007) 
identified protest as the essential extra-institutional form or tactic that was often used in 
social movement activities. In their highly influential piece (King & Soule, 2007) on 




social movement and reviewed The New York Times published between 1962 to 1990 to 
extract protest events targeting U.S. companies.  
According to King and Soule (2007), the decision was made because newspaper 
data on protest events are one of the most frequently used sources in social movement 
literature, and The New York Times is well positioned to report protests against 
corporations. King and Soule also used keywords such as protest, activist, and 
demonstration to search events covered by The Wall Street Journal and The Washington 
Post and found neither of them provided more comprehensive coverage than The New 
York Times. Thus, following King and Soule’s data collection method for social 
movements challenging companies, the author conducted a third round of data collection 
by searching combinations of keywords such as “social media” and “protest,” “boycott,” 
“activist,” and “activism” on The New York Times archived from 2014 to 2017 provided 
by the data set of Lexis Uni. This round of search identified 42 cases.  
To strive for a sufficiently large sample of cases that might capture variations 
among challenge paracrises, one more round of search was conducted by searching cases 
on Mashable, a digital-born news media, using the same sets of key words to extract 
cases from The New York Times. Digital-born news media refer to news media 
organizations launched on digital platforms vs. those who are digital extension of 
traditional media (Painter, Kristiansen, & Schäfer, 2018). Over the past few years, 
digital-born media such as Buzzfeed, Mashable, and Vice, have forayed into the field of 
journalism and challenged traditional media. Generally speaking, digital-born media have 
younger social media audience bases, and are more sophisticated at creating contagious, 




2017). Given social media’s significant roles during paracrisis communication, it seems 
reasonable to assume that these digital outlets are important sources of information 
regarding for protests as well.  
Among major digital-born media, Mashable was chosen over others because of its 
content emphasis: Buzzfeed focuses more on entertainment, Vice on online video content, 
whereas Mashable features a focus on technology and social goods, which might be 
closely related with challenge paracrises. What’s more, a closer look at Mashable’s 
coverage suggested this rising media outlet sought to be objective and impartial through 
making efforts to include corporate voices as well. In addition to covering activists’ 
protests, they also reached out to the challenged companies for a response, especially 
when the company had not issued any public statement before their coverage. Using the 
same sets of key words to extract paracrisis cases from The New York Times, the author 
conducted the fourth round of case collection from Mashable and identified 22 additional 
cases that were not found in previous rounds. 
Only cases that fit into the definition of paracrisis (Coombs, 2019; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2012) were retained in the data set for analysis. Three criteria of exclusion 
were used to guide this data cleaning process. First, crises occurring without a paracrisis 
or fermenting stage were excluded. These are negative events that once exposed or 
happened, immediately threatened an organization’s operation and/or reputational 
survival. For example, in 2017, large companies and government agencies learned their 
advertisements appeared next to extremist content on YouTube, one of Google’s 
subsidiaries. This means brands were actually unwittingly funding extremists, because an 




earned. This event immediately threatened Google’s operational survival because brands 
pulled millions of dollars in advertising, and governments as well as companies were 
pressuring Google to take corrective actions (Solon, 2017). Although cases like this one 
are often addressed as “social media crises,” they are actually crises that involve social 
media, either as related with the crisis causes or were discussed on social media, or both.  
The second criterion for case exclusion is to filter out negative situations that 
should be better managed by other management functions rather than risk or crisis 
communication. These situations include (1) customer relations issues and (2) labor rights 
disputes. As reviewed in Chapter II, customer relations was dropped from the revised 
paracrisis typology because customer complaints via social media should be addressed by 
social customer relations management rather than through paracrisis communication 
strategies. Likewise, labor rights disputes are usually managed through an internal 
conflict resolution process involving the corporate management, employees, and 
sometimes government mediators and legal forces. Nevertheless, if a customer relations 
issue or a labor rights dispute violates important stakeholders’ expectations on safety, 
economic interests or environmental issues, it then becomes a crisis and would require 
intervention from crisis professionals. For instance, in 2017, an uncooperative United 
Airlines customer was knocked out and dragged from an airline. Once this event was 
exposed via social media, United Airline was faced with a crisis (Benoit, 2018) because 
its actions may have broken laws surrounding safety issues and expectations for 
passenger treatment were egregiously violated. Although this event was originally 




full-blown crisis unveiled through social media and actively discussed by various voices 
on social media.  
Thirdly, “social media fails/blunder/crises” that were actually problems posing 
very minimal threats to organizational reputation were excluded. For instance, on 
November 24, 2017, McDonald’s tweeted: “Black Friday **** Need copy and link****”.  
Although this tweet was mentioned by several practitioners and social media 
consultancies as a “crisis” or “big fail” (e.g., Roberts, n.d.), it is only a mistake and did 
not violate any important public expectations. In addition to these three criteria of 
exclusion, any accusation or protest targeting individuals or countries were filtered out 
during the four rounds of searches.  Eventually, 143 paracrisis cases reported during 2014 
to 2017 were included in the sample (See Appendix A for a sample of cases).  
After collecting cases and filtering out those that did not fit the definition of 
paracrisis, the author then proceeded to the second step of a rigorous data collection, 
building a case study data set (Yin, 2009). For this case series study, each paracrisis case 
was summarized as including, but not limited to, name of the organization facing a 
paracrisis, the name of challenger (if any), description of the crisis threat or accusation, 
platform(s) on which the crisis risk was made publicly available, and the date on which 
the paracrisis first appeared.   
Secondly, the organization’s responses were entered into the data set, including 
the responses issued via its own social media account(s), the corporate website, and/or 
statements obtained by news media and/or trade publications. Also included in the data 
set are the author’s research notes when summarizing cases and collecting organizational 




software tool used to store, manage, and code large quantities of data in a time-efficient 
manner (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). In addition to these two steps for a rigorous data 
collection, Yin (2009) also listed a third principle designed to increase the reliability of 
case information: the maintenance of a chain of evidence, or the explicit links between 
the research questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn. This third 
principle can be fulfilled as the data collected directly address the research questions and 
the conclusions are based on an analysis adequately grounded in the data.   
It should be noted that the purpose of collecting paracrisis cases from different 
sources with different sets of keywords and phrases was not to build an exhaustive data 
set of all paracrises occurring during the period. Such mission would be impossible as 
media and trade publications may not cover every incident meeting the definition of a 
paracrisis, especially those confronted by small companies. However, given the scope of 
the four rounds of search, it is reasonable to expect the data set is comprehensive in 
paracrisis clusters. A quick review of the data set also indicates wide coverage of various 
types of organizations experiencing paracrises, including government agencies, 
nonprofits, large companies headquartered in different countries, medium-sized 
companies, and small businesses owned by families. Therefore, analysis based on this 
data set can be expected to have satisfactory external validity to account for paracrisis 
cases outside of this data set.  
Analysis Procedure  
The three research questions are addressed using different units of analysis. For 
RQ1 concerning paracrisis clusters, each individual paracrisis case scenario serves as the 




organization’s public reaction towards a paracrisis. For RQ3 connecting paracrisis 
clusters with response strategies, the unit of analysis is a paracrisis case, including a 
paracrisis scenario and the response strategies used to address the paracrisis. A three-step 
mixed content analysis was conducted to answer the three research questions that differ 
in unit of analysis. Firstly, a round of open coding was conducted, with reference drawn 
from existing paracrisis typologies (Coombs, 2015; 2018) and challenge paracrisis 
responses (Coombs & Holladay, 2015) as well as other crisis communication responses 
and elements identified in (para)crisis communication literature.  
After this round of opening coding, a constant comparative analysis (CCA) was 
conducted to distill open codes into main codes. Originating from Grounded Theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), CCA is an iterative and inductive qualitative analysis procedure 
that allows categories to emerge by reducing data through constant recoding (Fram, 
2013). Constant comparisons were made (1) within cases and responses labeled by the 
same codes, (2) by the same code families, (3) among cases and responses labeled by 
different codes, and (4) by different code families (Eisenhardt, 1989). This process 
enabled the author to more fully conceptualize similarities and differences that could be 
used to describe categories.  
The second round of in-depth analysis led to a paracrisis typology with six 
paracrisis clusters and a response strategy typology containing seven strategies.. 
Operational definitions for categories also were drafted. For the last step, the two 
typologies were returned to the entire data set to examine if they can account for all cases 
and responses, and if revisions of operational definitions should be made. During this 




that there was no outlier piece of data that cannot be explained by the framework (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). These two revised typologies were then returned to the data set to 
recheck coding of clusters and response strategies. Based on the audited coding results, 
the author proceeded to calculate the frequencies of paracrises clusters, as well as 
different response strategies used to address different clusters of paracrises.  
Reliability Measurement 
An intracoder reliability test was carried out to assess coding reliabilities for the 
typologies on paracrisis clusters and response strategies. Although intracoder reliability is 
"the weakest form of reliability check" (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 271), it excels in 
pinpointing possible coder drift (Neuendorf, 2016) the author might make when 
developing the two typologies. Thus, an intracoder reliability test would be the first step 
to check reliability for this exploratory study.   
The intracoder reliability test was conducted on a subset of 27 paracrisis cases 
randomly drawn from all 143 cases, which is about 20 percent of the full data set. The 
author coded this subset of cases at two different time frames with an interval of more 
than a month. Krippendorff’s alpha test (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007; Lombard, Snyder-
Duch, & Bracken, 2002) was used to estimate the intracoder reliability. The results are 
satisfactory for both paracrisis clusters (α = 1.00) and response strategies (the respective 
alpha values for refusal equals 1.00, for recognition .85, for refutation .93, for revision 








In line with the three research questions, this section on paracrisis communication 
contains three related components. The first subsection reports the classification of 
paracrisis clusters (RQ1), the second presents categories of response strategies 
organizations used to manage the paracrises in the sample (RQ2), and the third details 
various single and combined response strategies used to manage the paracrisis clusters 
(RQ3).  
Paracrisis Typology 
Drawing from Coombs’ conceptual work on paracrisis clusters (2015; 2019), this 
study identified six paracrisis clusters: (1) challenge, (2) faux pas, (3) social media 
misuse, (4) guilt by association, (5) misinformation, and (6) social media account hacking 
(Table 4). Among the six clusters of paracrises, Clusters 1 and 3 were identified in the 
two paracrisis typologies proposed by Coombs (2015; 2019). Cluster 2’s description was 
expanded, Clusters 4 and 5 were adopted from Coombs’ 2019 typology but were renamed 
to more sufficiently capture actual cases, and Cluster 6 is a newly identified type. 
 
 
Table 1 Typology on Paracrisis Clusters 
Paracrisis Cluster  Description  Frequency  
1. Challenge 
A situation when an organization's existing practice 
is charged by discontented stakeholders as unethical 











2. Faux Pas 
A situation when (1) an organization takes an 
action with good or no bad intention but is 
perceived by at least some publics as 
embarrassing, offensive, or insensitive;  
or (2) when an organization unintentionally allows 
people to generate embarrassing, offensive, or 
insensitive content that can be attributed to the 
organization.      56 
3. Guilt By 
Association 
A situation occurs when a negatively viewed actor is 
publicly associated with an organization        32 
4. Social Media 
Misuse 
A situation when an organization incurs crisis risk 
because it violates social media rule(s). 4 
5. Misinformation A risk situation triggered by the circulation of messages that lacks veracity 5 
6. Social Media 
Account Hacking 
A situation happens when an organization's social 
media account is hacked and generates crisis risk 2 
 Total 143 
 
 
As the only paracrisis type identified in both versions of Coombs’ paracrisis 
typology (2015; 2019), a challenge paracrisis occurs when an existing organizational 
practice, such as taking an issue stance or enacting a corporate policy, is accused of being 
unethical or irresponsible. This definition remains unchanged from previous 
conceptualizations of a challenge paracrisis. 
The second paracrisis cluster, faux pas paracrisis, was originally defined as a risk 
situation where an organization takes an action with good or no bad intention but that 
action is perceived by at least some publics as embarrassing, offensive, and/or insensitive 
(Coombs, 2019). The sampled cases suggested the need to modify this conceptualization 






of faux pas to further distinguish two different types of faux pas paracrises (Table 4). The 
first type of faux pas, or Type I faux pas, follows Coombs' definition (2018) as a situation 
where an organization itself takes an action that can be interpreted as embarrassing, 
offensive, and/or insensitive. The second type of faux pas, or Type II faux pas, refers to a 
situation where an organization unwittingly allows people to generate embarrassing, 
offensive, and/or insensitive content that can be attributed to the organization. Perhaps 
this type of faux pas had not been described in previous research due to its actual 
infrequent occurrence and/or perceived lack of “newsworthiness.” 
Although there were only 3 Type II faux pas out of all 58 faux pas paracrises in 
this data set, these two faux pas types are qualitatively different from each other and the 
differences might affect organizations' response strategies. For Type I faux pas, the 
organization is fully responsible for the action, albeit with no deliberate intention to upset 
the publics. But for Type II faux pas, the locus of control is more ambiguous. For 
example, Coca-Cola created a Tweeter generator that turned tweets with #MakeItHappy 
into cartoon pictures with ASCII code and urged its consumers to tag negative Tweets 
with this hashtag.  Gawker, an online media company and blog network, soon noticed 
Coke tweeted an ASII dog made up by the “Fourteen Words" slogan of white 
nationalism. Gawker than created a Twitter bot to post quotes from Mein Kampf, Hitler’s 
autobiographical manifesto with #MakeItHappy, so that Coke would turn those lines into 
art (Monllos, 2015). Compared to Type I faux pas where an organization is fully 
responsible for creating an ad or engaging in offensive action, the locus of control in this 
case was less on the company and more on those who abused this social campaign. For a 




manipulate its action to reduce the perceived responsibility for offending the publics (i.e., 
refutation). In Coke’s case, its spokeswomen clearly stated, “It's unfortunate that Gawker 
is trying to turn this campaign into something that it isn't. Building a bot that attempts to 
spread hate through #MakeItHappy is a perfect example of the pervasive online 
negativity Coca-Cola wanted to address with this campaign” (Monllos, 2015). However, 
for a Type I faux pas, the attacking strategy might not be recommended because the locus 
of control is less debatable because theorganization is responsible for creating the 
“objectionable” content. The other two paracrisis clusters proposed by Coombs (2019), 
rumor and collateral damage, were identified as mutually exclusive clusters in the sample 
and were renamed to provide more precise descriptions. The category of rumor paracrisis 
is renamed as misinformation paracrisis to account for a situation where “false or 
misleading information is purposefully circulated about an organization or its products in 
order to harm the organization” (Coombs, 2019, p. 59). By using the term misinformation 
instead of rumor, the author expands this paracrisis type to include other messages that 
are ambiguous in veracity. Though we have seen terms such as misinformation, rumor, 
and disinformation used interchangeably in academic work to describe messages or 
content that lacks truthfulness, there are important conceptual differences among those 
terms. For example, rumor is often defined as unconfirmed information (e.g., DiFonzo & 
Bordia, 2007) that can turn out to be either true or not. In contrast, misinformation is false 
and stems from the deliberate intention to mislead (Faris et al., 2017; Shin, Jian, Driscoll, 
& Bar, 2018). In addition to rumors, disinformation, and misinformation, the circulation 




To include paracrises resulting from all messages lacking truth value, the author 
thus follows Rojecki and Meraz’s (2016) conceptualization of misinformation as 
covering different types of unverified messages: rumor, gossip, disinformation, 
propaganda, and factitious information blend (FIB). According to Rojecki and Meraz, 
rumor and gossip originate from individual sources and are spread out of personal, 
psychological motivations; disinformation and propaganda are said to have state actors as 
sources and are spread to influence public attitudes; disinformation is meant to erode 
public support, whereas propaganda is used to muster public support. Rojecki and Meraz 
also proposed a new term, factitious information blend (FIB), to refer to misinformation 
generated by elites and “opinion entrepreneurs” who seek to discredit political rivals.  
By using Rojecki and Meraz’s understanding of misinformation to rename this 
paracrisis cluster, this author does not attempt to distinguish different types of 
misinformation. In some cases, it is impossible and unnecessary for organizations to 
distinguish misinformation types to manage a paracrisis. One example of this difficult 
situation was experienced by Roberta's, a Brooklyn restaurant, in 2016. Misinformation 
on social media sites such as Voat, a social media news aggregator featuring “no 
censorship,” linked this restaurant to the so-called Pizzagate hoax that claimed Hillary 
Clinton led a child-abuse gang that harbored children as sex slaves in a pizza restaurant. 
A Voat user posted an alleged finding of a reference to Roberta’s in one of Hillary 
Clinton’s emails, which then spurred discussion on related topics such as whether the 
restaurant’s logo, a skeleton holding a pizza paddle, connected the restaurant to the 
conspiracy. Suddenly this local restaurant became the center of national political fights 




this case, it would be difficult to accurately distinguish between rumor, misinformation, 
disinformation, and even FIB. Thus, misinformation as an overarching term may more 
accurately capture the complicated online flux of unverified information posted against 
organizations.  
The paracrisis type originally called collateral damage by Coombs (2019) was 
renamed “guilt by association.” Coombs’ definition of collateral damage used the term 
guilt by association: “a risk of guilt by association happens when some negatively viewed 
actor mentions or is publicly associated with the organization” (p. 59). Through renaming, 
the author distinguishes this type of paracrisis from the frequently used meaning of 
“damage” in the crisis literature, as in reputational, financial, and/or operational damage. 
Because a paracrisis only has the potential of causing such damages, guilt by association 
may more appropriately describe a situation where an organization faces a crisis risk 
because it is associated with some negatively-viewed entity. For example, Jim Beam 
experienced backlash on Twitter when its celebrity spokeswoman, Mila Kunis, stated on 
the "Conan Show" that she had been donating to Planned Parenthood under Vice 
President Mike Pence’s name in a form of “peaceful protest.” Although Jim Beam had 
never made pro-choice statements, it was still denounced online by some social media 
users who oppose the pro-choice stance and who saw the company as associated with the 
actress’s comments (Ledbetter, 2017).  
The analysis also revived a paracrisis type proposed by Coombs in 2015 but 
dropped in 2019: social media misuse. This paracrisis cluster refers to  situations where 
an organization engenders crisis risk because it violates the often unarticulated ethos of 




cases in the data set, this type is unique and should not be equated with a faux pas or 
challenge paracrisis. Take, for example, DiGiorno Pizza’s inappropriate use of 
#WhyIStayed. After a video surfaced of Ray Rice punching his then-fiancee Janay 
Palmer, thousands of female Twitter users used #WhyIStayed during the discussion of 
their physically and emotionally tortuous experiences in abusive relationships. DiGiorno 
jumped onto the trendy hashtag and tweeted "#WhyIStayed You had pizza.” This tweet 
was vehemently denounced as highly inappropriate and offensive to female victims of 
domestic violence who used the hashtag to share their heartbreaking stories (Meyer, 
2015). This tweet could not be interpreted as an innocent mistake on DiGiorno’s part. 
Rather, using the popular but emotionally-laden hashtag to promote their products was 
viewed as exploitive. The commercialization of the hashtag trivialized the issue of 
abusive relationships.  
Likewise, social media account hacking, the newly-identified cluster of paracrises, 
also occurred infrequently (n = 2) but cannot be categorized into other paracrisis clusters. 
Social media account hacking often provokes short-term social media attention and 
discussion because the account is hacked to post insensitive, controversial, or even 
egregious content. While most hackings are crises because they jeopardize an 
organization’s daily operation and threaten information security, social media account 
hacking typically poses relatively minimal risk and can be managed easily with 
appropriate responses. Hacking a social media account is qualitatively different from 
hacking for financial benefit to access data from an organization.   
Overall, the case series of 143 cases informed the identification, description, 




paracrises, the analysis supported the need to distinguish between six clusters and to 
further refine definitions presented in extant literature. Faux pas (n = 56) was the most 
frequently observed paracrisis, and together with challenge (n = 44) and guilt by 
association (n = 32) paracrises, comprised 92.3% of the paracrisis cases. Though social 
media misuse (n = 4), misinformation (n = 5), and social media account hacking (n = 2) 
occurred less frequently, their contents represented qualitatively distinct clusters that 
warranted their own labels. 
Paracrisis Response Strategies 
The second part of Study 1 addresses RQ2 concerning use of paracrisis response 
strategies. The response strategies corresponding to the previously classified cases were 
identified. Coombs and Holladay (2015) proposed six response strategies for challenge 
paracrises: (1) refusal, (2) refutation, (3) repression, (4) recognition and/or reception, (5) 
reform, and (6) revision. Their operationalizations provided the groundwork for 
identifying response strategies in the data set.  
The author found all six response strategies were used to manage not only 
challenge paracrises but also the other paracrisis clusters. This is not surprising because 
their proposed response strategies generally are consistent with response strategies 
identified for crises. However, because the original response strategies were developed 
for challenge paracrises, revisions of the response strategy descriptions were made to 







Table 2 Paracrisis Response Strategies 
Response Strategies Description 
Refusal An organization deliberately ignores a paracrisis by not making any direct response 
Refutation An organization denies a challenge accusation, an accused bad intention, or attack the accuser  
Repression 
An organization takes efforts to silence discontented 
stakeholders through actions such as deleting negative social 
media posts 
Recognition An organization acknowledges the validity of a challenge 
accusation or an accused negative intention 
Revision An organization takes action to make change(s) regarding a 
faux pas or a challenged existing organizational practice 
Reference to 
Organizational Values 
An organization refers to its organization values and/or its 
long-termed commitment to pursue the values to address an 
accused negative intention or a challenge 
Disassociation An organization denies its connection with an negatively perceived actor or action that generates crisis risk 
 
 
In addition to revising response strategy descriptions, the reform and revision 
strategies developed by Coombs and Holladay (2015) were collapsed into the single 
revision strategy. Originally, the revision strategy was reserved for instances of requests 
for minor modifications, whereas the reform strategy was reserved for cases where the 
exact change expected by the challengers was implemented. However, given the 
multivocal nature of the social media arena, different challengers may hold different 
expectations for revision and reform. In other words, the demands made with respect to a 
particular issue may differ. More importantly, it can be difficult to distinguish between 
the two. Like a crisis, a paracrisis may be a sudden, emergent situation that requires a 
quick response from an organization. It is not uncommon for an organization to make an 




challenge, and then engage in a relatively long-term management process to negotiate 
with challengers and take further actions. In such scenarios, only the initial response to a 
challenge would be counted as a paracrisis response; whether the organization eventually 
implements the reform is not a concern for paracrisis communication at this point. 
Therefore, the decision was made to collapse reform and revision into one single 
response strategy to refer to organizations’ efforts to make changes regarding a faux pas 
or a challenge paracrisis.  
Furthermore, two new response strategies were identified: disassociation and 
reference to organizational values. Disassociation is typically used to address two 
paracrisis clusters: guilt by association and social media hacking. The goal is to separate 
the organization from a negatively viewed action (e.g., a racist tweet posted by a hacked 
account) or an actor (e.g., an employee who engaged in racial profiling of a customer). 
Disassociation comes in two forms: direct disassociation and indirect disassociation. The 
former is used when an organization publicly announces its disconnection with the entity 
and the negativity associated with the entity. In contrast, latter is used when an 
organization drops its connection with the entity without directly addressing the 
negativity element in a public statement. This often happens when a controversial or even 
divisive issue is involved. For example, in 2017, online activists organized a boycott to 
urge several department stores to drop Ivanka Trump’s brand because of President 
Trump’s political stances. While several department stores did drop the brand following 
the protests, none of them stated publicly that the decision was in reaction to the protests 
or had anything to do with their corporate stances toward with President Trump (Taylor 




The other newly identified response strategy is reference to organizational values. 
When organizations are accused of offending people or engaging in unethical or 
irresponsible behaviors, many of them refer to their organization’s values to counter  
criticism and to remind the publics of their continuous commitment to certain causes.  A 
somewhat similar strategy, bolstering, was also observed in the cases. Bolstering is a 
“secondary” crisis response strategy recommended by SCCT that is used to foster a 
positive connection with stakeholders. However, as a secondary strategy, bolstering 
cannot stand alone to address public concerns but can be combined with any of the six 
primary crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2019). Thus, bolstering is not considered to 
be a separate paracrisis response strategy. In contrast, reference to organizational values 
can be used alone to address paracrisis challenges, because an organization can express 
and validate its issue stance by stating its values. Reference to organizational values is 
used to justify its (in)actions. All paracrisis response strategies identified in the sample 
can be coded into the seven primary strategies, along with bolstering as a secondary 
response strategy which was used to remind the publics of an organization's positive 
facts. 
Connecting Paracrisis Response Strategies with Paracrisis Clusters  
The third part of Study 1 seeks to connect paracrisis response strategies with 
clusters to examine if there are any patterns of applying certain response strategies to 
address a specific paracrisis cluster (RQ3). While some paracrisis cases were managed 
with a single response strategy, most cases were addressed by using more than one. Table 
3 reports the frequencies and percentages of stand-alone and combined response 




Table 3 Single and Combined Uses of Response Strategies to Address Six Paracrisis Clusters 
 
Single and Combined Response 
Strategies 









n % n % n % n  % n % n % 
Refusal 4 9.10 3 16.25 5 15.63 0 0.00 2 40.00 0 0.00 
Refusal & Revision 11 25.0
0 
1 0.45   2 6.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refusal & Disassociation 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refusal & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Repression & Reference to 
Organizational Values 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 20.00 1 0.50 
Refutation 9 20.4
5 
2 0.37 5 15.63 1 25.0
0 
1 0.20 0 0.00 
Refutation & Repression 0 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refutation & Recognition  1 2.27 2 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refutation & Revision 1 2.27 6 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 




2 0.24 5 15.63 1 25.0
0 
1 20.00 1 50.00 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 3 6.81 21 0.12 1 3.15 1 25.00 
0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
1 2.27 1 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refutation, Recognition, & 
Reference to Organizational Values 

































Note.. The n size is the frequency of single or a combined response strategies used to manage a paracrisis cluster; percentage 
represents the n size of a strategy divided by the total number of paracrises within the cluster.  
Table 3 Continued 
Single and Combined Response 
Strategies 









n % n % n % n  % n % n % 
Refutation, Recognition, Revision, 
& Reference to Organizational 
Values 
1 2.27 0 0.04 2 6.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Refutation, Recognition, Reference 
to Organizational Values, & 
Disassociation 
0 0.00 0 0.00 2 6.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Recognition 0 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Recognition & Revision  4 9.10 8 0.16 2 6.25 2 50.0
0 
0 0.00 0 0.00 
Recognition, Revision, & Reference 
to Organizational Values 
0 0.00 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 50.00 
Revision  1 2.27 0 0.04 2 6.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Revision & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
1 2.27 0 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Reference to Organizational Values 0 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Disassociation 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Reference to Organizational Values 
& Disassociation 
0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total paracrisis number of each 
cluster:  44    56    32     4     5     2   
114 
 
As presented in Table 3, the author identified 21 single and combined response 
strategies by using an organization’s response for each case as the unit of analysis. 
Specifically, four single strategies, namely refusal, refutation, revision, and reference to 
organizational values, were used as stand-alone responses to address a paracrisis; and 19 
different combinations of response strategies were applied by using two to four response 
strategies together to address one single paracrisis. To better illustrate how strategies 
were applied to manage different paracrisis clusters, three additional tables display the 
single and combination strategies for the most frequently-observed paracrisis clusters: 
challenge, faux pas, and guilt by association paracrises. Since the data set contains few 
cases for the clusters of social media misuse (n = 4), misinformation (n = 5), and social 
media hacking (n = 2),  no separate tables were constructed for these clusters. Limited 
information was available to report different uses of response strategies, and these three 
clusters were less complicated to manage. The following subsections will review the 
uses of response strategies for the six paracrisis clusters in turn.  
Single and Combined Response Strategies for Challenge Paracrises 
Table 4 presents the strategies used to address challenge paracrises. Unlike Table 
3 that only focuses on reporting the frequencies of all single and combined response 
strategies used to manage the 6 paracrisis clusters, Table 4 organizes 20 different uses of 
response strategies to manage challenge paracrises with respect to the 4 paracrisis 
response strategies identified for RQ2. Therefore, in Table 4, a combined use of 
response strategies is displayed more than once, in order to illustrate the occurrence of 









Table 4 Strategies Used to Address Challenge Paracrises 
Paracrisis Response 




Refusal 4 9.10 
Refusal & Revision 11 25.00 
Repression  
(0, 0.00%) N/A 0 0.00 
Refutation  
(21, 50%) 
Refutation 8 18.19 
Refutation & Revision 2 4.55 
Refutation & Recognition  1 2.27 
Refutation & Reference to Organizational 
Values 6 13.64 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 3 6.81 
Refutation, Recognition, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, Recognition, Revision, & 
Reference to Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Recognition  
(9, 20.45%) 
Recognition & Revision  4 9.10 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 3 6.81 
Refutation, Recognition & Reference to 
Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, Recognition, Revision, & 









Table 4 Continued 
Paracrisis Response 




Revision  1 2.27 
Refusal & Revision 11 25.00 
Recognition & Revision  4 9.10 
Refutation & Revision 2 4.55 
Revision & Reference to Organizational 
Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 3 6.81 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 




(10, 22.73%)  
Refutation & Reference to Organizational 
Values 6 13.64 
Revision & Reference to Organizational 
Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, Recognition, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Refutation, Recognition, Revision, & 
Reference to Organizational Values 1 2.27 
Disassociation  
(0, 0.00%) N/A 0 0.00 
Total Number of Challenge Paracrises: 44 
Note. a represents the n size and percentage of challenge paracrisis cases that were 
addressed with a primary paracrisis response strategy divided by the total number of 
challenge paracrises. b represents the n size and percentage of challenge paracrisis cases 
that were addressed with  single or combined response strategies divided by the total 







Among the seven paracrisis response strategies, refutation (50%), revision 
(50%), refusal (34.09%), and recognition (20.45%) were all used frequently. It is not 
unexpected that organizations were taking different reactions towards CSR-based 
challenges, because the institutionalization of CSR has been based on the interplays of 
multiple, plural and sometimes conflicting voices in today’s networked society (Castelló, 
Morsing, & Schultz, 2013). An organization might choose different response strategies 
by considering the plural discourses underlying a challenge, the context where a 
challenge is raised, and its own CSR practices and organizational values.  
For example, Starbucks has been explicitly supported homosexual right (Garcia, 
2016). But when a prominent Muslim group in Malaysia joined calls by Islamic 
conservatives in Indonesia to protest the company for its pro-LGBT stance, Starbucks 
Malaysia used the strategy of refusal by not responding to news media’s request for 
comments (Harris, Cahya, & Latiff, 2017). Note that the LGBT issue is more sensitive 
and controversial in Malaysia than in the U.S. If the company’s Malaysia branch used 
refutation, it might attract more attention to the challenge and risk alienating more 
stakeholders because of the local context. But if the company uses more accommodative 
strategies such as recognition to express their understanding of the challengers’ 
concerns, it might incur criticism from all over the world for both withholding their 
diversity efforts and being inconsistent or even opportunistic with their CSR practices. 





what constitutes being socially (ir)responsible, it is not surprising that a continuum of 
strategies ranging from refutation to revision was applied to address various challenges.  
The complexity in addressing challenge paracrises in a multivocal arena is 
further reflected in the combined uses of response strategies. For example, refutation 
was used in tandem with revision in 6 out of 44 challenge paracrises (13.64%). At first 
glance, this combined use might deliver inconsistent messages: refutation is a defensive 
response strategy that denies a challenge accusation, whereas revision is an 
accommodative strategy as an organization takes action to make changes regarding its 
challenged organizational practice. However, a closer inspection of case scenarios 
suggests that such seemingly inconsistent use is actually well grounded in the multivocal 
or polyphonic interpretations on corporate social (ir)responsibility (Castelló et al., 2013).  
For instance, on 2017's World Refugee day, Starbucks announced its decision to 
hire 2,500 refugees across its European locations by 2022. In line with the company’s 
CSR practices and values, Starbucks’ decision was a response to Trump’s temporary 
travel ban on refugees and immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries. The 
company soon received backlash for its promise to hire refugees rather than unemployed 
people in the U.S.. In response to these challenges and accusations, Starbucks said it had 
already hired over 8,800 veterans and claimed its brand perception and customer 
satisfaction were not affected negatively by their promise to hire refugees. Additionally, 
the company also promised to speed up its previously stated goal of hiring 10,000 





the accusation that Starbucks did not hire U.S. citizens and that by doing so, the 
company tarnished its own reputation, Starbucks also made a revision as it promised 
more efforts to hire veterans. In this way, two response strategies were used to address 
different concerns and the message was clear and coherent.  
Similarly, refusal and revision were used together to address 25% of all challenge 
paracrises in the data set. For example, when pressed by activists to drop the Trump 
brand, Sears Holding Corporation announced that it would remove 31 Trump-branded 
items due to a stock refresh without making any direct reference to the challenge, and 
stated that the company preferred to focus on its business and “leave the politics to 
others” (Disis & Wiener-Bronner, 2017). In this way, the company used refusal as if 
deliberately ignored the challenge that it is irresponsible to carry the Trump brand. 
While we cannot know whether dropping the brand was part of its strategic initiative to 
optimize brand assortment, it is clear that by announcing this decision, the company was 
also using revision as it took at least some action regarding the challenge. Cases like 
these further showcase the complicated concerns for addressing challenge paracrises 
online: when pressed by different CSR expectations and interpretations, an organization 
would need to consider multiple voices in the arena and might use more than one 








Single and Combined Response Strategies for Faux Pas Paracrises 
Table 5 presents the single and combined response strategies used to address 
faux pas paracrises with respect to the seven response strategies. A faux pas paracrisis is 
a situation where an organization either unintentionally takes an action that is perceived 
by at least some publics as embarrassing, offensive, or insensitive or a situation where 
the organization allows people take embarrassing, offensive, or insensitive actions that 
can be traced back to an organizational action. Unlike challenge paracrises, where an 
organization’s existing practice and its implications are open to different, conflicting or 
even polarizing interpretations, faux pas paracrises are less ambiguous in terms of 
publics’ interpretations of an organizational action, because even those who are not 
offended by a faux pas can see why it’s offensive. Among the seven response strategies, 
refutation was used most frequently (67.86%) to deny a bad intention, followed by 
recognition (69.64%) as organizations acknowledged the unintentional act and admits it 
could be valid, and revision (55.36)% in the form(s) of deleting problematic social media 
content, halting offensive marketing campaigns, and/or promising to prevent a similar 














(n and %)a 
Single and Combined Response Strategies nb %b 
Refusal 
(4, 7.14%) 
Refusal 3 5.36 
Refusal & Revision 1 1.79 
Refutation 
(38, 67.86%) 
Refutation  2 3.57 
Refutation & Repression 1 1.79 
Refutation & Recognition 2 3.57 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 21 37.50 
Refutation, Recognition, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
3 5.36 
Refutation & Revision 6 10.71 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
1 1.79 
Refutation & Reference to Organizational Values 2 3.57 
Repression 
(1, 1.16%) Refutation & Repression 1 1.79 
Recognition 
(39, 69.64%) 
Recognition 2 3.57 
Recognition & Revision 8 14.29 
Recognition, Revision & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
3 5.36 
Refutation & Recognition 2 3.57 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 21 37.50 





Refutation & Revision 6 10.71 
Refutation, Recognition & Revision 21 37.50 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
1 1.79 











(n and %)a 





Reference to Organizational Values 1 1.79 
Refutation, Recognition, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
3 5.36 
Refutation, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 
1 1.79 




(0, 0%) N/A 0 0 
Total Number of Faux Pas Paracrises: 56 
Note. a represents the n size and percentage of faux pas paracrises that were addressed 
with a primary paracrisis response strategy divided by the total number of faux pas 
paracrises. b represents the n size and percentage of faux pas paracrises that were 
addressed with  single or  combined response strategies divided by the total number of 
faux pas paracrises. 
 
 
Regarding the combined use of response strategies, the three combined response 
strategies that recurred most often are: (1) refutation, recognition, and revision (37.5%), 
(2) recognition and revision (14.29%), and (3) refutation and revision (10.71%).  Such 
combined uses can be coherent as an organization might deny bad intention, 
acknowledge the validity of an accusation, and take corrective actions (i.e., delete an 
offensive tweet) to manage a faux pas.  
Single and Combined Response Strategies for Guilt by Association Paracrises 
            Table 6 reports the response strategies applied to address guilt by association 





perceived negatively not because of its own action, inaction, or existing policy, but 
because of its association with a negatively viewed entity. While an organization can use 
dissociation to sever its connection with a negatively viewed entity to reduce crisis risk, 
this study found that disassociation (15.63%) was used less frequently than refusal 
(28.13%), refutation (46.82%), recognition (21.88%), revision (28.13%), and reference 
to organizational values (34.38%). This is probably because denying association with a 
negatively viewed entity often comes at a tangible cost, ranging from firing an employee 
involved in racial profiling at workplace (Clarke-Billings, 2016), to terminating a 
partnership with a controversial celebrity hunter (Mirabella & Barker, 2016), to a 
business owner’s self-resignation because of his offensive remarks on political, 
religious, and feminist issues (Lindelof, 2017).  
Furthermore, when an entity is viewed negatively by some publics because of a 
complicated, divisive issue, using disassociation to sever its connection with such an 
entity would fail to address different concerns in the arena and might even make an 
organization looks inconsistent given its previous connection with the entity. In such 

















(n and %)a 
Single and Combined Response Strategies nb %b 
Refusal  
(9, 28.13%) 
Refusal 5 15.63 
Refusal & Revision 2 6.25 
Refusal & Disassociation 1 3.13 
Refusal & Reference to Organizational Values 1 3.13 
Refutation  
(15, 46.82%) 
Refutation  5 15.63 
Refutation & Reference to Organizational Values 5 15.63 
Refutation, Recognition, Reference to 
Organizational Values, & Disassociation 2 6.25 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 1 3.13 
Refutation, Recognition, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 2 6.25 
Repression 
(0, 0%) N/A 0 0.00 
Recognition  
(7, 21.88%) 
Refutation, Recognition, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 2 6.25 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 1 3.13 
Refutation, Recognition, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 2 6.25 
Recognition & Revision 2 6.25 
Revision  
(9, 28.13%) 
Revision 2 6.25 
Refusal & Revision 2 6.25 
Refutation, Recognition, & Revision 1 3.13 
Refutation, Recognition, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 2 6.25 





Refusal & Reference to Organizational Values 1 3.13 
Refutation & Reference to Organizational Values 5 15.63 
Refutation, Recognition, Reference to 
Organizational Values, & Disassociation 2 6.25 
Refutation, Recognition, revision, & Reference to 
Organizational Values 2 6.25 
Reference to Organizational Values & 
Disassociation 1 3.13 










(n and %)a 
Single and Combined Response Strategies nb %b 
Disassociation 
(5, 15.63%) 
Disassociation 1 3.13 
Refusal & Disassociation 1 3.13 
Reference to Organizational Values & 
Disassociation 1 3.13 
Refutation, Recognition, Reference to 
Organizational Values, & Disassociation 2 6.25 
Total Number of Guilt by Association Paracrises: 32 
Note. a represents the n size and percentage of faux pas paracrises that were addressed 
with a primary paracrisis response strategy divided by the total number of guilt by 
association paracrises. b represents the n size and percentage of guilt by association 
paracrises that were addressed with single or  combined response strategies divided by 
the total number of guilt by association paracrises. 
 
 
The combined use of refutation and reference to organizational values (15.63%) 
stood out among 12 different combined uses of response strategies applied to address 
guilt by association paracrises. Compared with refutation as a stand-alone response 
strategy (15.63%), this combined use might be more effective if an organization’s 
refusal against an accusation is in line with its long-term practices and values.  
For example, Under Armour was denounced as divisive after its CEO, Kevin 
Plank, called Trump a “real asset” for the country in a CNBC interview (Bhasin, 2017). 
Though Plank’s opinion on Trump cannot be equated to the company’s stance on issues, 
disassociation might not be an effective response strategy as a CEO often is viewed as 





supported Trump’s business policies, not his social viewpoints. Plank soon released two 
statements to further address this paracrisis by emphasizing the company’s commitment 
to “developing innovative ways to support and invest in American jobs and 
manufacturing” (Bhasin, 2017). With specific evidence on their long-term strategies for 
domestic manufacturing, Plank was able to reinforce his argument on why he and the 
company have supported Trump’s business policies. Additionally, Plank highlighted the 
company’s values regarding equal rights, diversity, and immigration issues to further 
refute the accusation of being divisive. In this way, using refusal coupled with references 
to organizational values might be more effective than using disassociation or refusal as a 
stand-alone strategy.  
Response Strategies for Social Media Misuse, Misinformation, and Social Media 
Account Hacking Paracrises 
Because this data set has very limited cases of social media misuse, 
misinformation, and social media account hacking paracrises (See Table 3), no 
convincing response strategy patterns can be discerned for these three clusters. 
Compared with the three paracrisis clusters reviewed earlier, these three clusters are 
relatively easier to manage because the loci of responsibility and control are less 
ambiguous. For example, social media misuse paracrises are situations when an 
organization violates social media ethos, as in the case of DiGorno Pizza’s offensive 
misuse of #WhyIStayed. Since DiGorno was fully responsible for abusing an 





recognition to admit and apologize for its senseless social media misuse, and (2) revision 
to delete the promotional tweet “"#WhyIStayed You had pizza.” Refutation should be 
used very cautiously because denying its intention to sell its products by taking 
advantage of a serious trendy hashtag might not be convincing.  
For misinformation paracrises, the most appropriate response strategy is 
refutation that denies a falsified charge and provides corrective information. Repression 
such as deleting comments might only be considered if the comments violate social 
platform rules and/or prevalent social media ethos. For social media account hacking, 
refutation can be used to deny the agency of posting offensive social media content, 
together with recognition to acknowledge the inappropriateness of content posted by 
hackers, and revision to delete the content and promise future action to prevent similar 
paracrises from occurring again.  
To sum up, there is no panacea that could be applied across all paracrisis clusters. 
To choose effective response strategies, an organization would need to understand 
various voices on the arena, evaluate the costs and implication of (not) taking actions, 
and ensure the coherence of paracrisis communication.   
Discussion 
On the one hand, the availability of social media platforms has created 
opportunities for organizations to engage in real-time, interactive communication with 
stakeholders. On the other hand, organizations are now compelled to face and address 





threats may attract the attention of practitioners keen to sell their services and 
mainstream media who may be drawn to a paracrisis' conflict elements. Though trade 
journals and some research have labeled these threats as "social media crises," this term 
focuses more on the platform rather than the varied reasons for these incidents.  
This investigation confirms the vagueness and inadequacy of the term "social 
media crises" as it obscures important differences between crisis threats requiring public 
risk communication and other online incidents, as well as differences among various 
types of crisis threats emerging in online environments. By sifting through trade 
publications and news media coverage on "social media crises" over the time frame of 
four consecutive years, this study suggests that the term "paracrisis" is more useful and 
can distinguish crisis threats requiring public risk communication from mere incidents, 
negative online feedbacks, and/or trolling that have few negative consequences.  
Specifically, this case series shows that while customers' online complaints are 
often referred as "social media crises," they are actually customer relations problems that 
can be addressed by the function of customer relation management rather than by risk or 
crisis management communication. Customer relations problems, as well as other 
operational problems that are spread online, such as online labor rights protests, are not 
paracrises because paracrises are closely aligned with stakeholders' corporate social 






 Brown and Dacin (1997) distinguished two types of corporate associations 
stakeholders have with a company, CA associations and CSR associations. Sohn and 
Larisy (2012, 2014) extended this distinction to the field of crisis communication to 
draw the differences between two types of reputational crises: CA reputational crises and 
CSR reputational crises. CA reputational crises are critical events "adversely affects 
reputation associated with expertise of products and service, technological innovation, 
and industry leadership", whereas CSR reputational crises are major events that "pose a 
threat to reputation associated with norms and values cherished by society and socially 
expected obligation" (Sohn and Lariscy, 2014, p. 25).  
If we extend this CA-CSR distinction to view online crisis threats, it is clear that 
paracrises are CSR crisis threats triggered by accusations or challenges contingent upon 
social obligations. In contrast, customer complaints and other operational problems 
spread online are CA incidents that might have the potential to evolve into a CA crisis if 
not addressed properly. But before a CA incident shows signs of escalation, intervention 
should be delivered from a corresponding operational function, not crisis communication 
professionals. The only situation when paracrisis communication is necessary for a CA 
problem is when an organization treats its customers or employees in unfair or unjust 
ways, which can be linked to CSR. But the reasons for the paracrises would be the unfair 
or unjust treatment, not products or services.  
Besides further illustrating what is and what is not a paracrisis, this study also 





Holladay’s conceptual work on the typologies of paracrisis clusters (RQ1) and response 
strategies (RQ2) (Coombs, 2017; 2018; Coombs & Holladay, 2012, 2015) through a 
series case study. Though case studies are valuable tools in theory-building (Yin, 2009), 
often cases are selected because they “stand out” from other cases due to factors like 
exceptional controversy or miserable failure. Describing a range of cases that have been 
systematically selected and presumably are free from researcher bias helps to ensure the 
external validity of the typologies derived from the cases. Furthermore, connecting the 
typology of response strategies to the typology paracrisis clusters (RQ3) represents the 
first step towards building an organizational paracrisis communication framework. As 
such, this study will contribute to paracrisis communication research in several ways.  
Firstly, developing a classification of paracrisis clusters is an essential step 
towards further theory development in paracrisis communication. A weakness in existing 
paracrisis research is the tendency to draw conclusions for paracrisis management 
communication without considering the differences among various paracrisis clusters.  
For example, Kim, Zhang, & Zhang (2016) identified humorous self-mocking as 
the most effective response strategy. Drawing partly from Kim et al.’s (2016) research 
findings, Honisch (2018) then found that a humorous strategy was the least effective 
strategy compared with reform, refusal, and refute strategies. What Kim et al. (2016) 
examined  should be classified as a faux pas paracrisis that arose when a company sent a 
Weibo tweet that unintentionally exaggerated product sales numbers. Arguably, humor 





was actually recognition and refutation: Alibaba’s CEO used humor to acknowledge the 
company’s mistake to exaggerate its sales number and to deny the accused intention to 
literately falsify figures to promote itself.  
In contrast, what Honisch (2018) investigated seemed to be challenge paracrises 
where companies were challenged for their contracts with factories experiencing labor 
rights conflicts. Humor as a form of response strategy might not be appropriate because 
a challenge paracrisis is often related with issues more serious than a faulty sales figure. 
Therefore, the discrepancy in the effectiveness of response strategies can be at least 
partially explained by the fact that these two studies were examining different paracrisis 
clusters; thus, their conclusions are incommensurable. 
As such, without a clear understanding of varied reasons for paracrisis 
development that could sort paracrises into different clusters, scholarly efforts to test the 
effectiveness of paracrisis response strategies may have limited heuristic value and 
flawed practical implications. In other words, future work on response strategies based 
on a consensus understanding of paracrisis clusters will be more productive in 
generating theories to guide practice.  
Secondly, this study contributes to paracrisis research through the identification 
of a set of response strategies gleaned from the analysis of actual communication 
practices. Coombs and Holladay (2015) developed an inventory of response strategies 
for challenge paracrises by drawing from the crisis literature and the rhetoric of agitation 





strategies. This study further refined and expanded the inventory of responses to all 
paracrisis clusters. These seven paracrisis response strategies identified in the current 
investigation support Coombs’ (2017) argument that paracrisis responses are variations 
of crisis responses. Though paracrisis response strategies might resemble crisis response 
strategies, they may appear to differ when applied to paracrisis communication practices.  
For example, the refutation paracrisis response strategy might look like the denial 
strategy used for crisis communication, which also includes the tactic of attacking the 
accuser. The point is that in actual situations, denial as a crisis response strategy is used 
differently from refutation as a paracrisis response strategy. When using the denial 
strategy to manage a crisis, an organization either denies the existence of a crisis or 
denies its responsibility for causing the crisis. Therefore, denial is a highly defensive 
strategy that cannot be used with more accommodative strategies such as correction 
action. For example, for a technical error crisis (i.e., operational error crisis), it is not 
appropriate to use the denial strategy (which claims there is no crisis) together with 
either a compensation strategy (which provides money to victims) or with an excuse 
strategy (which minimizes the organization’s culpability for the crisis) because the two 
sets of strategies send t inconsistent messages about the situation.  However, as shown in 
Table 3, refutation frequently was used in combination with other more 
“accommodative” strategies such as recognition and/or revision to manage challenge and 
faux pas paracrises. An organization can use refutation to deny its intention to cause 





preclude similar incidents from happening again. Such combined use of strategies 
underlies the dynamic of agitation and control during paracrisis communication 
Arguably, this dynamic is what separates paracrisis response strategies from 
crisis response strategies. Agitation exists when people outside the establishment 
advocate changes from the establishment. In response to agitation, the establishment 
uses control responses, including avoidance, suppression, adjustment, and capitulation 
(Bowers, Ochs, Jensen, & Schulz, 2009). Coombs and Holladay (2015b) identify the 
parallels in agitation-control dynamics between social movements and challenge 
paracrises and modified the four control responses into the domain of paracrisis 
communication.  
As discussed before, a crisis is a negative event or situation where important 
stakeholder expectations on safety, economic interests, and/or fundamental ethical issues 
are violated. The negative outcomes of a crisis can be measured by damages experienced 
by important stakeholders and/or the organization itself. However, for any paracrisis, 
there is likely to be dissensus among stakeholders regarding the existence and/or severity 
of the crisis risk. Though the existence and severity of a crisis also is largely subjective, 
the existence of a paracrisis and perceptions of its severity may be even more so as a 
paracrisis is related with social obligations and is thus more open to stakeholders' 
interpretation. Therefore, when addressing a paracrisis communicatively constructed by 
multiple and sometimes opposing voices, an organization may consider using combined 





effectiveness of using multiple, sometimes seemingly contradictory response strategies 
to respond to paracrisis is a researchable question that may further support the distinction 
between crisis and paracrisis. 
Thirdly, by connecting organizations' uses of response strategies with different 
paracrisis clusters, this study provides an essential step towards building a coherent 
framework on organizational paracrisis communication with rich possibilities for 
developing and testing hypotheses. Take challenge paracrises for example. As reviewed 
earlier, refutation and refusal as more “defensive” strategies were used more frequently 
than revision and recognition as more “accommodative” ones. It is likely that contextual 
factors related with a CSR challenge might affect organizations' selections of response 
strategies.  
When being challenged for less contestable issues, an organization might use 
"accommodative" strategies such as revision and/or recognition; but if a challenge 
involves more contestable or divisive issues, an organization might be more likely to 
consider the use of refusal (i.e., deliberately making no response) to avoid the risk of 
alienating important stakeholders whose issue stances are different from the challengers'.  
In 2018, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University 
conducted a survey on CEO activism and found that Americans' attitudes towards CEO 
activism varied by issues (Larcker, Miles, Tayan, & Wright-Violich, 2018). Most 
Americans were found to be in favor of environmental issues such as clean air or water 





(68%) and income inequality (66%). While the focus of this survey was CEO's advocacy 
impacts, it might also showcase that the publics tend to have less divisive expectations 
for companies regarding these issues. Thus, when an organization is challenged as 
irresponsible or unethical in one of these issue arenas (Luoma-aho & Vos, 2010), 
revision and recognition might be more effective, as suggested by Honisch's (2018) 
experimental study on a challenge paracrisis regarding a labor rights issue.  
However, an organization might be more cautious when using recognition and 
revision to address a challenge paracrisis involving controversial, divisive issues. The 
survey on CEO activism suggested that while 40% of Americans supported CEO 
activism on gender issues, 37 did not; 43% supported activism on LGBTQ rights, 32% 
did not; and although 45% favored activism on racial issues, 29% did not. Abortion, 
politics, and religion are all found to be issues with net-unfavorable reactions, meaning 
more Americans agree that CEOs should not use their position and influence to advocate 
for these issues. Furthermore, more Americans tend to decrease their purchasing if they 
do not agree with a CEO's advocacy stance than to increase their purchasing because 
they support the CEO's advocacy position (Larcker et al., 2018).  
Given the publics' tendency to decrease purchasing (Larcker et al., 2018) because 
of disagreement with an organization's advocacy position, it is possible that if a company 
makes a revision to address a challenge paracrisis involving a divisive issue, the 
company might draw more attention to the challenge and risk estranging more 





why refusal was used frequently to address more than a third of challenge paracrises in 
this data set; and why organizations sometimes made "quiet" revisions, i.e.  implemented 
actions suggested by a challenge but refrained from making direct, explicit public 
statements.  
Actually, the salience of divisive issues is not limited to challenge paracrises; the 
above-mentioned issues also underlie accusations against unintentional organizational 
actions (i.e., faux pas paracrises) and organizations' association with a controversial 
entity (i.e., guilt by association paracrises). For example, Pepsi and Coca-Cola both 
experienced a faux pas paracrises for publishing a Russian map including Crimea, a 
controversial area over which  the Ukraine also claims sovereignty. When Pepsi used 
refusal and declined to make any comments, Coca-Cola apologized and published a new 
map without Crimea, which then triggered another round of protests from Russia 
(Beshisky, 2016). Because of this backfire, Coca-Cola seemed to attract longer and 
heavier media attention than Pepsi. Thus, for paracrises on divisive issues, refusal might 
be effective if an organization would not wish to take sides s and risk losing  
stakeholders; revision might also be used, but ideally in combination with other response 
strategies to deliver a more subtle yet coherent message that respects different voices in 
the arena.  
Apart from the nature of issues involved in a paracrisis, an organization's own 
values are likely to play an essential role in deciding which response strategies can be 





Kaepernick, a former NFL quarterback and national-anthem protest leader, suggest that 
companies are increasingly taking public positions on issues that are not directly related 
with their business but are in line with their organizational values. Meanwhile, the 
publics have increasingly expected and pressured organizations to make responses when 
they are not satisfied with an organization's (in)action regarding CSR issues. This 
investigation found that reference to organizational values was used together with 
recognition, revision, and/or refutation to address paracrises related with various issue 
arenas on race, gender, religions and immigration. It is possible that by referring to 
organizational values, a paracrisis statement might be more effective in account 
acceptance (i.e., effectively defend the organization’s stance), as it suggests that the 
organization's action, inaction, and/or revision is in line with its intrinsic, long-standing 
values rather than out of some opportunistic concerns.  
Conclusion  
So far, few researchers have examined these types of online risks, termed 
paracrises. Because this research is in its infancy, foundational work is needed to first, 
determine if the paracrisis concept is viable as distinct from crisis, and second, to better 
understand the nature of paracrises and how organizations engage in paracrisis 
communication. This research represents the first study to identify paracrisis clusters and 
response strategies applied to address these clusters in naturally-occurring paracrises 





empirical research on paracrisis communication will benefit from this study’s 
description of how organizations communicate to manage risks posed by paracrises.  
Limitation and Future Research Directions 
That being said, Study 1 is limited in its theoretical contributions because it is a 
descriptive study seeking to identify typologies of paracrisis clusters and response 
strategies with high external validity. Nevertheless, it represents an essential first step in 
developing sound typologies. Future work could build on this study to conduct further 
studies to examine and test response strategies used to address different paracrisis 
clusters. For example, analytic studies can be conducted to explore whether reference to 
organizational values would actually increase account acceptance for different paracrisis 
clusters.  
Secondly, this study is limited in that the typologies on paracrisis clusters and 
response strategies were developed without  insider knowledge on how the organizations 
made sense of the paracrises and what were their intended communication goals behind 
their paracrisis responses. There might be situations where the author's categorization of 
response strategies did not fully capture an organization's own sense-making process. 
For example, an organization might not respond to a press request for a statement simply 
because they did not see the necessity of doing so; but the author would code this lack of 
response as refusal and speculate that the organization was doing so to avoid alienating 
other stakeholders. Although the author made substantial efforts to reduce the possibility 





after a paracrisis it remains unknown how organizations' own sense-making and 
decision-making processes might refine or enrich the typologies.  
Thirdly, when focusing on organizations' responses for paracrises, this study did 
not examine other voices in the arena and how voices responded to the organizations’ 
communications. This weakness has limited this study in two respects. First, without 
examining voices after releasing a paracrisis statement, the reactions to and the 
effectiveness of paracrisis responses remains unknown. Moreover, in collecting and 
describing response strategies, the researcher assumes these responses were effective. 
These paracrises (crisis risks) did not escalate into crisis. Second, this study assumes that 
using different response strategies would help to address different concerns in the arena. 
But without actually looking into the content of other voices in the arena, this 
assumption remains a speculation that needs future empirical examination. Future 
research can also examine other voices to understand how different stakeholders 
interpret and interact with an organizations' paracrisis communication efforts.  
This study also tends to privilege organizations in paracrises by focusing on 
building an organizational paracrisis communication framework that is intended to 
mitigate crisis risk. Future research can also take a critical perspective to study how an 
organization might dominate an arena with its discourse and resources, and how 
different, alternative voices and tensions might be suppressed from proposing more 





In addition, another limitation of this study is the selection of cases that were 
reported in English. Although several paracrises that occurred in Asia and Europe were 
included in the data set, most of the cases feature companies located in or headquartered 
in the US. Given paracrises’ nature as socially constructed processes, future research 
should also investigate how national cultures or intercultural differences might affect an 
organization’s paracrisis communication practices. Cultural context is likely to influence 
“what counts” as a paracrisis as well as the perceived impetus of the paracrisis. 
Differences in cultural values are likely to influence perceptions of appropriate 
responses.  Additionally, formalized laws and policies as well as systems of government 
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CHAPTER IV  
STUDY 2 
 
Chapter IV presents Study 2 which seeks to gain heuristic knowledge on paracrisis 
monitoring and diagnosing by examining one paracrisis' evolution process on Twitter. 
Using a big data approach, Study 2 investigates the paracrisis' evolution pattern over 
time and the identities and network structures of social media influencers (SMIs) who 
spurred the evolution. The organization of Chapter IV is as follows: (1) a literature 
review to establish the rationale and research questions for Study 2; (2) methods used to 
address the research questions; (3) results and discussion, and (4) conclusion, including 
theoretical and practical implications and limitations of Study 2.  
Overview 
Both researchers and practitioners claim that risks unfolding on social media may 
evolve in highly uncertain and complicated ways. While there are many cases when one 
online accusation or challenge against an organization evolves into a paracrisis or even a 
crisis, understanding on how an accusation or challenge might trigger a paracrisis is still 
very limited. One way to close this knowledge gap is to identify patterns of paracrisis 
evolution through case studies on various naturally-occurring paracrises. As an initial 
effort to do so, Study 2 tracks the #DeleteUber movement, a challenge paracrisis that 
originated in Twitter and led 200,000 Uber users to delete their accounts within three 





operational damages for the organization, it did not escalate into a crisis. Specifically, 
this study seeks to gain understanding on paracrisis evolution by looking into the 
variables of time, social media influencers' account and network characteristics, and 
traditional media coverage's roles in the evolution process.  The following section 
presents a more detailed literature review that informs the research questions for this 
study.  
Literature Review 
Work in crisis communication recommends a timely response within 24 hours 
after a crisis hits, because a rapid, appropriate, and ethical response can increase the 
organization’s ability to protect stakeholders and influence the publics’ crisis 
understanding and perception, including their perceived crisis responsibility (Coombs, 
2014). Arguably, the time frame of 24 hours might even be shortened considering social 
media’s affordance for both asynchronous and synchronous communication. However, 
for paracrises, it is possible the recommended time strategy may differ. 
In contrast to exigencies posed by a crisis, a paracrisis represents only a crisis 
risk or threat. Although organizations’ strategic responses to address a paracrisis would 
be necessary (Coombs & Holladay, 2015a), an immediate public response to a crisis risk 
is not always desirable. To assess the potential for a challenge to evolve into a crisis 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2012), crisis managers should evaluate its escalating likelihood 
and potential impact, which vary extensively from one case to another, because a 





A paracrisis could rapidly escalate into a crisis, since an accusation potentially 
can diffuse at an exponential rate on social media and might, in turn, attract traditional 
media coverage (Pang, Hassan & Chong, 2014). For example, in the case of the prank 
video circulated by two Domino’s Pizza employees, it took only one day for this visual 
threat to go viral and evolve into a crisis (York, 2009). But not all paracrises have such 
escalating potentials. After all, many social media sites feature niche-based, fragmented 
communities (Tampere, Tampere & Abel, 2016). An online accusation, although 
potentially visible to all, might only be viewed by a community of users and never go 
viral. Even when initial diffusion of the accusation seems rapid, its spread may stall soon 
due to users’ information overload, myriad distractions, and short attention spans 
(Gomez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Purcell et al., 2012; Tapscott, 2009). In such 
scenarios, a premature paracrisis statement might attract unwanted attention rather than 
address stakeholder concerns and potential reputational threats. 
Furthermore, wide reach alone does not necessitate high crisis likelihood; 
sometimes simply the news elements of an accusation itself, such as those involving 
animals, sports, and having the newsworthiness of deviance (Valenzuela, Piña, & 
Ramírez, 2017) is likely to attract heavy online information sharing, no matter whether 
or not the accusation actually threatens stakeholders or the organization’s reputation. 
Unfortunately, both academic and practitioner literatures are quick to label any negative 
publicity or event for an organization that garner social media and traditional media 





hold media attention for a short period of time and quickly “blow over,” having no 
serious ramifications for the organization aside from inspiring clever memes, social 
media shares, or late-night talk show jokes. While it is very likely that organizations’ 
timing strategies for paracrisis communication is different from those of crisis 
communication, currently few studies actually differentiate paracrisis from crisis, let 
alone exploring organizations’ timing strategies for paracrisis communication, which 
should be based on sophisticated understanding on paracrisis evolution patterns. 
Perhaps the study most relevant to understanding paracrisis evolution patterns is 
the multiple case study research conducted by Pang, Hassan, and Chong (2014), which 
analyzed the life spans of five crises triggered on social media that were then covered by 
traditional offline media. To examine how crises developed on and off social media, the 
authors studied both online and offline data and found that if an accusation against an 
organization involves engaging visuals, celebrities, and/or resonates with other 
stakeholders’ pre-existing negative experiences, it can travel quickly online and become 
a social media hype (Pang, 2013), a situation when social media users demonstrated 
intense interest and engagement in online conversation. If the accusation includes the 
news values (Treadwell & Treadwell, 2004) of novelty or conflict,  mainstream, offline 
media would most likely cover it, which then legitimizes the accusation as a crisis and 
add momentum to social media discussion which would last and taper off after offline 





While the five crises examined by Pang et al. (2014) all began with a pre-crisis 
stage fermenting online, their model of crisis life span seems limited in that it does not 
elaborate on possible variations of paracrises evolutions, or in the words, how and when 
crisis threats evolve into a crises. An a priori approach examining crisis threats that had 
already become crises (as in Pang et al, 2014) cannot sufficiently account for the 
evolution patterns of paracrises that do not escalate into crises. Furthermore, recent 
media-related changes also press scholars to test and perhaps update Pang et al.’s 
research findings from a decade ago to more contemporary (para)crises. For example, as 
publics in the Western world report less trust in mass media (e.g., Müller 2013), one 
might question if a paracrisis still requires the coverage from traditional mass media to 
become a crisis. Additionally, how might recent changes in social networking sites’ 
technological affordances, including burgeoning niche communities, and user 
demography affect the dissemination and escalation of a challenge crisis threat? Thus, 
research focusing on paracrises is needed to further understanding of paracrises as 
distinct from crises.  
Content analysis on a naturally-occurring paracrisis cases would effectively 
answer the above-mentioned questions. However, extant data-based case studies on 
crisis communication in social media mainly take manual approaches to sample, code, 
and analyze content, which are fruitful in understanding how different voices on an 
rhetorical arena Frandsen & Johansen, 2016) co-construct crisis discourse (e.g. Brown & 





processed, when a case involves large amount of social media data, it is risky to claim a 
selected sample is representative and the results from sampled voices can be generalized 
to understanding the entire arena.  
In order to take the entire social media dataset into consideration, this study used 
mainly computational methods to collect and analyze data. #DeleteUber was selected for 
Study 2 as this particular paracrisis gained heavy attention from both traditional and 
social media. This is a challenge paracrisis involving divisive issues and would likely 
attract plural voices to join the arena. The first research question builds on and extends 
Pang et al.’s (2014) research findings to ask: 
RQ 1: How did the #DeleteUber paracrisis evolve over time online on Twitter? 
Twitter data for this case were collected because Twitter was where the paracrisis 
originated and gained the most attention as compared to other social media sites that also 
shared information about the paracrisis. All tweets with the hashtag #DeleteUber were 
collected to examine the temporal pattern of paracrisis evolution. 
Roles of Traditional News Media in Shaping Paracrisis Evolution  
The roles of traditional news media have been frequently explored in 
communication literature. As communication channels, traditional news media often are 
reported as more credible than social media, and publics are more to be more likely to 
share messages from traditional media than from social media (Schultz, Utz, & Göritz, 
2011; Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2013). Furthermore, traditional news media remain 





case study revealed that while the publics initially developed speculative framings based 
on their personal interpretations, they later aligned their frames to be consistent with the 
frames provided by extended news media coverage. Specifically regarding the life span 
of a crisis on social and traditional media, Pang et al. (2014)’s research highlighted 
traditional news media’s role in elevating a risk into a crisis.  
However, in recent years, public trust in traditional news media has declined 
(e.g., Müller 2013). Moreover, the rise of “fake news” (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; 
Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018) or “fabricated information that mimics news media 
content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (p. 1094), further questions 
traditional media’s long-standing institutional functions in agenda setting and agenda 
building. For paracrises entangled with divisive socio-political issues, attributions of 
organizational culpability may be less contingent on facts than on personal 
interpretations of facts. Considering journalism’s longstanding norms of impartiality and 
objectivity, much uncertainty still exists on whether traditional news media, especially 
mainstream ones, would hold a company responsible for (not) taking stances on such 
issues. Without clear, explicit attributions of crisis responsibility, news media coverage 
may not legitimatize a paracrisis as a crisis; and consequently might not add much 
momentum to paracrisis escalation. To test such assumption, the second question is 
posed:  
RQ 2: Did news coverage from traditional media escalate the evolution of the 





Understanding SMIs’ Account Identities and Content Diffusion Patterns  
In addition to crystalizing knowledge on paracrisis’ life span patterns temporally, 
understanding social media influencers is another imperative task for paracrisis 
management. SMIs are social media users who play a significant role in disseminating 
opinions and shape publics’ attitudes (Freberg, Graham, McGaughey, & Freberg, 2011). 
While no empirical research has attested to the significance of SMIs during paracrisis or 
crisis communication, social media studies in crisis communication and related fields 
both suggest that some users are more powerful than others in creating and diffusing 
content. 
Firstly, according to Social Media Crisis Communication model (SMCC), there 
are three types of social media users in a crisis setting: (1) influential social media 
creators, (2) social media followers, and (3) social media inactives (Austin, Fisher Liu, 
& Jin, 2012). Influential social media creators generate crisis information for followers 
to consume. Applying the SMCC model to a paracrisis setting, we might assume that 
influential social media creators could be SMIs who largely shape the publics’ 
interpretations of a paracrisis. Secondly, empirical studies in related fields also confirm 
the importance of SMIs, because the majority of social media accounts passively 
retweeted content created by others. For instance, during a French activism movement, 
70% of the tweets were retweets (Giglietto & Lee, 2017); among tweets regarding 
Washington shooting of four police officers, retweets take more than 50% of all the 





influential social media users can initiate a deluge of message diffusion (De Choudhury 
et al., 2010).  
Traditionally, SMIs are presumed to be individuals and organizations with strong 
public images, such as famous athletes, politicians, musicians, and social media accounts 
owned by mainstream media and established activism organizations. Yet since 2000s, 
social media have enabled “ordinary” users to develop engaging public images within 
various online communities. Recent marketing research and trade publications have 
begun to notice such users and address them as “micro-influencers,” “niche-influencers,” 
or “micro-celebrities” (e.g., Ang & Welling, 2017). For brands targeting generations of 
“digital natives,” identifying and engaging micro-influencers is now key to marketing 
success and reputation management (Montecchi & Nobbs, 2018). While their follower 
bases are smaller than SMIs with strong public images, micro-influencers tend to have 
stronger connections with their followers and thus provide “the best combination of 
engagement and broad reach”  (Markerly, 2018).   
Identifying SMIs can be challenging during pressing moments like paracrises, 
when an organization is compelled to scan the environment, evaluate known and 
previously unknown stakeholders (Sedereviciute & Valentini, 2011), and choose 
response strategies accordingly. Unlike SMIs who work with marketing professionals to 
promote products and services, SMIs during paracrises might be unknown to the 
organization before or even during the evolution of a paracrisis. Given micro-





also play significant roles during paracrisis evolution; and if so, how might these 
influencers be characterized. What’s more, knowledge on SMIs during paracrises would  
help organizations better understand the salience of SMIs (Coombs & Holladay, 2012) 
and develop effective paracrisis responses, if necessary. After all, an organization may 
only engage a limited number of SMIs for dialogic paracrisis communication on social 
media; and even one-way communication may need to address voices from key SMIs 
who can shape publics’ (para)crisis perceptions.  
To enrich our understanding of the natures and roles of SMIs in the development 
of #DeleteUber, the following research questions are posed:  
 RQ 3: Who are the SMIs during #DeleteUber on Twitter? 
 RQ 4: How might their accounts be characterized?  
Any SMI can participate in paracrisis communication. Some might instigate a 
challenge and remain influential during the entire communication process until the 
paracrisis loses momentum or until the organization makes satisfactory responses, as in 
the example of Greenpeace’s “Unfriend Coal” campaigns against Facebook (Katz-
Kimchi & Manosevitch, 2015). But some might only launch a challenge and then other 
SMIs would step in to actively spread the challenge, as in the example of Domino’s 
Pizza's prank video (Clifford, 2009). Besides, some SMIs might gradually exhaust their 
reach in a social network and cease to gain any further attention as all possible interested 
users become satiated with their content. Since SMIs’ influences might vary across the 





RQ 5: How might SMIs change over time during #DeleteUber on Twitter?  
In sum, the three research questions are posed to enhance our understanding of 
social media influencers on Twitter during the #Delete Uber paracrisis. Answers to these 
questions will contribute to the under-researched area of social media influencers as well 
as enhance our appreciation of the dynamic nature of social media influence. 
SMIs’ Content Diffusion Structures as Overlooked in Public-centric Crisis Research 
SMIs impact the development of a paracrisis mainly via two communication 
dimensions: (1) content creation and (2) content sharing.  For the purposes of this 
project, SMIs are conceptualized as those who are capable at both creating and sharing 
messages. Thus, users who are highly influential simply because they repost others’ 
content are not the focus of this study are not the focus of this study. 
Inspired by RAT, scholars have begun to take a multivocal approach to examine 
crisis communication produced by a multitude of senders and receivers (Frandsen & 
Johansen, 2016). However, most crisis studies inspired by RAT focus on the dimension 
of content creation, analyzing the responses of faithholders and hateholders (Luoma-
aho, 2015) to crises and organizations’ crisis responses (e.g., Brown & Billings, 2013; 
Johansen, Johansen, & Weckesser, 2016). Surprisingly few empirical studies have 
examined how SMIs share their content during crises. Apart from providing engaging 
content, a SMI would need to be well-positioned in a network to disseminate the content. 
Before the prevalence of social media, Coombs (1998) had already emphasized the 





of a stakeholder in a network, the more power that stakeholder has in the relationship” 
(Coombs, 1998, p. 294; also see Coombs & Holladay, 2015b).  
Research into SMIs’ content diffusion patterns would not only address this 
research gap in multivocal research on crisis communication, but also provide practical 
insights for practitioners to further understand and prioritize SMIs. Recalling marketing 
research on micro-influencers, social media users’ account-level variables, such as 
numbers of followers, followees and total counts of “likes” received, might not be 
sufficient indicators of their impacts during paracrises. To complement these variables, 
their network positions should also be examined. Emerging research on SMIs with 
strong public images also suggests the importance of different content diffusion patterns. 
For instance, Bhattacharya and Ram (2012) examined major news agencies’ content 
diffusion on Twitter and found BBC’s contents were more able to reach users far beyond 
its immediate follower base compared to the Guardian’s. Their study also suggested that 
larger follower sizes could not always guarantee larger numbers of retweets. Hence, to 
gain deeper insight into the content diffusion side of SMIs’ impact during paracrises, this 
study explores how different key SMIs disseminate original content within the network 
of #DeleteUber. Therefore, the last research question is:   
RQ 6:  What are representative SMIs’ volumes and extends in spreading their 








To address these research questions, the author conducted a case study on the 
#DeleteUber paracrisis by using computational time series analysis and social network 
analysis with a large data set of Tweets, along with a textual analysis of offline news 
coverage. After a brief review of the case background, this section will describe the data 
collection process and the methods used to address the six research questions.  
Case Background and Description  
On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order to halt 
the US refugee program for 120 days, stop indefinitely the acceptance of refugees from 
Syria, and bar citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US for at 
least the next 90 days (Shear & Cooper, 2017). Though supported by some individuals 
and organizations seeking immigration restrictions, this executive order was widely 
criticized and condemned by Democrats, religious groups, academics, and many others 
as inhumane and discriminatory. Most business leaders of Silicon Valley also reacted 
negatively towards the order. One of them was Travis Kalanick, CEO of Uber and a 
member of Trump’s economic advisory board. On 3:30 pm, Saturday, January 27, 
Kalanick emailed Uber employees, noting the order’s impact on “a dozen or so 
employees” and promising compensation for drivers who might be barred from entering 
the U.S.. Also on the same afternoon, The New York Taxi Workers Alliance (NYTWA), 
a non-profit group representing 19,000 taxi drivers in the City, called for a temporary 





Kennedy International Airport, where hundreds of protestors already gathered after 
people affected by the order were detained or turned away. According to NYTWA, their 
members and other cab drivers joined the strike in solidarity (Papenfuss, 2017). At 7:49 
pm, Uber New York (@Uber_NYC) sent a tweet to remove its surge pricing: “surge 
pricing has been turned off at #JFK Airport. This may result in longer wait times. Please 
be patient.” Surge pricing is a function that increases the cost of a ride during times of 
high demand. Uber had been criticized in the past for using surge pricing to profit 
unduly in times of emergency. This time, some interpreted the tweet as an opportunistic 
attempt to capitalize on the strike, although it was sent 49 minutes after the protest 
ended. Nevertheless, Uber did not encourage its drivers to join the strike. The hashtag 
#DeleteUber went viral for much of Saturday night, January 28, as well as on Sunday, 
January 29, when many Twitter and Facebook users sent screenshots of themselves 
deleting their Uber accounts. According to a New York Times’ report, more than 200,000 
Uber accounts were deleted as a result of the #DeleteUber protest on social media (Isaac, 
2017). The next Thursday, February 2, Kalanick resigned from Trump’s economic 
advisory board and explained in an internal email to employees “there are many ways 
we will continue to advocate for just change on immigration, but staying on the council 








Two sets of data were collected and analyzed. The first and main set of data 
consists of 210, 892 tweets sent during the #DeleteUber paracrisis that involves 46,324 
distinct Twitter accounts. Activity-based sampling (De Choudhury et al., 2010) was 
used, as the author collected all tweet activities using the hashtag “DeleteUber.” The 
time frame for data collection was from 4:00 pm, January 28th, half an hour after Uber’s 
CEO sent an email to employees regarding the immigration ban, to January 30th, 9:00 
pm, when the tweet volume steadily plummeted close to the level prior to #DeleteUber, 
without any signs of regaining momentum. To collect a complete sample of tweets 
without constraints from Twitter’s free application programming interface (Morstatter, 
Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013), tweets were obtained from DiscoverText, a web-based 
social media crawler and text analytic tool. The second dataset includes 18 news articles 
identified in LexisNexis published between January 29 and early February that contain 
keyword #DeleteUber.  
Case Study with a Big Data Approach 
In the study of socially mediated crisis communication, the case study method 
has been used frequently for its strengths in allowing researcher to unobtrusively observe 
publics (Holladay & Coombs, 2013). Given this study’s focus on paracrisis as a 
relatively new crisis concept, a case study method is particularly fit to test previous 
findings and under-studied theories and to gain new understandings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The six research questions are all essentially “who,” “how,” or “what” questions that can 





As discussed earlier, to increase the analytic precision of social media data 
analysis, computational analyses was used to optimize the strength of the large data set 
of tweets. Additionally, a textual analysis on the second data set of news coverage was 
conducted to gain understanding on the case and on traditional media's possible 
(para)crisis interpretations.  By doing so, the author hopes to preserve both the 
algorithmic accuracy in depicting temporal changes and structural patterns as well as the 
human sensitivity (Lewis, Zamith, & Hermida, 2013) to discuss a corporate paracrisis 
intertwined with divisive social and political issues. The following section describes 
analyses used to address the research questions.   
Computational Time Series Analysis 
To answer RQ 1 concerning the paracrisis evolution on Twitter, the author first 
used the time series analysis tool provided by DiscoverText to plot how the tweet 
volumes changed per hour over the 65-hour time span. This method was possible 
because each tweet contains its own metadata of the exact time when a tweet was posted. 
In this way, all 210, 892 tweets were taken into computation to generate a precise 
temporal trajectory of #DeleteUber evolution. 
RQ 2 examined the impacts of traditional news media during the paracrisis 
evolution. To answer this question, the author compared #DeleteUber’s temporal 
development on Twitter with offline news media coverage, with attention to the times 
when mainstream media began their coverage. This temporal analysis on the paracrisis’ 





addition, all 18 offline news reports were analyzed to discover how traditional media 
described the case, especially how, if at all,  might this paracrisis be legitimized as a 
crisis. This analysis was especially important because it could reveal whether this 
paracrisis hit a crisis stage, and if so, whether the media legitimized the paracrisis. 
Mixed Analysis on Identifying and Categorizing SMIs 
Social network analysis (SNA) was used to answer the three research questions 
on SMIs (RQs3-5). While this method is still quite new to organizational crisis studies, it 
has demonstrated strong analytic advantages in identifying social media users’ structural 
positions and assessing their influence within a network (del Fresno García, Daly, & 
Segado Sánchez-Cabezudo, 2016). From a SNA perspective, the first dataset of tweets 
can be viewed as a social network where 46,324 Twitter users, or vertices, were 
connected with each other via edges, i.e. the activities of retweeting and mentioning. 
RQ3 and RQ4 sought to identify and categorize SMIs over the entire paracrisis 
evolution process. To answer RQ3, the author calculated and ranked the total number of 
retweets each Twitter account received. This method was used because this study 
operationalizes SMIs as those who are effective in disseminating their original content. 
In addition, for possible reference and comparison, two typical SNA metrics, (1) in-
degree centrality and (2) betweenness centrality, were examined. In-degree centrality as 
used here refers to the number of mentioned and retweeted a vertex or a Twitter account 
received. A vertex with a high in-degree value indicates a large number of accounts in 





user should be noticed in the content created by other users. Betweenness centrality 
indicates the level of importance a Twitter user has in controlling the information flow. 
This metric can be calculated based on how many times a Twitter user or a vertex 
emerges in the shortest paths between other vertices (Freeman, 1978). NodeXL Pro, a 
general-purpose social network application founded by the Social Media Research 
Foundation (Smith et al., 2010) was used to calculate and rank all users on these three 
metrics.  
Determining SMIs. There are no operational rules or consensus for determining 
how many top-ranking social media users should be considered as SMIs within a 
network; rather, the decision is left to the researcher’s judgment. For example, when 
exploring patterns of Twitter communication after the 2015 Charlie Hebdo Shooting, 
Giglietto and Lee (2017) focused on five Twitter accounts that authored the most 
retweeted tweets. To develop a relatively comprehensive description of SMIs, an indirect 
approach was taken by first examining which tweets were most influential in terms of 
retweet counts they gained, and then identifying the Twitter user accounts posting these 
tweets. Among 60,681 original tweets, 9,922 tweets were retweeted at least once. The 
retweet counts for all 9,922 tweets is a heavily right-skewed distribution (Max = 18,469, 
M = 15.46, Mdn= 1, SD = 267.13). The author thus decided to focus on the top 230 
most frequently retweeted tweets, because although this subset of tweets only includes 
2.31% of all 9,992 tweets, cumulatively they contribute to 70.31% of the total number of 





192 distinct accounts, these 192 accounts were selected as SMIs for further analysis. 
Using this method I am confident the sample of SMIs is sufficient to capture SMIs of 
different account types.  
Content Analysis of SMI Categories. RQ4 seeks to categorize SMIs based on 
their account features. Content analysis was used to examine 192 SMIs’ account 
profiles, which include their account descriptions, statuses of Twitter verification, and 
other information such as profile photos and size of followers. This analysis produced 
four major categories of SMIs.  
RQ 5 explores how SMIs change over time. Following Giglietto and Lee’s 
(2017) study, I pinpointed three peak hours when Tweet volumes per hour reached an 
apex. I then applied text-mining technologies provided by DiscoverText to create three 
sub-data sets with tweets posted during those three hours to identify the 10 most 
retweeted accounts during each hour. 
Ego Network Analysis to Examine Key SMIs’ Content Diffusion Structures 
RQ 6 addresses key SMIs’ information diffusion structures. Since it’s impossible 
to discuss all 192 SMIs’ content diffusion patterns, the author selected eight SMIs that 
are mostly retweeted from different categories and sub-categories of SMIs. A series of 
ego-network analyses were then conducted to examine and compare the volumes and 
extends of their content dissemination. An ego network is a social network formed by a 
given vertex (ego) and all other vertices (alters) with whom the ego has edges or 





are at the center of information cascades, i.e., the SMI disseminates content that is then 
disseminated by alters. Level-1 alters are those who immediately retweeted an ego’s 
tweet(s); level-2 alters are those who then retweeted the information for their immediate 
alters, i.e. the ego’s level-1 alters, and so on. To examine different SMIs’ information 
diffusion extents and structures, I compared the percentages and numbers of vertices 
contained within each level of the ego network cascades. To visually illustrate the 
difference among different levels of reach,  the most retweeted SMI was selected to 
generate four graphs on the all four levels of reaches.  
Results 
Life Span of #DeleteUber Paracrisis 
 The first two research questions address the evolution of the #DeleteUber 
paracrisis on the sub-arenas of Twitter and traditional offline media. Figure 3 presents 
the temporal analysis that answers RQ 1. In line with previous research (e.g., Pang et al., 
2014), social media allowed paracrisis information to travel quickly. During the hour of 
the most intense activity, 16,119 tweets were posted; among 1039 Twitter accounts that 
disclosed their geographic locations, 80% were from the U.S. and the remainder were 








Notes. The horizontal axis represents the incremental time change of the paracrisis 
evolution by every two hours. The vertical axis represents the total volume of tweets 
posted per hour. The three peak hours where tweet volume climaxed are 3 am, 5 am, and 
6 pm on January 29. Offline media, such as The Daily Telegraph, first covered the story 
on January 30, when Tweets volume steadily tapered off. Mainstream media such as The 
New York Times continued to cover the story from January 31 to February 7, when the 
paracrisis completed lost momentum on Twitter.   
 
 
Despite the intense tweet volumes and wide geographic scope of #DeleteUber, it 
remains debatable whether #DeleteUber eventually evolved from a paracrisis into a 
crisis. As reviewed in Chapter II , though definitions of organizational crisis vary to 
some extent, scholars generally agree that a crisis results in major reputational and 
operational damages for the organization, and may include the possibility of endangering 
human lives, environments or properties (e.g., Coombs, 2019; Heath & Palenchar, 2009; 
Kaman, 2005; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Coombs especially (2004) cautioned against the 





confusion of incident with crisis: an incident is of minor significance and does not harm 
the organizational routine. In contrast, a crisis does have, or has the potential to have, 
major impact(s) on the organization. A crisis is also perceptual because the violation of 
important stakeholder expectations on safety, environment, health, and/or economic 
issues constitutes a crisis. 
Given this understanding of the nature of crises, #DeleteUber did not enter a 
crisis stage because (1) #DeleteUber did not disrupt Uber’s operations (e.g., see Barton, 
2001; Coombs, 2019), (2) nor did it inflict significant, sustained reputational harm, 
which is often seen as a hallmark of a crisis (e.g., Sohn & Lariscy, 2014), (3) Kalanick’s 
resignation from Trump’s advisory board does not seem to be a corrective action taken 
to manage a crisis, and (4) coverage by traditional mainstream media was did not 
legitimize #DeleteUber as a crisis trigger. The following subsection will elaborate on 
these four reasons.  
To begin with, #DeleteUber has two major consequences. First, 200,000 Uber 
users deleted their accounts, presumably as the result of this online movement. Yet this 
might not represent major damage, because the deleted accounts comprised only 0.5% of 
Uber’s monthly active users (Shen, 2017) and did not impede Uber’s daily operation. 
Research comparing Uber and Lyft’s IOS and Android app download numbers after 
#DeleteUber shows the damage was only fleeting and did not affect the ecosystem of 





Another consequence of #DeleteUber would be Kalanick’s resignation from 
Trump’s business advisory board five days after #DeleteUber emerged on Twitter. 
While without inside information, we cannot convincingly infer Uber's motivation or 
rationale for this decision, the author argues that the resignation is more of a revision as 
a proactive paracrisis response than a crisis outcome or response. Firstly, the pressure for 
Kalanick to resign from the advisory broad did not mount to a crisis. As a matter of fact, 
other CEOs on the board with also faced internal and external criticism for their 
relationships with Trump (Muoio, 2017). Though Kalanick was the first to resign, 15 top 
executives quit Trump’s business councils before they were dissolved (Ballinger, 2017). 
No evidence showed that these 15 companies faced a crisis because of because of their 
associations with Trump. Besides, in an internal email to employees, Kalanick explained 
his resignation, saying “there are many ways we will continue to advocate for just 
change on immigration, but staying on the council was going to get in the way of that” 
(Issac, 2017). Thus, his resignation could be interpreted as more of an effort to use 
revision as a paracrisis response strategy to address challenges than a corrective action 
taken to manage a crisis.  
In addition, despite the instant, widespreading challenges again Uber, it cannot 
be concluded that the company violated important stakeholder expectations on safety, 
environment, health, and/or economic issues. Firstly, the company's active users are an 
important stakeholder group and did not seem to change their consumption. Secondly 





sometimes even polarizing voices in the arena, as the political divides have been 
intensified (Pew Research Center, 2018). 
Assessing if and when #DeleteUber evolved into a crisis could be informed 
further by examining how coverage from traditional media affected its status. Though 
Pang et al. (2014)’s study of organizational crises concluded offline media coverage 
would legitimize crisis threats and elevate them to crises, this case demonstrates this 
pattern may not hold for all paracrises. Firstly, unlike in Pang et al.'s (2014) model, the 
life span of the #DeleteUber paracrisis was not prolonged after mainstream media 
coverage (Figure 3). In fact, when most mainstream media joined the paracrisis arena on 
January 30 and later, #DeleteUber had already faded on the Twitter sub-arena. Secondly, 
the very limited mainstream media that entered the arena when the hashtag was still 
trendy did not seem to generate much momentum to the escalation. Among the top 192 
SMIs, only three are accounts owned by mainstream media; and the most retweeted 
traditional media account, CNN en Español  @CNNEE) only ranked 23rd in terms of 
retweets counts, well behind many individual and niche media accounts. Last but not 
least, very few mainstream media explicitly attributed crisis responsibility to Uber; 
instead, they described the accusations against Uber as one-sided claims rather than 
objective facts (e.g., Shen, 2017). For paracrises involving controversial or even divisive 
social and political issues, mainstream media tend to avoid blaming companies for their 
actions or inactions because publics, as a whole, lack consensus on judgments of right or 





be the most important reason why Pang et al.’s (2014) crisis life span model could not 
extend to this case, as none of their cases involved divisive social and political issues 
and challenges like #DeleteUber.  
Identifying and Prioritizing SMIs  
RQ 3 and RQ 4 seek to identify and categorize SMIs. Due to space limits, Table 
7 reports the top 10 Twitter users, accompanied by their status of Twitter verification 
and account descriptions. Among 192 SMIs, 26 are accounts owned by verified 
organizations, 4 by unverified organizations, 57 by verified individuals, and 102 by 
unverified individuals.  
 
 
Table 7 Top 10 SMIs during #DeleteUber's Evolution on Twitter 
SMI ID SMI Category 
Retweet 
Counts Account Description 
@MikeLynch09 Unverified Individual 18,470 
"higher ed professional | educator | 
@bentleyu & @UConnHESA alumnus | 
social media & tech enthusiast | coffee 
lover | striving to dare greatly | views are 
my own" 
@GeorgeTakei Verified Individual 15,780 
" Some know me as Mr. Sulu from Star 
Trek but I hope all know me as a believer 
in, and a fighter for, the equality and 
dignity of all human beings." 
@moisturizeds Unverified Individual 5,473 
"The outburst I had at JoAnn’s Fabrics is 
not reflective of who I am." 
@shannoncoulter Verified Individual 4,629 
"Co-founder of #GrabYourWallet. Maker 
of lists. Eater of tacos. Ann who? Retweets 
are not endorsements. Email: 
shannon@grabyourwallet.org" 
@Bro_Pair Unverified Individual 3,361 
"BASW 2015. Seen in Rolling Stone, 






Table 7 Continued  
SMI ID SMI Category 
Retweet 





2,943 NYC-based music magazine 
SMI ID SMI Category 
Retweet 
Counts Account Description 
@DKMatai Unverified Individual 2,892 
"Entrepreneur Founder Investor QBRAIN 
#Quantum #Blockchain #Robo #AI #Nano 
QiLabs Scientist Engineer #FinTech 
#InsTech #QueensAward mi2g ATCA 
Philanthropia" 
@JoltedToad Unverified Individual 2,502 
"Social media justice warrior. Nerd 
culture. Atheist. #FactsNotFeelings" 
@EricRMurphy Unverified Individual 2,433 
"Security worker. Union member. Tweets 
= official position of my employer." 





Of 159 individual SMIs, 49 account descriptions included interests in social 
and/or political issue(s) (e.g., “Writer, feminist, activist, and unionist”). This finding 
suggests many individual SMIs were neither hateholders nor faithholders with strong 
pre-existing attitudes (Luoma-aho, 2015) towards Uber; rather, they were vocal on this 
sub-arena mainly because of the issues intertwined with #DeleteUber. A strong example 
is @shannoncoulter, a co-founder of the #GrabYourWallet movement that has boycotted 
all large companies with presumed Trump associations. After Kalanick resigned from 





“@travisk thank you very much for resigning from Donald's Economic & Policy Forum. 
As a woman in the tech world, it means a lot to me.” 
Of the 26 verified organizations, 24 were professional media houses. Following 
recent journalism studies on online media sources (Painter, Kristiansen, & Schäfer, 
2018; Vargo & Guo, 2017), the author organized 24 Twitter accounts owned by media 
houses into four categories: (1) traditional mainstream media with social media 
extensions (e.g., @CBSNews; n = 4), (2) digital-born general media (e.g. @Mashable; n 
= 5), (3) digital-born partisan media (e.g., @RawStory, n = 3), (4) niche media targeting 
specialized interests that might or might not be digital born (e.g., @TeenVogue, n = 10) 
and (5) news media funded by a foreign government (e.g., @AJENews, n = 2). This 
finding has several implications for paracrisis and crisis communication research. 
Firstly, previous crisis studies often fail to include the digital extensions of 
traditional news sources in social media because they typically compare the roles of 
traditional mainstream media with social media to explore channel effects and publics’ 
information-seeking behaviors. But as digital journalism evolves, many traditional 
mainstream media actively use social media platforms to promote their own news 
reporting (Malik & Pfeffer, 2016). This paracrisis case also demonstrated that some 
traditional mainstream media also could be influencers on Twitter, as their news reports 
were retweeted frequently. Therefore, scholars should not assume traditional mainstream 





Secondly, the impacts of digital-born media have been understudied in paracrisis 
and crisis literature. Digital-born media refer to news media organizations launched on 
digital platforms vs. those who are digital extension of traditional media (Painter et al., 
2018). They vary extensively in content focus, audience size, bias, self-identification as 
media companies or technology companies, and non-profit or for-profit status (Nicholls, 
Shabbir, & Nielsen, 2016; Painter et al., 2018). Given the social and political context of 
#DeleteUber, this study distinguished digital-born, general media from digital-born, 
partisan media. It is noteworthy that digital-born, general media, such as BuzzFeed, 
Mashable, and Vox, have begun to engage in serious journalism (Tandoc & Foo, 2018) 
and have expanded their presences internationally (Küng, 2015). Compared with legacy 
media, these emerging players excel in engaging online audiences and using various 
social media platforms to distribute their content (Tandoc & Jenkins, 2017). In this case, 
all SMIs who are digital-born, general media tweeted their news stories ahead of their 
traditional mainstream media counterparts. For example, @Mashable, the most 
retweeted digital-born, general media account tweeted their coverage nearly 5 hours 
earlier than @CBSNews, the most retweeted traditional mainstream media account.  
Another type of understudied SMI identified in this case study is digital-born, 
partisan media. For example, influential twitter accounts owned by @Slate and 
@RawStory both identify themselves as media with a liberal or progressive stance. 
While partisanship is not new to offline media, social media platforms allow partisan 





might not be covered by general, presumably nonpartisan media. Similar to individual 
SMIs devoted to political and/or social causes, digital-born, partisan media might not be 
interested in for-profit companies like Uber unless they get involved into ideological 
challenges or accusations. As companies increasingly become involved in social and 
political issues, influential digital-born, partisan media would be assigned high priority 
on companies’ watch lists for environmental scanning.  
Furthermore, several niche media that are seemingly irrelevant to a technology 
company like Uber emerged as SMIs. For example, the most retweeted media account of 
all 26 verified organizational SMIs is @thefader, a New York-based music magazine. 
This magazine reported the paracrisis because a famous rapper publicly announced he 
would not use Uber due to the #DeleteUber boycott. The magazine's single tweet on this 
story received more retweets than all accounts owned by traditional mainstream media 
combined.  
In addition, to further explore differences in the number of retweets received by 
the five categories of media, a one-way ANOVA test was performed, using media type 
as the independent variable and number of retweets as the dependent variable. No 
significant retweet difference was found among the five media types. This result 
provides additional support for the idea companies should focus not only on traditional 
news media but also on niche and partisan media, especially those that effectively 






Flux in SMIs’ influence and composition 
RQ 5 examines possible changes in SMIs identities and influence over time. 
Table 8 reports the top 10 most retweeted accounts in terms of tweet volumes during the 
three peak hours, i.e., 3 am, 5 am, and 6 pm on January 29. The table includes 25 distinct 
Twitter accounts, with only three accounts ranked in the top 10 twice and one ranked in 
the top 10 across all three time periods. In addition, the top two most frequently 
retweeted accounts throughout the #DeleteUber paracrisis didn’t enter the sub-arena of 
Twitter until after the first two peak hours. Although only the top 10 SMIs during three 
peak hours were identified, it is likely that most SMIs could not remain influential 
during the entire process as they might exhaust their reach and their original tweets 
might lose audience’s attention. Meanwhile, new voices might enter and gain influence 
in this sub-arena.  
 
 
Table 8 Top 10 SMIs during Three Peak Hours 
Peak Hour 1 Peak Hour 2 Peak Hour 3 
@Bro_Pair* @moisturizeds* @GeorgeTakei 
@EricRMurphy @shannoncoulter* @MikeLynch09 
@Lubchansky* @jordantarwater @lynseyarce 
@adamjohnsonNYC @Bro_Pair* @YouDonKnowMe 
@scottbix @cathyparkhong @MarkDice 
@merrittk @HITEXECUTIVE @eveewing 
@KeeganNYC @ChicagoActivis1 @TeenVogue 
@moisturizeds* @Lubchansky* @ChiCityMaven 
@transgamerthink @eidvisuals @shannoncoulter* 
@virgiltexas @LeeCamp @moisturizeds* 
Notes. Twitter accounts followed by * indicates the accounts ranked top 10 at least twice 





Previous research indicates that during crises, social media users tend to trust 
social media coverage more than traditional news media coverage (Jin, Liu, & Austin, 
2014). In this paracrisis case, “social media coverage” came from a multitude of 
individual and organizational Twitter accounts, including traditional mainstream media. 
To further understand the impacts of various SMIs, the author examined some of the 
most retweeted SMIs’ ego network structures. 
SMIs’ ego network structures 
To explore SMIs’ ego network structures during a paracrisis, his study focused 
on  only the most retweeted SMIs from seven main categories. These seven categories 
include verified individuals, unverified individuals, unverified organization, and the four 
types of verified media SMIs discussed earlier. Table 9 lists details of these ego 
networks, including each SMI’s number of followers, number of first-level nodes, total 
nodes within each input ego network, and their maximum levels of reach. First-level 
nodes are Twitter users who retweeted one of the seven SMIs’ tweets directly; second-
level nodes are those who retweeted first-level nodes’ retweets and so on. These seven 
ego networks were then further compared on the percentage of nodes within each of 











Table 9 Seven SMIs' Ego Network Details 












3063 4,438 4,556 4 
@GeorgeTakei Verified 
Individual 
2,086,524 3,725 7,544 9 
@thefader Niche media 465,030 704 3,402 12 
















14,730,118 206 296 3 
@AJENews Media funded 
by a foreign 
government 
1,180,714 155 178 3 
@NYTWA Unverified 
Organization 




1,020,973 115 116 1 
Note. First level vertices refers to alters who directly retweeted an ego's tweet(s) as 
compared to second level vertices who retweeted first level vertices' retweet and so on. 
Maximum level refers to the amount of levels an ego had in its ego network that allow 









Figure 4 Seven SMIs' Nodes Percentages At Different Levels 
Note. The horizontal axis represents seven most retweeted SMIs from their respective 
SMI categories. The vertical axis represents the percentage of vertice contains within 
each of their levels. Level 1 refers to vertices that retweeted a SMI's tweet(s), Level 2 
refers to vertices that retweeted Level 1 vertices, Level 3 vertices that retweeted Leve 2, 
and maxium level refers to vertices that retweeted the retweet(s) from vertices at Level 3 
and beyond, if an SMI has more than 3 levels of reach in the ego network.  
 
 
To visually illustrate the diffusion dynamics with an ego network, 
@MikeLynch09, the most retweeted SMI, was selected as an example. The figures 
depict his ego network diffusion within Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4 reaches. 
























































Figure 5 @Mikelynch09's Level-1 ego network 







Figure 6 @Mikelynch09's Level-2 ego network 







Figure 7 @Mikelynch09's Level-3 ego network 







Figure 8 @Mikelynch09's Level-4 ego network, i.e. the complete ego network 
Note. The red dot represents @ MikeLynch09. 
 
 
As shown in Table 12 and Figure 4, sizes of follower base do not correspond to 
Twitter users’ influences in message dissemination. To illustrate, @MikeLynch09 with 
only 3,063 followers was able to attract more edges than @CNNEE, whose follower size 
was overwhelmingly larger than @MikeLynch09 as an unverifed individual user. A 





was retweeted by users beyond his immediate reach up to four levels.  This result echos 
marketing research findings on micro-influencers’ signifcance and potential in 
generating content virality.  
Furthermore, content diffusion patterns seem to affect SMIs’ reaches. For 
example, @thedailybeast, a digital-born media that is nonpartisan but not neutral, gained 
retweets mostly from its first-level alters; in contrast, @TheFader had its single tweet 
shared more by alters beyond its first three levels than by its immediate followers. It is 
possible that  @TheFader’s content was able to travel through many levels because 
many Twitter users peceived the potential virality of @TheFader’s content that involved 
the news value of celebritiy. Also, @TheFader gained retweets from other SMIs, such as 
@Bro_Pair, a heavily retweeted SMI and fifth-level alter whose retweet seemed to help 
@TheFader’s tweet go viral again. At Level 5, @TheFader seemed to exhaust its reach, 
as the number of Level-5 alters only took 2.12% of all alters within @TheFader’s input 
ego network. But the number of Level-6 alters dramatically increased and took 40.65% 
of the total alter counts. Thus, results for RQ6 attest to the importance of SMIs’ network 
structures in disseminating content and affecting paracrisis evolution.  
Conclusion 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
This study contributes to theory building concerning paracrisis evolution and the 
roles of SMIs in the process. Firstly, with empirical evidence derived from a big data 





previous research findings on crises' life spans on and off social media (Pang et al., 
2014). There’s a word missing in the highlighted sentence.  I’m not sure what you want 
to say here Coombs (2018) points out that a crisis is contestable because of three 
elements: crisis existence, crisis severity, and crisis responsibility. Compared with a 
crisis, a paracrisis may be more contestable on all three elements. In the example of 
#DeleteUber, despite the social media firestorm, general, non-partisan media all 
refrained from blaming Uber directly for causing harms due to the ideological 
divisiveness that fueled the social media hype. When general, non-partisan media, either 
traditional or digital born, do not hold organizations responsible for causing tangible 
harms, the coverage itself cannot legitimize a paracrisis as becoming a crisis.  
The distinction between a paracrisis and a crisis is instructive for managers who 
struggle to address “social media crises” appropriately. Note that neither “social media 
hype” nor coverage from traditional mainstream media would provide conclusive signals 
for the paracrisis escalating into a crisis. On the one hand, managers should closely 
monitor emerging paracrises but recognize that convening the crisis management team 
probably is not necessary. On the other hand, managers should be cautious when 
managing paracrises because their communication transpires within potentially the full 
view of all publics, including hateholders (Luoma-aho, 2015) as well as those who are 
highly committed to the issues underlying a paracrisis. Insensitive public responses 





Sensitive paracrisis communication is not possible without sophisticated 
knowledge on SMIs both in general and during particular paracrisis situations. By 
examining SMIs’ influence in terms of retweets they gained, this study further reveals 
the complexity of their identities. Since various types of individuals and media houses 
can be SMIs, risk and crisis communication research should examine social media as 
more nuanced intersections of messages and channels rather than merely as channels 
distinct from traditional media. Additionally, crisis scholars and practitioners should 
direct attention to the roles of digital-born media such as Slate, Buzzfeed, and Mashable 
during precrisis and crisis stages, as their influence during the #DeleteUber paracrisis is 
no coincidence. Recent journalism research has begun to recognize their foray into 
serious, ethical journalism (e.g., Tandoc & Foo, 2018; Tandoc & Jenkins, 2017) and 
found elite media are more likely to follow the agenda set by digital-born media rather 
than the other way round (e.g, Vargo & Guo, 2017). For practitioners, media monitoring 
and relationship building with digital-born media are especially crucial to understanding 
and responding to potential paracrisis. Though partisan media are less likely to provide 
favorable coverage if they are not satisfied with a company’s business actions or 
involvement in socio-political issues, managers’ timely communication with digital-
born, general media is desirable because they could disseminate more credibly a 
company’s response to wider social media audiences.  
Apart from revealing the nuanced social media presence of media houses, this 





Within offline health campaigns, Boster, Kotowski, Andrews, and Serota (2011) 
identified three factors that make certain members influential during campaigns: 
connectivity, persuasiveness, and expertise in the focal area. Though the persuasiveness 
of specific messages and SMI expertise are not the foci of this study, it did reveal how 
connectivity impacts SMI’s message diffusion on Twitter. SMIs with limited follower 
sizes might have strong relational connections with followers, as their followers’ retweet 
rates can be much higher than publicly established accounts with larger follower bases. 
If other SMIs find their messages worthy of sharing, they might retweet and 
consequently transfer their social media reach to SMIs who are retweeted. Many micro 
influencers’ accounts described strong interests in social, political and environmental 
issues. Their roles in escalating the #DeleteUber paracrisis affirm the significance of 
individual activists in challenging firms.  
Finally, this study enriches research methods for paracrisis and crisis 
communication research. Despite growing interest in taking a multivocal perspective to 
study crisis communication via social media, most extant studies on organizational crises 
still rely on manual methods to collect and analyze relatively small data sets. This might 
be problematic in gaining comprehensive understanding when the focal paracrisis or 
crisis case involves a large amount of social media data that exceeds the analysis 
capacity of human beings. Using computational methods to describe the #DeleteUber 
paracrisis evolution on Twitter, this study showcases how such methods can produce 





rather than analyzing content generated by publics as in most studies examining publics’ 
communication during organizational crises, this study examined the operation of social 
network structures underlying and sustaining content dissemination. This method of 
analysis effectively complements current research, as the structures that enable content 
to spread is arguably as important as the content itself.   
Limitation  
This study is limited in that it only examined only one single case evolving on 
one single social media site. Previous research indicates that while Twitter and YouTube 
are often used to raise an issue, Facebook and blogs might excel in escalating the issue 
beyond immediate stakeholders (e.g., Pang et al., 2014). Meanwhile, a Pew research 
study found Twitter was not representative of public opinions in the wider world context 
(Mitchell & Hitlin, 2013). Thus, future studies could examine paracrisis cases on various 
digital sites to see how a paracrisis might evolve on and among different sub-arena 
platforms.  
Another limitation is that this study only examined a single type of paracrisis, a 
challenge paracrisis, which is likely to be the most difficult to manage. Future research 
should examine other clusters to generate more sophisticated understanding on paracrisis 
evolution. In addition, alternative metrics to operationalize SMIs may be explored to 
generate more comprehensive understanding. This study operationalize SMIs as those 
who gained most retweets for their original content. Yet retweet might be motivated by 





develop alternative operational definitions of SMIs to better understand powerful voices 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
With the constant and increasing connectivity afforded by social media, few 
organizations can be immune from online crisis threats. Unfortunately, nearly a decade 
after the concept of "social media crisis" was raised, today's organizations are still 
struggling to understand and address online risks. One of the most important reasons for  
this continuous struggle is the lack of understanding on the uniqueness of crisis risks 
emerging in online environments. Often times, "social media crises" are used to refer to 
both risks and crises spreading on social media sites. But as almost all crises today 
involve the channels of social media, the term "social media crises" tend to 
overemphasize the platforms for communication without considering the contents of the 
communication. 
To address the potential to exaggerate the risks associated with negative online 
comments about an organization and its practices, Coombs and Holladay (2012b) 
conceptualize the term "paracrisis" to distinguish crisis risks from crises emerging in 
digital media. As "a publicly visible crisis threat that charges an organization with 
irresponsible or unethical behavior" (p. 409), paracrises require public responses from an 
organization that are variations of crisis responses (Coombs, 2017). Coombs and 
Holladay also propose an inventory of paracrisis response strategies to address challenge 
paracrises (Coombs & Holladay, 2015b). Coombs (2015a) later went on to describe 




misuse of social media, and venting. In a more recent work, Coombs (2019) revised the 
paracrisis typology to include four clusters: (1) faux pas, (2) rumor(s), (3) challenge(s), 
and (4) collateral damage. 
As a nascent field, paracrisis communication research has begun to gain 
increasing scholarly attention over the past few years. Several analytical studies have 
been conducted to examine organizational paracrisis response strategies (e.g., Honisch, 
2018; Lim, 2017; Roh, 2017), which further attest to the viability of paracrisis as a 
concept distinct from crisis and the necessity to differentiate organization paracrisis 
responses from crisis responses. However, previous studies tended to treat all paracrises 
as the same, and this failure to distinguish between types of paracrises creates conceptual 
confusion for both paracrisis types and paracrisis responses. But as paracrisis research is 
still in its infancy, it is imperative to first solidify a conceptual consensus so that future 
studies would better advance theories in this field. Specifically, foundational, 
observational studies are needed to (1) further determine whether the concept of 
paracrisis is viable, (2) gain more understanding on the reasons for paracrises and 
organizations' paracrisis communication practices, and (3) investigate how paracrises, as 
crisis threats contingent on the publics' interpretations of social obligation, are 
communicatively constructed by different voices in a rhetorical arena, especially the 
sub-arenas of social media sites.  
This dissertation seeks address the above-mentioned goals via two distinct yet 
complementary studies. Study 1 uses a case series study and content analysis to identify 




expand the typologies on paracrisis clusters and response strategies, and to connect 
clusters with response strategies. Study 2 focuses on one single paracrisis case to analyze 
its evolution on a social media platform to gain initial understanding on paracrisis 
evolution patterns and the identities and network structures of social media influencers 
(SMIs) who largely shaped the evolution process. 
While Study 1 aims to generate comprehensive understanding of organizations' 
paracrisis communication practices and to develop an organizational paracrisis 
communication framework with external validity, Study 2 addresses the distinctions 
between a paracrisis and a crisis by providing an in-depth analysis of a large social 
media data set. Taken together, these two studies clarify the differences between 
paracrises and crises, develop a framework that relates paracrisis clusters to response 
strategies, and reveal how a paracrisis might be structurally shaped by SMIs on a social 
media sub-arena. By employing (1) a case series to provide conceptual clarity through an 
externally valid process (Study 1) and an in-depth case to develop knowledge of 
paracrisis evolution (Study 2), this dissertation answers foundational questions and holds 
implications for future research and practice. 
This final chapter presents the implications of the research reported in this 
dissertation and addresses limitations and future research directions. The first section 
reviews key findings from the two studies. Next, the implications of these findings for 
paracrisis communication theories, methodologies, and practices are discussed. Finally, 






Review of Key Research Findings 
Key Research Findings of Study 1 
This dissertation presented two separate but interrelated studies. This section 
focuses on Study 1. Study 1 presents a case series study based on a systematic 
identification of “social media crises” as well as other online risks covered by traditional 
media, digital-born media, and trade publication articles over the time span of four years. 
By analyzing and comparing these cases, the author further clarifies the distinctions 
between paracrises that requires risk communication interventions and operational 
problems that are often labelled as "social media crises" but should be better managed by 
other management functions.  
Besides further distinguishing paracrises from operational problems, this case 
series study proposed a paracrisis communication framework by refining and expanding 
conceptual typologies on paracrisis clusters (Coombs, 2017; 2018) and response 
strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 2015b), and articulating connections between paracrisis 
clusters and response strategies. Firstly, based on Coombs’ conceptual work (2017; 
2018), Study 1 refined and expanded paracrisis clusters. Social media hacking as a new 
paracrisis type was identified, faux pas paracrises were clarified and expanded into two 
distinct sub-types, and paracrisis cluster descriptions were revised to provide more 
precise accounts for naturally-occurring paracrises.  
Secondly, a typology of paracrisis response strategies was developed by 




(Coombs & Holladay, 2015b) to all seven paracrisis types. Furthermore, by connecting 
the uses of paracrisis response strategies with paracrisis clusters, this study initiates the 
effort to build a communication framework that has the potentials to guide 
organizational paracrisis communication.   
The research findings on the uses of response strategies, especially the combined 
uses of response strategies, highlights the dynamics of agitation-control (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2015a) that underlie all paracrisis communication processes in rhetorical 
arenas. As discussed in Chapter III, compared with a crisis, a paracrisis' existence and 
severity might be more open to stakeholders' interpretations, because a paracrisis is 
always intertwined with the publics' perceptions of an organization's social obligations. 
To address plural and sometimes opposing voices that communicatively construct a 
paracrisis situation, an organization might consider using more than one response 
strategy in a single response statement to address various concerns arising  in a rhetorical 
arena. In fact, the results revealed the majority of paracrisis cases were addressed using 
multiple response strategies.  
Key Research Findings of Study 2 
While Study 1 aims to develop an organizational paracrisis communication 
framework through a case series study examining a large collection of naturally-
occurring cases, Study 2 dives deeper into the evolution process of one single paracrisis, 
#DeleteUber, so as to gain initial understanding of paracrisis evolution on Twitter.  
By examining the temporal development of #DeleteUber on Twitter in 




termed outcomes, this study found that neither an intense backlash on social media nor 
traditional media coverage is a marker for crisis. This research finding calls into question 
previous research on crisis threat escalation online and offline (Pang, Hassan, & Chong, 
2014), and illustrates different implications of paracrises and crises. That being said, the 
above findings were obtained with hindsight, as the author examined evidence on short-
term and long-term outcomes of the #DeleteUber incident to evaluate whether crisis 
damage was evident. When confronted with an ongoing paracrisis, an organization might 
closely monitor its evolution by identifying SMIs and scanning their content diffusion 
processes online.  
 As perhaps the first study to examine SMIs during an organizational crisis risk 
situation, Study 2 found that SMIs who excelled at creating and disseminating original 
content contributed to the majority of Twitter content posted during the paracrisis 
evolution process. This study also revealed that individual micro influencers, digital-
born media, and niche media can all be SMIs whose original content concerning the 
paracrisis and paracrisis interpretations is widely disseminated on Twitter. In addition to 
gaining understanding on the various identities of SMIs, this study also examined their 
ego network structures that allowed the content to travel widely. Results indicate the 
sizes of follower base do not correspond to Twitter users’ influence in message 
dissemination. Additionally, content diffusion patterns, such as the levels of reach and 
connections with other SMIs, might affect SMIs' content diffusion during the paracrisis 




To sum up, Study 2 complements Study 1 by providing more nuanced knowledge 
on paracrisis evolution on Twitter as involving time variables, social media influencers 
with different account and network features, and traditional media coverage. The 
following section will summarize the implications of these two studies.  
Implications 
This dissertation contributes to paracrisis communication research through a case 
series study seeking to explore the viability of paracrisis as a distinct concept, building a 
framework on organizational paracrisis communication (Study 1), and gaining in-depth, 
more nuanced knowledge on paracrisis evolution on Twitter (Study 2). These two 
studies offer theoretical and methodological contributions to the field of risk and crisis 
communication as well as practical implications for social media practitioners. This 
section will address in turn the implications in these three areas. 
Theoretical Implications  
Examining Paracrisis as a Viable, Distinct Concept 
This dissertation contributes to the theory building on paracrisis communication 
in mainly three ways: examining paracrisis as a viable concept distinct from crisis, 
developing a preliminary framework on organizational paracrisis communication, and 
documenting the evolution of a paracrisis on Twitter as well as in traditional media. To 
begin with, this dissertation further attests to the vitality of paracrisis as a distinct 
concept by (1) collecting and analyzing a corpus of cases occurring from 2014 to 2017 




Most case studies in crisis communication literature examine a single or a few 
high-profile crises that have peculiar features (e.g., serious crisis outcomes, highly 
unusual situations, and intense media attention). While these studies may provide in-
depth knowledge on specific crises, their implications might be limited, unless a number 
of case studies are conducted and reveal similar results (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). To 
overcome case study's deficiencies in generalizability, Study 1 examined a wide, diverse 
range of cases from four years of traditional mainstream media coverage, digital-born 
media coverage, and trade publication articles that either contain key phrases such as 
"social media crisis" or cover a challenge paracrisis. In this way, Study 1 captures both 
the overall characteristics of crisis threats in digital environments and special elements 
that might be overlooked in previous literature. This method of data collection supports 
the external validity of the cases.  
Based on the case series that occurred naturally and were systemically collected,  
the author concludes that paracrisis, as "a publicly visible crisis threat that charges an 
organization with irresponsible or unethical behavior and requires public response from 
the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2012b, p.409), is a viable conceptualization that 
is closely related to but distinct from the conceptualizations of crisis. As presented in 
Chapter III, the 143 paracrisis cases were collected systematically from various media 
outlets ranging from The New York Times to Mashable to Ad Age to Utah Business. All 
143 crisis risks were important enough to be reported by one or more media outlets, 





All 143 paracrises identified through this method fit into the conceptualization of 
paracrisis for three reasons. Firstly, they were publicly visible as they were spread on 
social media, and the visibility might be further expanded by media outlets that picked 
up the stories. Secondly, all cases required a form of public response from the 
organization, including a deliberate silence when the media requested comments. Thus, 
they were all managed under the full view of potentially all publics. 
Thirdly, all cases were triggered by a challenge or accusation regarding social 
obligations, as illustrated the descriptions of six paracrisis clusters, including social 
media account hacking. Although being hacked might resemble a corporate ability (CA) 
problem, social media account hacking is more closely related with social obligations. 
This particular type of hacking features insensitive, controversial or even outrageous 
content posted by the hacker(s) who hijacked an organization's social media account(s). 
While other hackings are operational failures with serious negative implications for 
customers and other important stakeholders, this particular type of hacking only poses 
crisis risk when the publics attribute problematic content from the hacker(s) to the 
organization. Thus, it is still about social obligations, not operational capacities.  
In addition to showcasing the viability of paracrisis as a distinct concept, the data 
collection and screening process also found the term “social media crisis” was often used 
to refer to (1) paracrises that posed crisis risks but did not have crisis implications and (2) 
incidents that should be addressed by management functions other than crisis 
management communication. As discussed in Chapter III, such incidents are not 




social obligations. However, they might become corporate ability crises if not addressed 
appropriately. For example, they might morph into paracrises only when organizations 
do not treat consumers or employees fairly in addressing the problem and thus violate 
social obligations to their publics.  
Besides distinguishing a paracrisis from an operational incident that might pose 
corporate ability crisis risk, it is also important to understand if and when a paracrisis 
might become a crisis, because paracrises and crises require different management 
interventions, including response strategies. Study 2 addresses this research purpose by 
conducting an in-depth single case study on a high-profile challenge paracrisis to gain 
initial insight. Based on research findings gleaned from big social media data and 
mainstream traditional media coverage, this dissertation found that neither intense yet 
short-term online backlash nor coverage by traditional mainstream media is a convincing 
sign of crisis, which challenges prevalent assumptions and earlier research findings 
regarding markers for crises emerging in social media (Pang, Hassan, & Chong, 2014). 
Although Study 2 focused on only one paracrisis, the results demonstrate future studies 
examining "social media crises" might need to be more cautious and draw  distinctions 
between paracrises as crisis threats and full-blown crises.  
Building a Preliminary Framework on Organizational Paracrisis Communication  
This research is used to develop two typologies on paracrisis clusters and 
response strategies with high external validity by refining and expanding Coombs and 
Holladay's conceptual work on paracrisis clusters (Coombs, 2017; 2018) and response 




paracrisis clusters demonstrates the ambiguous term "social media crisis" is problematic 
because it obscures not only differences among paracrises, crises, and operational 
incidents, but also among different types of paracrises. Though a variety of online 
communications may be labeled “social media crises,” it is not the uses of social media 
platforms themselves that present problems. Rather, it is the contents of the 
communications via social media that should garner researcher and practitioner interest. 
Through a systematic investigation, Study 1 also identifies paracrisis types that 
might have been overlooked before, such as social media account hacking and Type II 
faux pas. These types occur less frequently than other clusters, and might be less 
interesting for media to cover, compared with challenge paracrises that involve 
important issues and/or reflect news values like conflict, oddity, and human interest. But 
because social media account hacking is qualitatively different from other paracrisis 
clusters and Type II faux pas differs  from Type I faux pas, they should be studied as 
distinct types of paracrisis.  
Unfortunately, current paracrisis research (e.g. Honisch, 2018; Kim, Zhang, & 
Zhang, 2016; Roh, 2017) may draw potentially erroneous conclusions about paracrisis 
management communication because it does not consider important differences among 
paracrisis clusters. Mixing paracrisis clusters problematic because different paracrises 
may require different response strategies. By developing a typology on paracrisis 
clusters, the findings of this dissertation are valuable to researchers who seek to develop 
more effective studies that are based on these meaningful differences among paracrisis 




neglect these distinctions may overlook important characteristics that should be 
incorporated into their research designs.  Failing to do so could lead to fruitless 
comparisons among vastly different clusters.  
The typology on paracrisis response strategies addresses the differences between 
paracrisis response strategies and crisis response strategies. As discussed in Chapter III, 
addressing a paracrisis with a crisis response strategy might not only increase the 
publics’ perceived levels of crisis responsibility, but also fail to address the agitation-
control dynamics characterizing paracrisis communication. Thus, this dissertation urges 
scholars to be more cautious when testing crisis response strategies for analytic studies 
on paracrises.   
In addition, this research is important because it identifies and elaborates on 
organizations' uses of combined response strategies in public statements or statement(s) 
designed to address paracrises. This research finding further enriches our understanding 
on organizations' paracrisis communication practices and offers inspiration for analytic 
research that has not yet looked into various combinations of response strategies for 
paracrisis communication.  
Furthermore, by connecting paracrisis clusters with response strategies, this 
research builds a preliminary framework for organizational paracrisis communication 
that generates rich possibilities for future analytic studies. Specifically, this framework 
addresses how paracrisis clusters might affect the choices of response strategies. 
As recommended by Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) reviewed 




should select crisis response strategies by first assessing the attributed crisis 
responsibility to decide which crisis cluster best characterizes the crisis.  While crisis 
history and prior relational reputation as mitigating factors should also be considered, 
crisis clusters classified by different levels of attributed crisis responsibility largely 
dictate what response strategies should be most effective. 
However, for paracrises, clusters' implications for  response strategies might be 
more complicated and less direct. As presented in Table 3 in Chapter III that lists the 
frequencies of all single and combined response strategies used to manage six paracrisis 
clusters, although some response strategies were used more frequently than others, no 
assumptions can be made about which single or combined response strategies might be 
most effective for each clusters. But this is not to say paracrisis clusters do not affect the 
selection of response strategies. A limitation of SCCT is that it assumes the publics have 
a consensus on the attributed crisis responsibility, and does not consider the possible 
differences among the various voices in a rhetorical arena. Since a paracrisis is largely 
about social obligations constructed by various voices, it would not be reasonable to 
ignore the possible differences, especially for more complicated paracrisis clusters such 
as challenge, faux pas, and guilt by association.  
For challenge, faux pas, and guilt by association paracrises, this research argues 
that contextual factors should be taken into consideration. If a challenge or accusation is 
related with a less contestable issue, such as environmental protection and general social 
welfare, more "accommodative" strategies such as revision and/or recognition might be 




compete for attention and influence in the arena. If an organization wishes to avoid the 
risk of alienating important stakeholders, its social media practitioners might consider 
refusal, i.e., deliberately making no response.  
The three remaining paracrisis clusters, social media misuse, misinformation, and 
social media account hacking, are relatively easier to address. Although no discernable 
response patterns could be identified in Study 1 due to the limited number of observed 
cases, tentative recommendations on response strategies were offered based on the 
objections or problems underpinning the development of these paracrises. But because 
Study 1 simply identified paracrisis clusters and their associated response(s), it may be 
premature to evaluate which strategy and/or combinations of strategies could address 
most effectively the paracrises.   
Extending RAT to Paracrisis Communication Research  
This dissertation also seeks to extend Rhetorical Arena Theory (RAT) (Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2016, 2018) to paracrisis communication as produced by a multitude of 
voices in a rhetorical arena. So far, studies inspired by RAT tend to focus on analyzing 
how faithholders and hateholders (Luoma-aho, 2015) respond to crises and 
organizations’ crisis responses (e.g., Brown & Billings, 2013; Johansen, Johansen, & 
Weckesser, 2016). This research suggests that RAT is also a good fit for paracrisis 
communication. When a challenge or an accusation is raised on social media, an 
rhetorical arena opens for potentially all publics.   
While Study 1 privileges organizational voices by focusing on organizational 




suggests that it is important to understand, prioritizes, and respond to voices of different 
stakeholders in an arena. For example, as discussed in Chapter III, some organizations 
used revision and refusal to manage a guilt by association paracrisis involving a divisive 
issue, as they implemented quite revisions to sever a connection with a negatively 
viewed entity, without stating their purpose in doing so. While Study 1 does not examine 
an organization's motivation or rationale for doing so, it is reasonable to assume that 
revision was used to address the concerns of challengers and those who agree with them, 
and refusal was used to avoid alienating other important stakeholders who might view 
the entity as positive. Before selecting paracrisis response strategies, organizations might 
need to listen to different voices in a rhetorical arena and decide which voices they 
would address in their paracrisis responses.  
Study 2 shifts attention from organizational responses to understand SMIs' 
communication practices during a paracrisis evolution process on the sub-arena 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2014) of Twitter. Unlike previous RAT-based research that 
examined content created by faithholders and hateholders during crises (e.g., Brown & 
Billings, 2013; Johansen et al., 2016), Study 2 examines the structures that allow the 
content to spread in a social networking site. Before the prevalence of social media, 
Coombs (1998) had pointed out the significance of network structures in evaluating 
stakeholders' power. But few analytic researches have examined how SMIs share their 
content during crises (see also Coombs & Holladay, 2012a; 2015b). Given this 
knowledge gap, Raupp (2019) made a recent call to extend multivocal crisis research 




structures of different SMIs, Study 2 echoes this call in the context of paracrises and 
addresses the knowledge gap by revealing the importance of ego network structures 
during paracrisis communication.  
In addition, this research also unveils identity features of social media influencers 
who largely shaped the #DeleteUber paracrisis. Results revealed that individuals with 
and without established pubic images, digital-born media with and without salient 
ideology biases, and traditional media’s extensions on social media were all shaping the 
evolution process by having their original tweets widely spread. Recalling current RAT 
studies' focus on faithholders and hateholders, this research suggests that individuals and 
organizations with no salient pre-existing attitudes towards an organization might also 
participate in the rhetorical arena, if they are strongly committed to the issue involved.  
Coombs and Holladay (2014) posit that a rhetorical arena consists of many sub-
arenas or spaces where discussion on a crisis occurs, and that crisis managers need 
understand publics' crisis communication in various arenas, which might affect the 
effectiveness of organizational crisis response(s). Extant studies have examined 
communicative interactions in different sub-arenas, including a corporate blog and the 
comment section of an online news report (Coombs & Holladay, 2014), a corporate 
Facebook page (Frandsen & Johansen, 2016), Sina Weibo, a Chinese social media 
platform (Zhao, 2017), and newspapers (Raupp, 2019).   
Extending the concept of sub-arena to paracrisis research, Study 2 examined the 
#DeleteUber paracrisis' evolution on the sub-arenas of Twitter and traditional mass 




incident originating from and fermenting in the social media sub-arenas, and some 
traditional media outlets entered the sub-arena of Twitter via their official Twitter 
accounts and became Twitter SMIs during the #DeleteUber evolution. On the other hand, 
as a challenge paracrisis, #DeleteUber's evolution on Twitter did not gain further 
momentum after the majority of traditional mass media reported this case, which differs 
from Pang et al.'s (2014) research finding. Based on this discrepancy, the author infers 
that the interaction patterns (i.e., crisis risk information migration from one sub-arena to 
another) among different sub-arenas might differ from one paracrisis to another. Future 
research might examine different paracrises, including those that evolved into crises, to 
better understand how interactions among sub-arenas contribute to paracrisis evolution.  
To sum up, all paracrises are not the same in terms of their genesis and evolution 
patterns on different sub-arenas. To better help organizations address online risks, it is 
important to have clear foundational understanding on paracrisis clusters and paracrisis 
response strategies, and to understand paracrises as communicatively constructed by 
different voices in a rhetorical arena.  
Methodological Implications 
Along with the theoretical implications presented above, this dissertation also 
offers three main methodological implications for paracrisis communication as a 
burgeoning field as well as for communication research in general. This sections 
presents the three methodological implications regarding (1) adapting case series study 
to communication research in general, (2) applying computational big data case study for 




Adapting Case Series Study to Communication Research 
Study 1 is perhaps the first study to graft the method of case series study from 
clinical research onto communication research. Methodologically, Study 1 illustrates 
how this observational method, with its focus on analyzing and comparing a large, 
diverse sample of cases, might be instrumental to developing accurate descriptions and 
classifications for nascent research domains’ lack of a consensus on definitions and 
variables. By infusing case series study with data collection principles developed for 
focused case studies(Yin, 2009) and constant comparative analysis, Study 1 adapts this 
clinical research method to communication research focusing on text-based data and 
offers insights on how this method might be used for research directed toward 
communication interventions. Systematically collected case series provide a corpus of 
evidence with strong external validity and can be applied to a variety of communication 
contexts, allowing scholars to generate reasonable hypotheses for further communication 
theory development.  
Applying Computational Big Data Case Study for (Para)crisis Research 
While Study 1 introduces a new research method into communication research, 
Study 2 enriches research methods for paracrisis and crisis communication research by 
conducting a focused case study using computational method to collect and analyze big 
data. Despite growing interest in the spread of crisis online, most studies examining the 
publics' crisis communication in social media still use manual methods to collect, sample, 
and analyze relatively small data sets (e.g., Brown & Billings, 2013; Johansen et al., 




manual methods are not ideally suited to generating more comprehensive, precise 
research findings for crises and paracrises that engender large amount sof social media 
data.  
As one of the few studies using computational methods for organizational 
(para)crisis research, Study 2 illustrates the strengths of this method for analyzing 
various concerns related to the “who’s” of paracrisis development as well as the “how’s” 
of paracrisis development. For example, Study 2's time series analysis provides a precise 
description of the #DeleteUber paracrisis' complete evolution process on Twitter by 
taking all tweets with #DeleteUber into consideration. . Future research that examines 
paracrisis life spans on social media might use similar methods to enable comparisons 
among different paracrisis clusters. 
Examining Sub-arenas with Social Network Analysis 
As a relatively new approach to crisis communication, RAT employs a 
multivocal approach to understand crises as consisting of communication among a 
multitude of senders and receivers (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010, 2016). RAT 
distinguishes itself from other crisis theories by conceptualizing crisis communication as 
a more dynamic, complicated process that arises from the voices of multiple crisis 
communicators and as such does not privilege the voice of the organizations in crises. As 
a relatively “young” theory, RAT offers provocative alternatives to its predecessors.  
The theory’s strengths are its heuristic value and conceptual contributions.  
However, the broad scope of the theory, coupled with difficulties in 




conducted thus far.  As researchers strive to apply ideas derived from RAT, additional 
insights into macro (patterns of interaction and relationships among voices) and micro 
components and parameters (senders and receivers, contexts, media, genre, and texts) of 
the (para)crisis arena should emerge (Frandsen & Johansen, 2010, 2018). Researchers 
who wish to use RAT as a foundation of their work will need to complicate their 
thinking as well as their research methods when studying paracrisis communication. 
As most of these studies use content analysis to examine hateholders and 
faithholders' crisis discourses, the possible participation of other voices and the 
structures that simultaneously enable and constrain the communication interactions 
within the arena are largely overlooked. To enrich RAT-based empirical research, Raupp 
(2019) recently urges scholars to extend RAT with network analysis. Her research 
examines the sub-arenas (Coombs & Holladay, 2014) of newspapers during the 
Volkswagen emission crisis, where Volkswagen was the most prominent voice, and 
voices from NGOs and affected stakeholders were rarely introduced (Raupp, 2019).  
Echoing Raupp's (2019) call for extending RAT with social network research, the 
author uses social network analysis to examine the voices of SMIs during a paracrisis on 
the sub-arena of Twitter. The author investigates both relationship data, i.e., interactions 
among vertices, and attribute data, i.e., vertices' property information (Borgatti & Halgin, 
2011; Freeman, 1978). To examine relationship data, SMIs ego networks were analyzed, 
compared, and visualized to reveal how the structures sustained SMIs' spreading of 
tweets. Regarding attribute data, SMIs' Twitter profiles were analyzed and categorized to 




Based on the above network analysis, the author suggest that SNA is particularly 
fit to study paracrisis communication in a rhetorical arena from a macro perspective. As 
reviewed in Chapter II, Frandsen and Johansen (2016) poisit that RAT draws upon two 
perspectives, macro and micro, to understand crisis communication. A macro 
perspective provides an overview of interactions among voices by examining all voices 
and and communication processes in a rhetorical arena, and a micro perspectivefocuses 
on individual communicative processes in terms of context, media, genre, and text. With 
its unique strengths inanalyzing interactions, SNA can be used to reveal voices beyond 
those of the organization,hateholders, and faithholders, and to understand how some 
voices gain more influence via communicative interactions. Recalling Raupp's (2019) 
study, it can be assumed that the composition of powerful voices vary by sub-arenas and 
by (para)crisis. By examining both attribute and relation data, researchers can use SNA 
to test this assumption and to enrich knowledge on paracrises as constructed by different 
voices in different sub-arenas.  
Practical Implications  
Many management fields are plagued by the gap between research and practice 
(Ven & Johnson, 2006). As a burgeoning field, paracrisis communication is no exception. 
While some researchers tend to overamplify the negative consequences of paracrises and 
address them as crises, most practitioners are actually well aware of the differences 
between online threats and crises. As discussed in Chapter II, Van den Hurk (2013), a 
crisis communication professional, distinguished four types of crises based on their 




and a crisis  as well as the need to offer different response strategies. Though the term 
“paracrisis” may not have entered their professional vocabulary, they recognize a 
paracrisis as a crisis risk rather than a crisis. 
Because of the paucity of research in paracrisis communication, practitioners 
might still feel uncertain or unprepared when addressing these online threats. The 
research findings of this dissertation might reduce practitioners' uncertainty in 
addressing paracrises by (1) complicating their understanding of paracrises clusters and 
response strategies and (2) proposing suggestions for media monitoring.  
Complicating Understanding on Paracrisis Clusters and Response Strategies   
Because the concept of paracrisis has not yet been fully integrated into risk and 
crisis communication vocabulary and research, social media practitioners are likely to 
rely on their experiences and/or intuitions to understand, assess, and address paracrises. 
As the term "social media crisis" is used ambiguously to address operational incidents, 
paracrises, and crises spreading on the channels of social media, practitioners might be 
limited in conceptualizing paracrises as a distinct form of crisis risk that covers different 
clusters, and might be addressed with paracrisis response strategies that differ from crisis 
response strategies.  
In situations where knowledge is limited, the two typologies on paracrisis 
clusters and response strategies would help to reduce practitioners' uncertainty with 
strong external validity (Cronbach & Shapiro, 1982). The typology on paracrisis clusters 
would help practitioners to develop a more sophisticated understanding on "social media 




This may be  particularly helpful when an unexpected online threat cannot be accounted 
for by a practitioner’s past experiences, either because the online negative backlash 
seems overwhelming or the organization is not prepared for a social issue or even a 
"wicked problem" it is pressured to address.  
Realizing the qualitative differences among different paracrisis clusters might 
also prepare a practitioner to choose effective response strategies. As discussed earlier, 
different paracrisis clusters might be managed by different single and/or combined 
response strategies. While practitioners can be capable of delivering effective paracrisis 
responses by drawing upon their experiences and intuitions, the typology on clusters and 
response strategies may highlight the importance of listening to different voices and 
systematize their understanding on paracrisis communication as distinct from crisis 
communication.  
Although Study 1 does not assess the effectiveness of response strategies, there 
are cases when an organization did not seem to address a paracrisis appropriately. For 
instance, on a night when the Houston Rockets played Dallas Mavericks, it posted a 
tweet that read " Shhhhh. Just close your eyes. It will all be over soon," with a gun emoji 
pointing at a horse emoji. The horse emoji presumably represents the Mavericks, whose 
mascot is a horse. Because this tweet angered some publics, the Rockets fired its digital 
communication manager, which upset more publics and triggered another online 
backlash. Many traditional media outlets, such as The Washington Times, also reported 
the Maverick’s overreaction to the Tweet and criticized the sports team for firing an 




In this case, the Houston Rockets seemed to offer a crisis response to this  faux 
pas paracrisis. Rather than firing its manager, the sports team could have addressed this 
paracrisis more effectively by using recognition to admit the mistake and apologize for it, 
refutation to deny the intention to offend others, and revision to delete the tweet and 
promise future improvement.  
To sum up, the two typologies on paracrisis clusters and response strategies 
might enable social media practitioners to develop more accurate conceptualizations of 
online threats, provide appropriate responses, and avoid resorting to crisis response 
strategies that may increase publics’ perception of crisis responsibility. As discussed in 
Chapter III, because organizations of all sizes and from all sectors are susceptible to 
paracrises, the two typologies would be especially important and informative for novice 
practitioners and practitioners working for small organizations who might lack 
experience with online threats and thus experience heightened uncertainty when facing a 
paracrisis.  
Suggestions for Media Monitoring 
Practitioners are increasingly aware of the importance of social media monitoring. 
Many large companies, such as Marriot, have developed their own social media centers 
to analyze social media content for the purposes of client engagement and brand 
promotion (Golden & Caruso-Cabrera, 2016). Other organizations have retained the 
services of external consultancies in social media monitoring. Meanwhile, social media 
monitoring tools, such as Social Mention, Quora, HootSuite, and Google Alert are 




continually  monitor their social media presence as well as the presence of their 
competitors (He, Zha, & Li, 2013).  
However, academic research on social media monitoring tends to focus on the 
contexts of marketing and customer service (e.g., Lee, 2018; Zhang & Vos, 2014); there 
is a dearth of practice-focused, scholarly crisis research regarding on how to conduct 
media monitoring for the purposes of organizational (para)crisis communication (with 
the exception of (Ruggiero & Vos, 2014). To address this gap, the author proposes the 
examination of two interrelated types of media monitoring with different goals. These 
two types are (1) real-time media monitoring and (2) non-real-time media monitoring. 
Both types encompass social media monitoring and traditional media monitoring.  
Real-time Media Monitoring  
The goals of real-time social media monitoring for paracrisis identification and 
management would be to observe paracrises' evolution trajectories on social media sites, 
analyze powerful voices in important sub-arena(s), and evaluate publics' responses to the 
organizations' (in)actions and paracrisis responses. Real-time, minute-by-minute media 
monitoring should be activated when an organization identifies a challenge or accusation 
circulating in social media site(s).  
So far, real-time social media monitoring for marketing purposes uses tools such 
as keyword analysis, complaint detection, and alerts from online reviews or comments 
(Lee, 2018), all of which can be adapted to scan for paracrises. Based on Study 2's 
research findings, the author suggests that SNA should also be considered when 




given SMIs' predominate influence suggested in Study 2, an organization can identify 
SMIs and plot their ego networks. When scanning social media sites to identify SMIs, 
organizations should not overlook individual social media users with limited follower 
sizes. If such users are adept at generating content that corresponds to social media ethos 
and have strong relational connections with followers, they might actually be micro 
influencers with the potential to gain a large number of retweets. Digital-born media 
might also be SMIs, given that they played a critical role in spreading their coverage on 
#DeleteUber and were found to set the agenda for traditional media in recent studies 
(e.g., Vargo & Guo, 2017). Extra attention might be directed to SMIs whose content is 
able to travel to more than two reaches, which might signal the content is deemed  
worthy of sharing by various online communities. 
When assessing a paracrisis, it is also important to monitor traditional media, 
including their extensions on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. If  
traditional media reports hold an organization responsible for causing serious negative 
consequences, this might signal that a paracrisis might become a crisis.  
Non-real-time Media Monitoring  
The goals of non-real-time media monitoring are to keep an organization abreast 
of the publics' changing expectations for an organization’s social obligations and to 
identify different influencers that might shape a paracrisis' evolution process. 
Organizations are confronted with various challenges and accusations, as a multitude of 
stakeholders, such as customers, activists, NGOs, and the general public, have 




profits and engaging in charitable actions (Voegtlin & Pless, 2014). Addressing these 
online threats can be especially challenging when divisive, "hot button" issues are 
involved and influencers in an arena contribute contradictory voices.  
To proactively prepare for these paracrises, social media practitioners can 
regularly engage in non-real-time traditional and social media monitoring to track 
possible changes in social values, norms, and expectations concerning an organization's 
social obligations. Meanwhile, important influencers in the arenas of controversial or 
"hot button" issues (Luoma-aho & Vos, 2010) can be identified. When a paracrisis 
related to such issues arises, it is likely that a multitude of stakeholders could become 
active in the arena, communicating with, against, and past each other to compete for 
attention and influence. Knowledge on issue influencers gained before a paracrisis 
would allow practitioners to assess the salience (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) of 
different voices and understand their stances in a more timely fashion.  
According to an annual study on brands' social engagement conducted by 
Lithium Technologies in 2017, only one percent of the brands build relationships with 
advocates and influencers, who, according to a PR Newswire article (Lithium 
Technologies, 2017), would be a resource to turn to ''in the event of a social media 
crisis". Indeed, given SMIs' influence during the #DeleteUber paracrisis, after 
identifying influencers both in general and during paracrises, an organization might take 
one step further to cultivate relationships with powerful voices that might speak for, to, 




align with the organization, and digital-born media that can disseminate more credibly a 
company’s response to wider social media audiences.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation used two studies to gain insights into paracrisis communication 
practices (Study 1) the process of paracrisis evolution (Study 2). As with all research, 
both studies involve limitations. This section discusses the two studies' limitations and 
offers several suggestions for further research in this area. 
Study 1 
Study 1 presents  descriptive research that identifies the typologies of paracrisis 
clusters and response strategies and articulates their connections through examining a 
corpus of naturally-occurring cases. Although the research method was designed to 
enhance the external validity of the two typologies, theories on organizational paracrisis 
communication cannot be developed without taking analytic steps to test the 
effectiveness of response strategies. A series of experiments, quasi-experiments, and 
case studies could be conducted to test which single paracrisis response strategy or 
combined use of strategies is most effective to manage a certain paracrisis cluster, so that 
the descriptive framework identified in this study can be improved to offer practical 
suggestions as grounded in analytical research.   
This study also suggests that contextual factors might affect organizations' 
choices of response strategies but does not elaborate these contextual factors or examine 
the possible impacts of contextual impactors. Future research should examine further 




development and the selection of response strategies. This would require the collection 
and analysis of a large number of cases. Ideally, practitioners could be interviewed to 
gain their perspectives on the influence of contextual factors in decision making 
processes. It is likely that the contextual factors include the nature of underlying social 
issues, organizational resources, organizational values, industry, and national cultural 
differences. Scholars might also explore how these contextual factors could affect 
organizations' selection of response strategies, and moderate or mediate the effectiveness 
of organizations' public responses.  
Moreover, it may be necessary to consider if “effectiveness” in paracrisis 
communication is commensurate with “effectiveness” in crisis communication. 
Compared to typical indicators of effectiveness in crisis communication (e.g., word of 
mouth, behavioral intention, and reputation), is it possible that different dependent 
measures of effectiveness should be developed for paracrisis communication? For 
instance, challenge paracrises arising from divisive social issues perhaps are the most 
difficult to address, due to multiple, often conflicting voices in the arena. For such 
paracrises, do we need different assessments of response effectiveness? Future research 
that addresses the effectiveness of paracrisis response strategies might identify different 
dependent measures to examine if those outcomes would be a better fit for paracrisis 
communication.  
Moreover, consistent with the multivocal approach endorsed by RAT, the idea 
that voices will agree on what constitutes an effective response is questionable. 




organization. Since stakeholders differ in their salience (Mitchell et al., 1997), some 
voices may be valued more highly over others. Thus, when analyzing the effectiveness 
of an organization's public response, focused case study or experimental research might 
complicate the understanding of "publics" and examine different publics/voices' 
reactions.  
While it is important to generate knowledge on the "effectiveness" of 
organizations' public responses, it should also be noted that a paracrisis addressed by an 
organization might also be an issues management practice and/or part of a large-scale 
social movement pursued by activists. To align with a multivocal approach, critical 
lenses might be introduced to paracrisis communication to study whether and how the 
voices of various stakeholders may be marginalized in different sub-arenas, and what 
communication strategies might empower voices that are less heard.    
Because this study relied upon category descriptions based on previous research  
as well as new, researcher-generated clusters, assessments of coding reliabilities were 
needed. Intracoder reliability were computered to verify the consistency of the coder. 
Though confidence in the distinctiveness of category description and coding were 
augmented through definitions offered in the previous research (Coombs, 2017; 2018; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2012b, 2015a) as well as additions and refinements to the category 
descriptions, coding reliability should be a primary concern in future research. Future 
research should continue verify the reliability by assessing intercoder reliability as well 




Additionally, the reliability of the two typologies is only tested by through 
intracoder reliability. Although the author is confident in the reliability, reliability, 
because they were identified based on previous research  and the results for intracoder 
reliability are satisfying, a follow-up step would be to conduct intercoder reliability to 
further identify possible categorizing deficiencies, if any.  
Study 2 
Study 2 is also limited in only generating descriptive understanding on one single 
challenge paracrisis. First, since paracrises might evolve in unexpected and complicated 
ways, no conclusive guidelines can be drawn by only examining a high-profile challenge 
paracrisis that might be more complicated in evolution patterns than other clusters. To 
complicate scholars and practitioners' understanding on paracrisis evolutions, a series of 
paracrises can be examined, using similar methods employed in Study 2. Apart from 
studying challenge paracrises, other paracrisis such as faux pas and guilt by association, 
could also be investigated to explore possible differences in evolution patterns. 
Second, this study only examined the sub-arena of Twitter. The research finding 
on Twitter SMIs’ social media account features and ego network structures might not be 
generated to other platforms, as different social media sites features different 
technological affordance and user bases. Twitter might not represent public opinions in 
the wider world. Future research should study additional sub-arenas, including but not 
limited to social media sites, and investigate differences and possible dynamic 




Third, the operational definition of SMIs for Study 2 only focuses on the counts 
of retweets. Considering the publics' complicated motivations for retweeting (Macskassy 
& Michelson, 2011), future research can include other indicators, such as the publics' 
sentiment reactions to SMIs' original content. In addition to examining SMIs’ identities 
and ego network structures, the publics’ reaction to and interpretation of paracrises could 
also be studied to gain more nuanced insights on how various voices co-construct the 
processes of paracrisis communication.  
Study 2 analyzed traditional media coverage on the short-term and long-term 
consequences of the #DeleteUber incident, and concluded that this paracrisis did not 
evolve into a full-blown crisis. Case series studies could be conducted to explore 
situations where paracrises eventually turns into crises, so as to enrich our knowledge on 
antecedent variables that might contribute to paracrisis escalation. For example, would 
an inappropriate paracrisis response lead to a crisis? Would continuous attacks from 
powerful voices incur a crisis? When an organization experiences a series of paracrises 
(e.g., has a history of paracrises), would the organization eventually face a crisis due to 
the aggregated risks of each paracrisis?   
Additionally, are there cases where a paracrisis is prolongs as a crisis risk is not 
reduced or amplified? It is likely that in some situations, challengers and their supporters 
are persistent with their protests as they do not accept organizations' responses. Since the 
challenge has already been raised and addressed, would such situation still qualify as a 
paracrisis? Or would they fit better into the realm of issues management? Future 




issues management when a crisis risk tends to linger, so as to optimize the strategic 
efforts in these two connected fields.  
Study 2 contributes to RAT studies by shifting the focus from content to 
structures. But since the analysis on SMIs' attribute data suggest the importance of issue 
influencers in the sub-arena, future research might not only study the communication 
content of faithholders and hateholders who have strong preexisting attitudes towards an 
organization  but also the content of other powerful voices.  
This dissertation proposes two interrelated types of media monitoring in the 
context of paracrisis communication that might shed light on the practices. But the 
suggestions on media monitoring, especially social media monitoring are limited, 
because current research has not yet generate a thorough understanding on organizations'  
concerns and constraints on this area. Actually, a logistic limitation that might refrain 
crisis scholars from making more contribution to social media monitoring practices 
would be the lack of full access to either large companies' self-developed social media 
monitoring centers or popular social media monitoring tools. To address this 
shortcoming, more engaged scholarship research might be employed, so that scholars 
and practitioners could leverage different strengths to coproduce knowledge (Barge & 
Shockley-Zalabak, 2008). While large companies might resort to various resources to 
build and operate customized social media monitoring systems, many small 
organizations with limited revenues might experience greater uncertainty when selecting, 
applying, and adjusting various social media tools in the context of (para)crisis 




effective analytics and develop guidelines that would benefit similar organizations with 
pressing budget concerns.  
Conclusion 
From a social media company being charged for its use of unclean energy to a 
Twitter firestorm (Pfeffer, Zorbach, & Carley, 2014) on a Spanish fashion retailer’s 
insensitive product design, it seems that no organizations can be completely immune to 
paracrises. Rather than bemoaning challenges posted by online risks, organizations 
should always scan the social media environments to identify risks, monitor their 
evolution systematically and decide if, when, and how to make public responses.  
This dissertation enriches research on paracrisis communication as an 
understudied area of risk and crisis communication research by making theoretical, 
methodological, and practical contributions. Taken as a whole, this dissertation suggests 
that in today's complex environment, organizations should constantly monitor different 
voices interacting in paracrisis arenas, enact various response strategies accordingly, and 
at the same time, strive to be consistent with their organizational values and identities, 
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